Paul J. Saunders

Bio: Paul J. Saunders is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Treaty & Terrorism. The author has an hindex of 2, co-authored 3 publications receiving 12 citations.

Why "Globalization" Didn't Rescue Russia

Abstract: RUSSIA HAS NOT LIVED up to its hype. After nine years of independence and tens of billions of dollars in international assistance -- not to mention voluminous foreign advice -- Russia is far from having met the expectations of a bright future so widespread in 1991, the time of the fall of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Rather, Russia remains a poor, semi-authoritarian country -- a considerable disappointment. Boris Yeltsin's surprise resignation just over a year ago rekindled long-frustrated hopes for rapid improvement. Instead of the ailing and erratic Yeltsin, who appeared to lack both the will and the political muscle to advance a radical reform agenda in his last years in office, Russia would have a younger, more vigorous leader backed by a newly supportive parliament. In fact, on Vladimir Putin's first full day in office as president, President Clinton called the new Russian leader to tell him that he was "off to a good start" and that his appointment was "encouraging for democracy." Secretary of State Madeleine Albright soon said that she was impressed by his "can-do approach." Despite this initial optimism from Clinton administration officials, however, Russia's transformation under Putin has begun to look like one step forward and two steps back. While the country is experiencing modest economic growth, largely attributable to windfalls from high oil prices and a cheap currency, its political system and its foreign policy are increasingly troubling. The "dictatorship of law" proclaimed by the Russian president seems to be taking shape as simply a more effective version of the semiauthoritarian system created by Yeltsin; justice is still dispensed selectively and is used in full force only against political opponents of the regime. Internationally, Moscow seems to be strengthening its ties with former Soviet allies such as North Korea while reviving decades-old efforts to expand and exploit differences between Washington and European capitals. Taking into account these realities, we must ask why Russia has still not met the expectations that so many held for its future. Were our expectations realistic? If not, why not? What should we do? Great expectations THAT 1992 -- the first year of Russian independence -- should be a year of high hopes is hardly surprising. After all, the last months of 1991 were enormously exciting: They saw the end of 70 years of the Soviet empire and produced the enduring and heroic image of Boris Yeltsin fighting for freedom atop a tank in front of the Russian parliament building. The fact that the events of 1991 took place just after those of 1989, when communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, contributed to a widespread sense that democracy was sweeping the globe. But by the end of 1992, Russia was plagued with hyperinflation, sharp political conflict, and considerable human suffering. By the end of 1993, Yeltsin had illegally -- by his own admission in his memoir, The Struggle for Russia (1994) -- disbanded the Russian Supreme Soviet and written a new constitution granting vast powers to the country's president, himself. The years 1994 and 1995 brought further troubling developments, most notably Russia's first brutal war in Chechnya and the odious "loans-for-shares" privatization. Yet throughout this period, and well beyond it, great expectations persisted regarding the development of democracy, the market, and "partnership" with the United States. Why did these expectations endure? Part of the reason is, of course, that Russia was indeed making some progress. Since independence, Russia has held two presidential elections and three parliamentary elections. Each of these elections has been largely free, though most have been far from fair. Moreover, though cynical perspectives on Russia's underdeveloped democracy are widespread, many Russians have come to see elections as an essential component of their government's political legitimacy. …

The U.S. and Russia after Iraq

Abstract: THOUGH PRESIDENTS GEORGE W. BUSH and Vladimir V. Putin continue to express their desire to work together after sharp differences over Iraq, their governments have not yet managed to do so in a meaningful way. The two leaders seem likely to try to overcome their differences at their first meeting since the war on June x in St. Petersburg. Yet, even after that meeting, the future of the U.S.-Russian relationship will be somewhat uncertain. Before the flare up over Iraq, the United States and Russia enjoyed what some have described as their best relationship since Russian independence. Despite disagreements over the American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the second round of NATO enlargement, the strong personal connection between the two presidents and new cooperation in the war on terrorism had contributed to a sense of optimism that Washington and Moscow were finally on track to becoming real partners. As a result, Russia's assertive opposition to the U.S.-British war against Saddam Hus sein came as a particular shock to many in the United States (and confirmed the suspicions of those who were not shocked) -- and the impact has only been worsened by Moscow's thus-far obstructionist postwar conduct. Yet the relationship remains one of considerable importance to American national interests. The Kremlin's cooperation in the war in Afghanistan -- in sharing intelligence, stepping up its preexisting effort to arm the Northern Alliance, and setting aside earlier objections to a major U.S. military presence in the region -- significantly aided U.S. forces in the field. And a strong and sustainable relationship with Moscow can serve important and even vital American interests in many other areas, ranging from the war on terrorism to non-proliferation and international trade and investment. Conversely, a weak relationship with Russia could embolden "rogue states" hostile to the United States, return the United Nations Security Council to its Cold War uselessness, and expose Americans to additional danger from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. This raises two questions. What can be done to strengthen the U.S.-Russian relationship and put it on a more solid foundation? And, taking into account obvious and substantial differences with Moscow on some major international issues, how far can the relationship really go? What went wrong? ANY DISCUSSION OF improving the U.S.-Russian relationship should begin with an understanding of the status of the relationship today and analysis of "what went wrong" in American efforts to win Russian support for, or at least acquiescence to, the war in Iraq. Unfortunately, even before Iraq, neither Washington nor Moscow was satisfied with the progress in the relationship. American officials frequently complained that in the absence of Kremlin involvement, Russian government departments routinely obstructed effective collaboration. Russian officials similarly grumbled that only the White House could force action from Cold War-era bureaucrats in the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency. Analysts and commentators in both countries lamented excessive reliance on the personal relationship between the two presidents. Nevertheless, American and Russian officials continued to declare their commitment to building a strong U.S.-Russian relationship, and - despite reservations about the American use of force and concerns that Russia could face more terrorism after a war -- Moscow initially seemed inclined to accommodate the United States on Iraq, where Russian economic and other interests were significant but not first-order concerns. After their meeting in St. Petersburg in November, Presidents Bush and Putin issued a joint statement essentially reiterating the message of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 by calling on Iraq "to completely and immediately comply" with all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions or "face serious consequences. …

A Climate Policy for the Real World

Abstract: GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WORLDWIDE are trying to put the best face on the 2010 United Nations climate change negotiations in Cancun, especially after 2009's debacle in Copenhagen. But the talks produced little real progress and led many to wonder whether the two global climate meetings represent a necessary, albeit somewhat sideways step in the long process towards an eventual global treaty reducing greenhouse gases or, alternatively, the gradual and unsurprising end to a nearly twenty-year effort to achieve binding international mandates. Advocates of a binding global treaty on greenhouse gas emissions are divided over the importance of the new agreement coming out of Cancun. For any who might harbor doubts, the Obama administration's approach to the negotiations is revealing: Neither the president nor the secretary of state (nor the vice president, for that matter) traveled to Mexico, leaving the negotiations in the hands of State Department Special Envoy Todd Stern. Key congressional leaders also skipped this year's talks. The administration's reduced emphasis on the UN meetings, and continuing international disagreements over climate change, demonstrate an uncomfortable fact for many greens: U.S. efforts to stem climate change thus far have largely vindicated the Bush administration's approach to global action on climate change during its final years. The failures of the high-profile Copenhagen talks--and of U.S. domestic legislation--reflect structural political and economic realities that will be profoundly difficult to overcome, if they can be overcome at all. Obama would do well to understand the lessons of Copenhagen and cap-and-trade and move on to a more practical approach--especially after the 2010 midterm elections. The pragmatic wing of the activist community has cautiously praised the Cancun summit, which produced a deal that brought a voluntary international climate agreement reached on the margins in Copenhagen inside the UN process and created a fund to help poor developing countries reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and manage the consequences of a warming Earth. At the other end of the spectrum, the climate movement's doctrinaire ideologues have denounced the talks' failure to produce a binding agreement on deep reductions. They are all the more bitter after the Copenhagen fiasco, years of resentment of the Bush administration's approach, and earlier surety that the Democrats controlling the White House and the Congress would accomplish what the prior Republican president was unwilling to try. The fact that they have no "Plan B" for addressing the climate problem--and apparently cannot conceive of a solution other than unprecedented and therefore very unlikely global regulation--only adds to their frustration. Equally troubling to both of these camps is the Kyoto Protocol's looming expiration in 2012, with its results limited and no follow-on arrangements in place. Since Kyoto's modest emissions targets were secondary to its goal of establishing a global system for deeper future reductions, supporters of binding international targets and timetables for emissions are alarmed by the relentless ticking of the clock. Compounding activists' worries is the refusal of key parties to the Kyoto Protocol--including Japan and Russia--to agree to an extension through a new so-called "commitment period." Japan sensibly refuses to accept deeper emissions reductions without commitments from the United States and China. Russia--whose ratification brought Kyoto across the threshold that made the pact legally binding--seems more interested in its ability to sell emissions credits than in preventing climate change. Moscow was an enormous beneficiary of Kyoto's 1990 base year for measuring emissions reductions; the combination of the Soviet Union's vast and highly inefficient industrial base and Russia's subsequent economic collapse meant that the country did not have to do anything to meet its targets and could sell both its natural gas and its leftover emissions to Europe. …

Cold War ideational legacies and contemporary US foreign policy towards Russia

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The Impact of Globalization Chances and Risks for Russia as a Transformation Country

Abstract: The process of economic transformation brought dramatic changes to Russia's society and economy. The disappointing economic results of the first decade of transformation, which brought macroeconomic instability and increasing poverty and inequality, are often understood as results of Russia's opening in the context of globalization. In this article, the impact of globalization on Russia is discussed, and it is shown that responsibility for the economic crisis is not globalization but a combination of the legacy of the centrally planned economy, together with incorrect policy choices after the beginning of transformation. Early attempts to transform Russia using shock therapy and applying a few guidelines dubbed the "Washington consensus" failed due to the complexity of institutional change. But this does not mean a failure of the market economy and is not at all an inevitable consequence of globalization, as popular misconceptions would imply. In this article, an alternative view of globalization is offer...

The Digital Divide

Abstract: The term digital divide has a narrow sense, which focuses on the unevenness of access to the Internet or perhaps to differences between groups in computer ownership levels (occurring in both homes and schools). In this paper, however, it also refers to a disparity in awareness, expertise, and use of computers between two or more societies as well as among groups within a single society. The ensuing treatment will attempt to highlight the main issues of this phenomenon in the allotted space, by providing a wide-scope framework (and taxonomy) for discussion. The digital divide is usually seen as a subspecies or mere consequence of the general economic or developmental divide, but there are other philosophical and sociological factors involved as well. It is, of course, an important problem because of a potential missed opportunity on the part of millions of people to obtain desirable jobs and enhance their lives by using computers and the Internet. Various explanations of this phenomenon will be assayed and analyzed, with the primary aim of examining several issues raised by this divide in a factually based, yet philosophical manner, rather than engaging in an empirical study. First, the types of disparity along with their associated causal factors will be discussed; then possible resolutions of the problem will be offered.

Russia And Globalization

Abstract: Globalization dramatically changed Russia and prompted its return to the global market economy on terms largely dictated by the West. The post-communist transition transformed not only the country's economic and political systems but also the state-society articulation at large. Russia's complete abandonment of socialist ethics cost the country and its people dearly. While neoliberal economists regard globalization as a worldwide advance in terms of economic efficiency and human enlightenment, the Russian example shows that the process can also be catastrophic and intrinsically unethical.