In 1974 an article appeared in Science magazine with the dry-sounding title “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” by a pair of psychologists who were not well known outside their discipline of decision theory. In it Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman introduced the world to Prospect Theory, which mapped out how humans actually behave when faced with decisions about gains and losses, in contrast to how economists assumed that people behave. Prospect Theory turned Economics on its head by demonstrating through a series of ingenious experiments that people are much more concerned with losses than they are with gains, and that framing a choice from one perspective or the other will result in decisions that are exactly the opposite of each other, even if the outcomes are monetarily the same. Prospect Theory led cognitive psychology in a new direction that began to uncover other human biases in thinking that are probably not learned but are part of our brain’s wiring.

Thinking fast and slow.

Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling (2nd ed.)

“WHAT can men do, what do they do, and what do they want to do ?”—these are the uestions that Prof. Thorndike seeks to answer in a very comprehensive and elaborate treatise. His undertaking is inspired by the belief that man has the possibility of almost complete control of his fate if only he will be guided by science, and that his failures are attributable to ignorance or folly. The main approach is through biological psychology, but all the social sciences are appealed to and utilized in an effort to deal with the human problem as a whole. The relative immaturity of the sciences dealing with man is continually stressed, but it is claimed that they provide a body of facts and principles which are “far above zero knowledge”, and that even now they are capable of affording valuable guidance in the shaping of public policy. Human Nature and the Social Order By E. L. Thorndike. Pp. xx + 1020. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940.) 18s. net.

Human Nature and the Social Order

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

Why Men Rebel was first published in 1970 on the heels of a decade of political violence and protest not only in remote corners of Africa and Southeast Asia, but also at home in the United States. Forty years later, the world is riveted on uprisings in the Middle East, and the United States has been overtaken by a focus on international terrorism and a fascination with citizen movements at home and abroad. Do the arguments of 1970 apply today? Why Men Rebel lends new insight into contemporary challenges of transnational recruitment and organization, multimedia mobilization, and terrorism.

Why Men Rebel

Introduction: Dragon-Slayers and Panda-Huggers 1. Saving Face 2. Chinese Identity and "the West" 3. A "Century of Humiliation" 4. The "Kissinger Complex" 5. Victors or Victims? 6. China's Apology Diplomacy 7. Popular Nationalism and the Fate of the Nation 8. Chinese Nationalism and U.S.--China Relations in the Twenty-First Century Notes Bibliography Acknowledgements Index

China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy

In most parts of the world, globalization has become an unstoppable and potent force that impacts everyday life and international relations. The articles in this issue draw on theoretical insights from diverse perspectives (clinical psychology, consumer research, organizational behavior, political psychology, and cultural psychology) to offer nuanced understanding of individuals’ psychological reactions to globalization in different parts of the world (Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Mainland China, Singapore, Switzerland, United States, Taiwan). These articles address the questions of how people make sense of and respond to globalization and its sociocultural ramifications; how people defend the integrity of their heritage cultural identities against the “culturally erosive” effects of globalization, and how individuals harness creative insights from their interactions with global cultures. The new theoretical insights and revealing empirical analyses presented in this issue set the stage for an emergent interdisciplinary inquiry into the psychology of globalization.

Toward a social psychology of globalization

What is the nature of Chinese patriotism and nationalism, how does it differ from American patriotism and nationalism, and what impact do they have on Chinese foreign policy attitudes? To explore the structure and consequences of Chinese national identity, three surveys were conducted in China and the US in the spring and summer of 2009. While patriotism and nationalism were empirically similar in the US, they were highly distinct in China, with patriotism aligning with a benign inter- nationalism and nationalism with a more malign blind patriotism. Chinese patriotism/internationalism, furthermore, had no impact on perceived US threats or US policy preferences, while nationalism did. The role of nation- alist historical beliefs in structures of Chinese national identity was also explored, as well as the consequences of historical beliefs for the perception of US military and humiliation threats.

Patriotism, Nationalism and China's US Policy: Structures and consequences of Chinese National Identity

The US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 sparked mass protests from Chinese across the globe. Few accepted America's explanation that the bombing (and subsequent death of three Chinese journalists) was a mistake caused by the CIA's use of outdated maps. Chinese students in the United States and Europe demonstrated against what they called "NATO fascism". The American consul's residence in Chengdu was firebombed. In Beijing Chinese students demanded revenge, chanting "Blood for blood!" Others threw bricks at US embassy buildings as People's Liberation Army soldiers looked on, and Ambassador James Sasser and other American diplomats were trapped inside for days. The demonstrations shocked the US media, which quickly pointed blame at the Chinese government for inflaming the protests. A brief review of major US newspaper editorials of 11 May reveals a consensus view: the Chinese people were not genuinely angry with (innocent) America; they were, rather, manipulated by Communist propaganda that the bombing was intentional. The San Francisco Chronicle complained that Beijing "failed to tell its citizens that the U.S. attack was an accident and that President Clinton has apologized to Beijing". The Washington Post declared: "The Big Lie is alive and well in Beijing ... It should come as no surprise, after weeks of ... internal propaganda, that many ordinary Chinese now believe the embassy bombing was deliberate". Such "state-supervised anger", the Boston Globe declared, was neither genuine nor popular. The "brutes in Beijing" were responsible for the Chinese people's

Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing

Following the publication of Ma Licheng's provocative article “New thinking on relations with Japan,” 2003 China witnessed a remarkable public debate on Japan policy. Academics tangled with internet nationalists, and heavy pressure was put on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take a tough line on Japan. The crushing defeat of the “new thinking” and a spate of anti-Japanese protests on the Chinese street and in Chinese cyberspace portends trouble in East Asia.

Peter Hays Gries

Papers

China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy

Toward a social psychology of globalization

Patriotism, Nationalism and China's US Policy: Structures and consequences of Chinese National Identity

Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing

China's “New Thinking” on Japan