Peter R. Wurman

Bio: Peter R. Wurman is an academic researcher from Amazon.com. The author has contributed to research in topics: Common value auction & Combinatorial auction. The author has an hindex of 32, co-authored 77 publications receiving 5356 citations. Previous affiliations of Peter R. Wurman include University of Michigan & Kiva Systems.

Coordinating Hundreds of Cooperative, Autonomous Vehicles in Warehouses

Abstract: The Kiva warehouse-management system creates a new paradigm for pick-pack-and-ship warehouses that significantly improves worker productivity. The Kiva system uses movable storage shelves that can be lifted by small, autonomous robots. By bringing the product to the worker, productivity is increased by a factor of two or more, while simultaneously improving accountability and flexibility. A Kiva installation for a large distribution center may require 500 or more vehicles. As such, the Kiva system represents the first commercially available, large-scale autonomous robot system. The first permanent installation of a Kiva system was deployed in the summer of 2006.

The Michigan Internet AuctionBot: a configurable auction server for human and software agents

Abstract: Market mechanisms such as auctions will likely rep resent a common interaction medium for agents on the Internet The Michigan Internet AuctionBot is a ex ible scalable and robust auction server that supports both software and human agents The server manages many simultaneous auctions by separating the interface from the core auction procedures This design provides a responsive interface and tolerates system and network disruptions but necessitates careful timekeeping proce dures to ensure temporal accuracy The AuctionBot has been used extensively in classroom exercises and is available to the general Internet population Its exi ble speci cation of auctions in terms of orthogonal pa rameters makes it a useful device for agent researchers exploring the design space of auction mechanisms

Analysis and Observations From the First Amazon Picking Challenge

Abstract: This paper presents an overview of the inaugural Amazon Picking Challenge along with a summary of a survey conducted among the 26 participating teams. The challenge goal was to design an autonomous robot to pick items from a warehouse shelf. This task is currently performed by human workers, and there is hope that robots can someday help increase efficiency and throughput while lowering cost. We report on a 28-question survey posed to the teams to learn about each team’s background, mechanism design, perception apparatus, planning, and control approach. We identify trends in this data, correlate it with each team’s success in the competition, and discuss observations and lessons learned based on survey results and the authors’ personal experiences during the challenge. Note to Practitioners —Perception, motion planning, grasping, and robotic system engineering have reached a level of maturity that makes it possible to explore automating simple warehouse tasks in semistructured environments that involve high-mix, low-volume picking applications. This survey summarizes lessons learned from the first Amazon Picking Challenge, highlighting mechanism design, perception, and motion planning algorithms, as well as software engineering practices that were most successful in solving a simplified order fulfillment task. While the choice of mechanism mostly affects execution speed, the competition demonstrated the systems challenges of robotics and illustrated the importance of combining reactive control with deliberative planning.

Flexible double auctions for electionic commerce: theory and implementation

Abstract: We consider a general family of auction mechanisms that admit multiple buyers and sellers, and determine market-clearing prices. We analyze the economic incentives facing participants in such auctions, demonstrating that, under some conditions, it is possible to induce truthful revelation of values by buyers or sellers, but not both, and for single- but not multi-unit bids. We also perform a computational analysis of the auctioneer's task, exhibiting efficient algorithms for processing bids and calculating allocations.

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations

Abstract: This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multiagent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics. The authors emphasize foundations to create a broad and rigorous treatment of their subject, with thorough presentations of distributed problem solving, game theory, multiagent communication and learning, social choice, mechanism design, auctions, cooperative game theory, and modal logics of knowledge and belief. For each topic, basic concepts are introduced, examples are given, proofs of key results are offered, and algorithmic considerations are examined. An appendix covers background material in probability theory, classical logic, Markov decision processes and mathematical programming. Written by two of the leading researchers of this engaging field, this book will surely serve as THE reference for researchers in the fastest-growing area of computer science, and be used as a text for advanced undergraduate or graduate courses.

A Comprehensive Survey of Multiagent Reinforcement Learning

Abstract: Multiagent systems are rapidly finding applications in a variety of domains, including robotics, distributed control, telecommunications, and economics. The complexity of many tasks arising in these domains makes them difficult to solve with preprogrammed agent behaviors. The agents must, instead, discover a solution on their own, using learning. A significant part of the research on multiagent learning concerns reinforcement learning techniques. This paper provides a comprehensive survey of multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL). A central issue in the field is the formal statement of the multiagent learning goal. Different viewpoints on this issue have led to the proposal of many different goals, among which two focal points can be distinguished: stability of the agents' learning dynamics, and adaptation to the changing behavior of the other agents. The MARL algorithms described in the literature aim---either explicitly or implicitly---at one of these two goals or at a combination of both, in a fully cooperative, fully competitive, or more general setting. A representative selection of these algorithms is discussed in detail in this paper, together with the specific issues that arise in each category. Additionally, the benefits and challenges of MARL are described along with some of the problem domains where the MARL techniques have been applied. Finally, an outlook for the field is provided.

Cloud computing

Abstract: As with any new trend in the IT world, enterprises must figure out the benefits and risks of cloud computing and the best way to use this technology. The buzz around cloud computing has reached a fever pitch. Some believe it is a disruptive trend representing the next stage in the evolution of the internet. Others believe it is hype, as it uses long established computing technologies. One thing is clear: The industry needs an objective, straightforward conversation about how this new computing paradigm will impact organizations, how it can be used with existing technologies, and the potential pitfalls of proprietary technologies that can lead to lock-in and limited choice. This document is intended to initiate a conversation that will bring together the emerging cloud computing community (both cloud users and cloud vendors) around a core set of principles. We believe that these core principles are rooted in the belief that cloud computing should be as open as all other IT technologies. This document does not intend to define a final taxonomy of cloud computing or to charter a new standards effort. Nor does it try to be an exhaustive thesis on cloud architecture and design. Rather, this document speaks to CIOs and other business leaders who intend to use cloud computing and to establish a set of core principles for cloud vendors. Cloud computing is still in its early stages, with much to learn and more experimentation to come. However, the time is right for the members of the emerging cloud computing community to come together around the notion of an open cloud.