Paul Pollard

Bio: Paul Pollard is an academic researcher from University of Central Lancashire. The author has contributed to research in topics: Belief bias & Response bias. The author has an hindex of 15, co-authored 21 publications receiving 1730 citations.

On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning.

Abstract: Three experiments are reported that investigate the weighting attached to logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Substantial belief biases were observed despite controls for possible conversions of the premises. Equally substantial effects of logic were observed despite controls for two possible response biases. A consistent interaction between belief and logic was also recorded; belief bias was more marked on invalid than on valid syllogisms. In all experiments, verbal protocols were recorded and analyzed. These protocols are interpreted in some cases as providing rationalizations for prejudiced decisions and, in other cases, as reflecting a genuine process of premise to conclusion reasoning. In the latter cases, belief bias was minimal but still present. Similarly, even subjects who focus primarily on the conclusion are influenced to an extent by the logic. Thus a conflict between logic and belief is observed throughout, but at several levels of extent.

Judgements about victims and attackers in depicted rapes: a review.

Abstract: This paper reviews the effects on subjects' judgements of a variety of factors that have been included in experimental depictions of rape. The focus is on attribution of responsibility or fault to the victim or attacker and related judgements, particularly regarding guilt and sanctions. Generally, females make more pro-victim judgements than do males, and people with non-traditional sex-role attitudes make more pro-victim judgements than do holders of more traditional views. Other factors covered are various victim characteristics, victim-attacker acquaintance, resistance, and victim attire and a range of behaviours prior to the attack. There are limits to generalization due to populations studied and methods used, and the observed effects of several factors are either minimal or inconsistent. However, some factors have reliable effects on judgements, which it is argued are explainable in terms of their link with traditional beliefs about women's rights and roles. Males have often been found to be more susceptible to these effects. In particular, it appears that if a female engages in any behaviour deemed to be ‘incautious’ that results in victimization then she may be perceived to be at fault, even though these behaviours would be ‘legitimate’ for males, and that prior romantic involvement with the attacker mitigates the perceived seriousness of, and may even be seen as supplying justification for, a sexual attack. The existence of these attitudes implies that rape may be tacitly condoned in many situations.

Debiasing by instruction: The case of belief bias

Abstract: The study is concerned with the question of whether robust biases in reasoning can be reduced or eliminated by verbal instruction in principles of reasoning. Three experiments are reported in which the effect of instructions upon the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning is investigated. Belief bias is most clearly marked by a tendency for subjects to accept invalid conclusions which are a priori believable. Experiment 1 attempted to replicate and extend an experiment reported by Newstead, Pollard, Evans and Allen (1992). In contrast with their experiment, it was found that belief bias was maintained despite the use of augmented instructions which emphasised the principle of logical necessity. Experiment 2 provided an exact replication of the augmented instructions condition of Newstead et al., including the presence of problems with belief-neutral conclusions. Once again, significant effects of conclusion believability were found. A third experiment examined the use of elaborated instructi...

Content and context effects in reasoning.

Abstract: Griggs and Cox (1982) reported a phrasing of the Wason selection task that produces considerable facilitation. Two experiments are reported here that break down aspects of this problem in an attempt to determine the key to this effect. In the first experiment, it is shown that neither the content of drinks and age per se, nor the evocation of a detective set alone, is responsible. The second experiment focuses more closely on the original Griggs and Cox design and shows that neither (a) the presence of alcoholic and nonalcoholic drinks and the legal age as content in the problem, nor (b) the specific scenario of people drinking in a bar and a policeman enforcing the law, appears to be solely responsible for the effect. There is, however, some indication that the scenario may be more important than the content. Results are interpreted as indicating that for orientation toward counter-examples to be observed, the context (or scenario) of the problem must relate to a type of situation that subjects have previously experienced and for which they have learned appropriate testing behavior. The content need not be previously experienced as long as it is clearly appropriate to that general type of situation.

Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition

Abstract: This article reviews a diverse set of proposals for dual processing in higher cognition within largely disconnected literatures in cognitive and social psychology. All these theories have in common the distinction between cognitive processes that are fast, automatic, and unconscious and those that are slow, deliberative, and conscious. A number of authors have recently suggested that there may be two architecturally (and evolutionarily) distinct cognitive systems underlying these dual-process accounts. However, it emerges that (a) there are multiple kinds of implicit processes described by different theorists and (b) not all of the proposed attributes of the two kinds of processing can be sensibly mapped on to two systems as currently conceived. It is suggested that while some dual-process theories are concerned with parallel competing processes involving explicit and implicit knowledge systems, others are concerned with the influence of preconscious processes that contextualize and shape deliberative reasoning and decision-making.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Abstract: A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

The empirical case for two systems of reasoning.

Abstract: Distinctions have been proposed between systems of reasoning for centuries. This article distills properties shared by many of these distinctions and characterizes the resulting systems in light of recent findings and theoretical developments. One system is associative because its computations reflect similarity structure and relations of temporal contiguity. The other is "rule based" because it operates on symbolic structures that have logical content and variables and because its computations have the properties that are normally assigned to rules. The systems serve complementary functions and can simultaneously generate different solutions to a reasoning problem. The rule-based system can suppress the associative system but not completely inhibit it. The article reviews evidence in favor of the distinction and its characterization. One of the oldest conundrums in psychology is whether people are best conceived as parallel processors of information who operate along diffuse associative links or as analysts who operate by deliberate and sequential manipulation of internal representations. Are inferences drawn through a network of learned associative pathways or through application of a kind of"psychologic" that manipulates symbolic tokens in a rule-governed way? The debate has raged (again) in cognitive psychology for almost a decade now. It has pitted those who prefer models of mental phenomena to be built out of networks of associative devices that pass activation around in parallel and distributed form (the way brains probably function) against those who prefer models built out of formal languages in which symbols are composed into sentences that are processed sequentially (the way computers function). An obvious solution to the conundrum is to conceive of the

Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.

Abstract: Perhaps the simplest and the most basic qualitative law of probability is the conjunction rule: The probability of a conjunction, P (A&B) cannot exceed the probabilities of its constituents, P (A) and P (B), because the extension (or the possibility set) of the conjunction is included in the extension of its constituents. Judgments under uncertainty, however, are often mediated by intuitive heuristics that are not bound by the conjunction rule. A conjunction can be more representative than one of its constituents, and instances of a specific category can be easier to imagine or to retrieve than instances of a more inclusive category. The representativeness and availability heuristics therefore can make a conjunction appear more probable than one of its constituents. This phenomenon is demonstrated in a variety of contexts including estimation of word frequency, personality judgment, medical prognosis, decision under risk, suspicion of criminal acts, and political forecasting. Systematic violations of the conjunction rule are observed in judgments of lay people and of experts in both between-subjects and within-subjects comparisons. Alternative interpretations of the conjunction fallacy are discussed and attempts to combat it are explored.

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

Abstract: Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.