Paul K. J. Han

Bio: Paul K. J. Han is an academic researcher from Maine Medical Center. The author has contributed to research in topics: Risk perception & Population. The author has an hindex of 43, co-authored 165 publications receiving 7324 citations. Previous affiliations of Paul K. J. Han include University of Pittsburgh & National Institutes of Health.

How numeracy influences risk comprehension and medical decision making.

Abstract: We review the growing literature on health numeracy, the ability to understand and use numerical information, and its relation to cognition, health behaviors, and medical outcomes. Despite the surfeit of health information from commercial and noncommercial sources, national and international surveys show that many people lack basic numerical skills that are essential to maintain their health and make informed medical decisions. Low numeracy distorts perceptions of risks and benefits of screening, reduces medication compliance, impedes access to treatments, impairs risk communication (limiting prevention efforts among the most vulnerable), and, based on the scant research conducted on outcomes, appears to adversely affect medical outcomes. Low numeracy is also associated with greater susceptibility to extraneous factors (i.e., factors that do not change the objective numerical information). That is, low numeracy increases susceptibility to effects of mood or how information is presented (e.g., as frequencies vs. percentages) and to biases in judgment and decision making (e.g., framing and ratio bias effects). Much of this research is not grounded in empirically supported theories of numeracy or mathematical cognition, which are crucial for designing evidence-based policies and interventions that are effective in reducing risk and improving medical decision making. To address this gap, we outline four theoretical approaches (psychophysical, computational, standard dual-process, and fuzzy trace theory), review their implications for numeracy, and point to avenues for future research.

Varieties of Uncertainty in Health Care: A Conceptual Taxonomy

Abstract: Uncertainty is a pervasive and important problem that has attracted increasing attention in health care, given the growing emphasis on evidence-based medicine, shared decision making, and patient-centered care. However, our understanding of this problem is limited, in part because of the absence of a unified, coherent concept of uncertainty. There are multiple meanings and varieties of uncertainty in health care that are not often distinguished or acknowledged although each may have unique effects or warrant different courses of action. The literature on uncertainty in health care is thus fragmented, and existing insights have been incompletely translated to clinical practice. This article addresses this problem by synthesizing diverse theoretical and empirical literature from the fields of communication, decision science, engineering, health services research, and psychology and developing a new integrative conceptual taxonomy of uncertainty. A 3-dimensional taxonomy is proposed that characterizes uncertainty in health care according to its fundamental sources, issues, and locus. It is shown how this new taxonomy facilitates an organized approach to the problem of uncertainty in health care by clarifying its nature and prognosis and suggesting appropriate strategies for its analysis and management.

A three-talk model for shared decision making: multistage consultation process

Abstract: OBJECTIVES To revise an existing three-talk model for learning how to achieve shared decision making, and to consult with relevant stakeholders to update and obtain wider engagement. DESIGN Multistage consultation process. SETTING Key informant group, communities of interest, and survey of clinical specialties. PARTICIPANTS 19 key informants, 153 member responses from multiple communities of interest, and 316 responses to an online survey from medically qualified clinicians from six specialties. RESULTS After extended consultation over three iterations, we revised the three-talk model by making changes to one talk category, adding the need to elicit patient goals, providing a clear set of tasks for each talk category, and adding suggested scripts to illustrate each step. A new three-talk model of shared decision making is proposed, based on “team talk,” “option talk,” and “decision talk,” to depict a process of collaboration and deliberation. Team talk places emphasis on the need to provide support to patients when they are made aware of choices, and to elicit their goals as a means of guiding decision making processes. Option talk refers to the task of comparing alternatives, using risk communication principles. Decision talk refers to the task of arriving at decisions that reflect the informed preferences of patients, guided by the experience and expertise of health professionals. CONCLUSIONS The revised three-talk model of shared decision making depicts conversational steps, initiated by providing support when introducing options, followed by strategies to compare and discuss trade-offs, before deliberation based on informed preferences.

Presenting quantitative information about decision outcomes: a risk communication primer for patient decision aid developers

Abstract: Making evidence-based decisions often requires comparison of two or more options. Research-based evidence may exist which quantifies how likely the outcomes are for each option. Understanding these numeric estimates improves patients’ risk perception and leads to better informed decision making. This paper summarises current “best practices” in communication of evidence-based numeric outcomes for developers of patient decision aids (PtDAs) and other health communication tools. An expert consensus group of fourteen researchers from North America, Europe, and Australasia identified eleven main issues in risk communication. Two experts for each issue wrote a “state of the art” summary of best evidence, drawing on the PtDA, health, psychological, and broader scientific literature. In addition, commonly used terms were defined and a set of guiding principles and key messages derived from the results. The eleven key components of risk communication were: 1) Presenting the chance an event will occur; 2) Presenting changes in numeric outcomes; 3) Outcome estimates for test and screening decisions; 4) Numeric estimates in context and with evaluative labels; 5) Conveying uncertainty; 6) Visual formats; 7) Tailoring estimates; 8) Formats for understanding outcomes over time; 9) Narrative methods for conveying the chance of an event; 10) Important skills for understanding numerical estimates; and 11) Interactive web-based formats. Guiding principles from the evidence summaries advise that risk communication formats should reflect the task required of the user, should always define a relevant reference class (i.e., denominator) over time, should aim to use a consistent format throughout documents, should avoid “1 in x” formats and variable denominators, consider the magnitude of numbers used and the possibility of format bias, and should take into account the numeracy and graph literacy of the audience. A substantial and rapidly expanding evidence base exists for risk communication. Developers of tools to facilitate evidence-based decision making should apply these principles to improve the quality of risk communication in practice.

Varieties of Uncertainty in Health Care

Abstract: Uncertainty is a pervasive and important problem that has attracted increasing attention in health care, given the growing emphasis on evidence-based medicine, shared decision making, and patient-centered care. However, our understanding of this problem is limited, in part because of the absence of a unified, coherent concept of uncertainty. There are multiple meanings and varieties of uncertainty in health care that are not often distinguished or acknowledged although each may have unique effects or warrant different courses of action. The literature on uncertainty in health care is thus fragmented, and existing insights have been incompletely translated to clinical practice. This article addresses this problem by synthesizing diverse theoretical and empirical literature from the fields of communication, decision science, engineering, health services research, and psychology and developing a new integrative conceptual taxonomy of uncertainty. A 3-dimensional taxonomy is proposed that characterizes uncert...

Decision aids for people facing health treatment or screening decisions

Abstract: Background Decision aids are intended to help people participate in decisions that involve weighing the benefits and harms of treatment options often with scientific uncertainty. Objectives To assess the effects of decision aids for people facing treatment or screening decisions. Search methods For this update, we searched from 2009 to June 2012 in MEDLINE; CENTRAL; EMBASE; PsycINFO; and grey literature. Cumulatively, we have searched each database since its start date including CINAHL (to September 2008). Selection criteria We included published randomized controlled trials of decision aids, which are interventions designed to support patients' decision making by making explicit the decision, providing information about treatment or screening options and their associated outcomes, compared to usual care and/or alternative interventions. We excluded studies of participants making hypothetical decisions. Data collection and analysis Two review authors independently screened citations for inclusion, extracted data, and assessed risk of bias. The primary outcomes, based on the International Patient Decision Aid Standards (IPDAS), were: A) 'choice made' attributes; B) 'decision-making process' attributes. Secondary outcomes were behavioral, health, and health-system effects. We pooled results using mean differences (MD) and relative risks (RR), applying a random-effects model. Main results This update includes 33 new studies for a total of 115 studies involving 34,444 participants. For risk of bias, selective outcome reporting and blinding of participants and personnel were mostly rated as unclear due to inadequate reporting. Based on 7 items, 8 of 115 studies had high risk of bias for 1 or 2 items each. Of 115 included studies, 88 (76.5%) used at least one of the IPDAS effectiveness criteria: A) 'choice made' attributes criteria: knowledge scores (76 studies); accurate risk perceptions (25 studies); and informed value-based choice (20 studies); and B) 'decision-making process' attributes criteria: feeling informed (34 studies) and feeling clear about values (29 studies). A) Criteria involving 'choice made' attributes: Compared to usual care, decision aids increased knowledge (MD 13.34 out of 100; 95% confidence interval (CI) 11.17 to 15.51; n = 42). When more detailed decision aids were compared to simple decision aids, the relative improvement in knowledge was significant (MD 5.52 out of 100; 95% CI 3.90 to 7.15; n = 19). Exposure to a decision aid with expressed probabilities resulted in a higher proportion of people with accurate risk perceptions (RR 1.82; 95% CI 1.52 to 2.16; n = 19). Exposure to a decision aid with explicit values clarification resulted in a higher proportion of patients choosing an option congruent with their values (RR 1.51; 95% CI 1.17 to 1.96; n = 13). B) Criteria involving 'decision-making process' attributes: Decision aids compared to usual care interventions resulted in: a) lower decisional conflict related to feeling uninformed (MD -7.26 of 100; 95% CI -9.73 to -4.78; n = 22) and feeling unclear about personal values (MD -6.09; 95% CI -8.50 to -3.67; n = 18); b) reduced proportions of people who were passive in decision making (RR 0.66; 95% CI 0.53 to 0.81; n = 14); and c) reduced proportions of people who remained undecided post-intervention (RR 0.59; 95% CI 0.47 to 0.72; n = 18). Decision aids appeared to have a positive effect on patient-practitioner communication in all nine studies that measured this outcome. For satisfaction with the decision (n = 20), decision-making process (n = 17), and/or preparation for decision making (n = 3), those exposed to a decision aid were either more satisfied, or there was no difference between the decision aid versus comparison interventions. No studies evaluated decision-making process attributes for helping patients to recognize that a decision needs to be made, or understanding that values affect the choice. C) Secondary outcomes Exposure to decision aids compared to usual care reduced the number of people of choosing major elective invasive surgery in favour of more conservative options (RR 0.79; 95% CI 0.68 to 0.93; n = 15). Exposure to decision aids compared to usual care reduced the number of people choosing to have prostate-specific antigen screening (RR 0.87; 95% CI 0.77 to 0.98; n = 9). When detailed compared to simple decision aids were used, fewer people chose menopausal hormone therapy (RR 0.73; 95% CI 0.55 to 0.98; n = 3). For other decisions, the effect on choices was variable. The effect of decision aids on length of consultation varied from 8 minutes shorter to 23 minutes longer (median 2.55 minutes longer) with 2 studies indicating statistically-significantly longer, 1 study shorter, and 6 studies reporting no difference in consultation length. Groups of patients receiving decision aids do not appear to differ from comparison groups in terms of anxiety (n = 30), general health outcomes (n = 11), and condition-specific health outcomes (n = 11). The effects of decision aids on other outcomes (adherence to the decision, costs/resource use) were inconclusive. Authors' conclusions There is high-quality evidence that decision aids compared to usual care improve people's knowledge regarding options, and reduce their decisional conflict related to feeling uninformed and unclear about their personal values. There is moderate-quality evidence that decision aids compared to usual care stimulate people to take a more active role in decision making, and improve accurate risk perceptions when probabilities are included in decision aids, compared to not being included. There is low-quality evidence that decision aids improve congruence between the chosen option and the patient's values. New for this updated review is further evidence indicating more informed, values-based choices, and improved patient-practitioner communication. There is a variable effect of decision aids on length of consultation. Consistent with findings from the previous review, decision aids have a variable effect on choices. They reduce the number of people choosing discretionary surgery and have no apparent adverse effects on health outcomes or satisfaction. The effects on adherence with the chosen option, cost-effectiveness, use with lower literacy populations, and level of detail needed in decision aids need further evaluation. Little is known about the degree of detail that decision aids need in order to have a positive effect on attributes of the choice made, or the decision-making process.

Thinking fast and slow.

Abstract: In 1974 an article appeared in Science magazine with the dry-sounding title “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” by a pair of psychologists who were not well known outside their discipline of decision theory. In it Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman introduced the world to Prospect Theory, which mapped out how humans actually behave when faced with decisions about gains and losses, in contrast to how economists assumed that people behave. Prospect Theory turned Economics on its head by demonstrating through a series of ingenious experiments that people are much more concerned with losses than they are with gains, and that framing a choice from one perspective or the other will result in decisions that are exactly the opposite of each other, even if the outcomes are monetarily the same. Prospect Theory led cognitive psychology in a new direction that began to uncover other human biases in thinking that are probably not learned but are part of our brain’s wiring.

Standards for educational and psychological testing

Abstract: Pedagosko i psiholosko testiranje i procjenjivanje spadaju među najvažnije doprinose znanosti o ponasanju nasem drustvu i pružaju temeljna i znacajna poboljsanja u odnosu na ranije postupke. Iako se ne može ustvrditi da su svi testovi dovoljno usavrseni niti da su sva testiranja razborita i korisna, postoji velika kolicina informacija koje ukazuju na ucinkovitost kvalitetnih instrumenata u onim situacijama u kojima je njihovo koristenje potkrijepljeno validacijskim podacima. Pravilna upotreba testova može dovesti do boljih odluka o pojedincima i programima nego sto bi to bio slucaj bez njihovog koristenja, a također i ukazati na put za siri i pravedniji pristup obrazovanju i zaposljavanju. Međutim, losa upotreba testova može dovesti do zamjetne stete nanesene ispitanicima i drugim sudionicima u procesu donosenja odluka na temelju testovnih podataka. Cilj Standarda je promoviranje kvalitetne i eticne upotrebe testova te uspostavljanje osnovice za ocjenu kvalitete postupaka testiranja. Svrha objavljivanja Standarda je uspostavljanje kriterija za evaluaciju testova, provedbe testiranja i posljedica upotrebe testova. Iako bi evaluacija prikladnosti testa ili njegove primjene trebala ovisiti prvenstveno o strucnim misljenjima, Standardi pružaju okvir koji osigurava obuhvacanje svih relevantnih pitanja. Bilo bi poželjno da svi autori, sponzori, nakladnici i korisnici profesionalnih testova usvoje Standarde te da poticu druge da ih također prihvate.