P
Paulo Tabuada
Researcher at University of California, Los Angeles
Publications - 300
Citations - 25801
Paulo Tabuada is an academic researcher from University of California, Los Angeles. The author has contributed to research in topics: Control system & Control theory. The author has an hindex of 60, co-authored 288 publications receiving 20444 citations. Previous affiliations of Paulo Tabuada include University of California, Berkeley & Instituto Superior Técnico.
Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
Symbolic Models for Nonlinear Control Systems Without Stability Assumptions
TL;DR: A new abstraction technique is proposed that is applicable to any nonlinear sampled-data control system as long as the authors are only interested in its behavior in a compact set.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
On event-triggered and self-triggered control over sensor/actuator networks
Manuel Mazo,Paulo Tabuada +1 more
TL;DR: Two novel distributed implementations of event-triggered and self- Triggered policies over sensor/actuator networks are introduced and their performance in terms of energy expenditure is discussed.
Journal ArticleDOI
Robustness of Control Barrier Functions for Safety Critical Control
TL;DR: This paper develops several important extensions to the notion of a control barrier function, including conditions for the control law obtained by solving the quadratic program to be Lipschitz continuous and therefore to gives rise to well-defined solutions of the resulting closed-loop system.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Robustness of Attack-Resilient State Estimators
Miroslav Pajic,James Weimer,Nicola Bezzo,Paulo Tabuada,Oleg Sokolsky,Insup Lee,George J. Pappas +6 more
TL;DR: This work presents a method for state estimation in presence of attacks, for systems with noise and modeling errors, and describes how implementation issues such as jitter, latency and synchronization errors can be mapped into parameters of the state estimation procedure that describe modeling errors.
Book ChapterDOI
Non-invasive spoofing attacks for anti-lock braking systems
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe the development of a prototype ABS spoofer to enable such attacks and the potential consequences of remaining vulnerable to these attacks and demonstrate one way in which an attacker can inject magnetic fields to both cancel the true measured signal and inject a malicious signal, thus spoofing the measured wheel speeds.