Author
Peter F. Pope
Other affiliations: University of London, University of Strathclyde, Lancaster University ...read more
Bio: Peter F. Pope is an academic researcher from Bocconi University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Earnings & Valuation (finance). The author has an hindex of 43, co-authored 142 publications receiving 7290 citations. Previous affiliations of Peter F. Pope include University of London & University of Strathclyde.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: The authors examined whether the incidence of earnings management by UK firms depends on board monitoring and found that the likelihood of managers making income-increasing abnormal accruals to avoid reporting losses and earnings reductions is negatively related to the proportion of outsiders on the board.
Abstract: This paper examines whether the incidence of earnings management by UK firms depends on board monitoring. We focus on two aspects of board monitoring: the role of outside board members and the audit committee. Results indicate that the likelihood of managers making income-increasing abnormal accruals to avoid reporting losses and earnings reductions is negatively related to the proportion of outsiders on the board. We also find that the chance of abnormal accruals being large enough to turn a loss into a profit or to ensure that profit does not decline is significantly lower for firms with a high proportion of outside board members. In contrast, we find little evidence that outside directors influence income-decreasing abnormal accruals when pre-managed earnings are high. We find no evidence that the presence of an audit committee directly affects the extent of income-increasing manipulations to meet or exceed these thresholds. Neither do audit committees appear to have a direct effect on the degree of downward manipulation, when pre-managed earnings exceed thresholds by a large margin. Our findings suggest that boards contribute towards the integrity of financial statements, as predicted by agency theory.
861 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare the timeliness and conservatism of reported earnings across the U.S. and U.K. GAAP regimes, and find that the degree of conservatism of the US GAAP regime appears significantly greater than for the UK, when estimated using ordinary earnings.
Abstract: In this study we compare the timeliness and conservatism of reported earnings across the U.S. and U.K. GAAP regimes. We present a theoretical model of the differential speeds of recognition of good news and bad news. This suggests informative and relatively robust ways of measuring dimensions of conservatism in income recognition. The analysis shows the importance of distinguishing between delays in reporting good news and early recognition of bad news, when comparing conservatism across GAAP regimes. Empirical results suggest that the treatment of extraordinary items is important in assessing relative conservatism. The degree of conservatism of the U.S. GAAP regime appears significantly greater than for the U.K. GAAP regime, when estimated using ordinary earnings. However, when conservatism is estimated using earnings after extraordinary items we find that the gap is far less pronounced, and may even disappear. Our results further indicate that the main feature distinguishing the timeliness of earnings between the U.S. and U.K. is not the relative speed of recognition of bad news, but the much slower recognition of good news under U.S. GAAP.
458 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors test whether the association between board composition and earnings management activity differs between the pre- and post-Cadbury periods using a constant sample, and they find no evidence of an association between the degree of accrual management and the composition of the board of directors in the pre Cadbury period, while results for the post-cadbury period indicate less income-increasing acculal management to avoid earnings losses or earnings declines when the proportion of non-executive directors is high.
Abstract: Central to both the Cadbury Committee’s initial remit and its subsequent recommendations is the view that director integrity and board effectiveness play key roles in ensuring the quality and reliability of published financial statements. Using a constant sample, this paper tests whether the association between board composition and earnings management activity differs between the pre- and post-Cadbury periods. Earnings management is measured by the use of income-increasing abnormal accruals when unmanaged earnings undershoot target earnings. Results provide evidence of accrual management to meet earnings targets in both periods. However, while we find no evidence of an association between the degree of accrual management and the composition of the board of directors in the pre-Cadbury period, results for the post-Cadbury period indicate less income-increasing accrual management to avoid earnings losses or earnings declines when the proportion of non-executive directors is high. These results are consistent with the view that appropriately structured boards are discharging their financial reporting duties more effectively post-Cadbury.
431 citations
TL;DR: This article examined the links between accounting quality, proxied by earnings timeliness and conservatism, and the composition of the board of directors and found that firms with a higher proportion of outside board members are more likely to recognise bad news in earnings on a timely basis.
Abstract: This paper examines the links between accounting quality, proxied by earnings timeliness and conservatism, and the composition of the board of directors. Results indicate that firms with a higher proportion of outside board members are more likely to recognise bad news in earnings on a timely basis. However, firms whose boards comprise a relatively high propor- tion of outsiders do not display greater reporting conservatism with regard to the recognition of good news. These findings suggest that board composition is an important factor in deter- mining the quality of UK firms' reported earnings with respect to incorporating bad news on a timely basis.
412 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the performance of cross-sectionally estimated models was examined and a new model called the "margin model" was proposed to detect artificially induced earnings management in companies.
Abstract: This paper examines specification and power issues in relation to three models used to estimate abnormal accruals. In contrast to the majority of prior work evaluating models estimated in time-series, we examine the performance of cross-sectionally estimated models. In addition to testing the standard-Jones (Jones, 1991) and modified-Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) models, we also develop and test a new specification, labelled the ‘margin model’. Consistent with prior US research employing time-series specifications of the two Jones models, our findings suggest that each of the three cross-sectional models are well specified when applied to a random sample of firm-years. However, the margin model appears to generate relatively better specified estimates of abnormal accruals when cash flow performance is extreme. Analysis of the models' ability to detect artificially induced earnings management indicates that all three procedures are capable of generating relatively powerful tests for economically pla...
390 citations
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01 May 1981
TL;DR: This chapter discusses Detecting Influential Observations and Outliers, a method for assessing Collinearity, and its applications in medicine and science.
Abstract: 1. Introduction and Overview. 2. Detecting Influential Observations and Outliers. 3. Detecting and Assessing Collinearity. 4. Applications and Remedies. 5. Research Issues and Directions for Extensions. Bibliography. Author Index. Subject Index.
4,948 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the specification and power of tests based on performance-matched discretionary accruals, and make comparisons with tests using traditional discretionary accumrual measures (e.g., Jones and modified-Jones models).
4,247 citations
TL;DR: The authors proposed a theory of securities market under- and overreactions based on two well-known psychological biases: investor overconfidence about the precision of private information; and biased self-attribution, which causes asymmetric shifts in investors' confidence as a function of their investment outcomes.
Abstract: We propose a theory of securities market under- and overreactions based on two well-known psychological biases: investor overconfidence about the precision of private information; and biased self-attribution, which causes asymmetric shifts in investors’ confidence as a function of their investment outcomes. We show that overconfidence implies negative long-lag autocorrelations, excess volatility, and, when managerial actions are correlated with stock mispricing, public-event-based return predictability. Biased self-attribution adds positive short-lag autocorrelations ~“momentum”!, short-run earnings “drift,” but negative correlation between future returns and long-term past stock market and accounting performance. The theory also offers several untested implications and implications for corporate financial policy. IN RECENT YEARS A BODY OF evidence on security returns has presented a sharp challenge to the traditional view that securities are rationally priced to ref lect all publicly available information. Some of the more pervasive anomalies can be classified as follows ~Appendix A cites the relevant literature!: 1. Event-based return predictability ~public-event-date average stock returns of the same sign as average subsequent long-run abnormal performance! 2. Short-term momentum ~positive short-term autocorrelation of stock returns, for individual stocks and the market as a whole!
4,007 citations
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TL;DR: This paper proposed a theory of securities market under- and overreactions based on two well-known psychological biases: investor overconfidence about the precision of private information; and biased self-attribution, which causes asymmetric shifts in investors' confidence as a function of their investment outcomes.
Abstract: We propose a theory of securities market under- and overreactions based on two well-known psychological biases: investor overconfidence about the precision of private information; and biased self-attribution, which causes asymmetric shifts in investors' confidence as a function of their investment outcomes. We show that overconfidence implies negative long-lag autocorrelations, excess volatility, and, when managerial actions are correlated with stock mispricing, public-event-based return predictability. Biased self-attribution adds positive short-lag autocorrelations (momentum), short-run earnings drift, but negative correlation between future returns and long-term past stock market and accounting performance. The theory also offers several untested implications and implications for corporate financial policy.
Prepublication version available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2017
3,303 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined whether audit committee and board characteristics are related to earnings management by the firm and found a negative relation between audit committee independence and abnormal accruals.
3,298 citations