Per Östberg

Bio: Per Östberg is an academic researcher from University of Zurich. The author has contributed to research in topics: Shareholder & Stock market. The author has an hindex of 10, co-authored 20 publications receiving 459 citations. Previous affiliations of Per Östberg include Swiss Finance Institute & Norwegian School of Economics.

Money and Liquidity in Financial Markets

Abstract: We argue that there is a connection between the interbank market for liquidity and the broader financial markets, which has its basis in demand for liquidity by banks. Tightness in the interbank market for liquidity leads banks to engage in what we term “liquidity pull-back,” which involves selling financial assets either by banks directly or by levered investors. Empirical tests on the stock market are supportive. Tighter interbank markets are associated with relatively more volume in more liquid stocks; selling pressure, especially in more liquid stocks; and transitory negative returns. We control for market-wide uncertainty and in the process also contribute to the literature on portfolio rebalancing. Our general point is that money matters in financial markets.

The Shareholder Base and Payout Policy

Abstract: We examine the relation between the shareholder base and payout policy. Consistent with the idea that the shareholder base is related to the cost of external financing we find that firms with small shareholder bases have lower payout levels and maintain higher cash holdings. We show that undertaking an open market repurchase results in a significant reduction in the size of the shareholder base. Consequently, we find that firms with small shareholder bases are less likely to undertake a repurchase (reduce the shareholder base even further) and are more likely to pay special dividends.

When Does Information Asymmetry Affect the Cost of Capital

Abstract: This paper examines when information asymmetry among investors affects the cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors. When equity markets are perfectly competitive, information asymmetry has no separate effect on the cost of capital. When markets are imperfect, information asymmetry can have a separate effect on firms’ cost of capital. Consistent with our prediction, we find that information asymmetry has a positive relation with firms’ cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors when markets are imperfect and no relation when markets approximate perfect competition. Overall, our results show that the degree of market competition is an important conditioning variable to consider when examining the relation between information asymmetry and cost of capital.

Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders

Abstract: Posttakeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free‐riding by the target shareholders lead the former to acquire as few sharcs as necessary to gain control. As moral hazard is most severe under such low ownership concentration, inefficiencies arise in successful takeovers. Moreover, share supply is shown to be upward‐sloping. Rules promoting ownership concentration limit both agency costs and the occurrence of takeovers. Furthermore, higher takeover premia induced by competition translate into higher ownership concen‐tration and are thus beneficial. Finally, one share‐one vote and simple majority are generally not optimal, and socially optimal rules need not emerge through private contracting.

When Does Information Asymmetry Affect the Cost of Capital

Abstract: This paper examines when information asymmetry among investors affects the cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors. When equity markets are perfectly competitive, information asymmetry has no separate effect on the cost of capital. When markets are imperfect, information asymmetry can have a separate effect on firms’ cost of capital. Consistent with our prediction, we find that information asymmetry has a positive relation with firms’ cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors when markets are imperfect and no relation when markets approximate perfect competition. Overall, our results show that the degree of market competition is an important conditioning variable to consider when examining the relation between information asymmetry and cost of capital.

Stock Repurchases in Canada: Performance and Strategic Trading

Abstract: During the 1980s, U.S. firms that announced stock repurchase programs earned favorable long-run returns. Recently, concerns have been raised regarding the robustness of these findings. This comes at a time of explosive worldwide growth in the adoption of repurchase programs. This study provides out-of-sample evidence for 1,060 Canadian repurchase programs announced between 1989 and 1997. As in the U.S., the Canadian stock market seems to discount the information contained in repurchase announcements. Value stocks announcing repurchase programs have particularly favorable returns. Canadian law requires companies to report how many shares they repurchase on a monthly basis. We find that managers are sensitive to mispricing as completion rates are higher in cases where undervaluation may be a more important factor. Moreover, trades are linked to price movements; managers buy more shares when prices fall and reduce their buying when prices rise.

The impact of the dimensions of social performance on firm risk

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of the individual dimensions of social performance (SP) on firm risk (total and idiosyncratic) using 16,599 firm-year observations over the period 1991–2007. We find that firm risk for S&P500 members is positively affected by Employee, Diversity, and Corporate Governance concerns. On the other hand, Community (Diversity) strengths negatively (positively) affect their risk. As to non-S&P500 members, firm risk is positively affected by Employee concerns and Diversity strengths. However, firm risk of non-S&P500 members is negatively affected by Environment strengths. The direction of causation between firm risk and SP depends on the dimension examined.