Peter Vedel Kessing

Bio: Peter Vedel Kessing is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Human rights & European union. The author has an hindex of 2, co-authored 2 publications receiving 24 citations.

The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom

Abstract: The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom by Evgeny Morozov New York: Public Affairs, 2011 409 pages $16.99 [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] In January 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a highly touted speech on Internet freedom in which she stated, "The freedom to connect is like the freedom of assembly, only in cyberspace. It allows individuals to get online, come together, and hopefully cooperate. Once you're on the Internet, you don't need to be a tycoon or a rock star to have a huge impact on society." Evgeny Morozov, in his book The Net Delusion, takes great issue with the implication, however, that the so-called "Arab Spring" and "Twitter Revolution" were caused by unfettered access to the Internet. Instead, Morozov, a research academic, provides a cautionary tale about what he argues is any attempt to establish a monocausal relationship to meaningful political change (especially when that single focus is information technology). The book opens with a discussion of cyber-utopianism and Internet-centrism--mind-sets that focus on the positive "emancipatory" aspects of Internet communication while ignoring the downsides. The argument throughout centers on nation-state policy, or lack thereof, that attacks the "wicked" problem of authoritarianism by, as a colleague of mine has dubbed it, "wiring the world." Morozov, expectantly, but importantly, cites the hedonistic world portrayed by Huxley and the "Big Brother" world of Orwell to consider both the proactive and reactive approaches to Internet freedom by authoritarian regimes. Interestingly, he notes that there is often a mix of both. Such regimes certainly use the anonymity and openness of the Internet to spy on their people and shutdown undesirable sites. But there is also a subtle approach that belies the jackboot on the keyboard methodology. While China may be known more for suppressing the Internet and for employing the masses to counter antiregime rhetoric, Russia imposes no formal Internet censorship. It relies on entertainment (porn is specifically cited) to soothe the masses, assuming that given options for political discourse and anything else, most opt for "anything else." Hitler would understand. And in nations where freedom is not widely understood from a western perspective, any bit of additional mindless diversion may be viewed as liberty by the populace. Perhaps most importantly, Morozov rails against social media determinism as driving the end of authoritarianism, labeling it "an intellectually impoverished, lazy way to study the past, understand the present, and predict the future." He does not dismiss the value of Facebook and Twitter to quickly mobilize like-minded individuals. He notes as well that the development of that very like-mindedness is complex and potentially can be manipulated by authoritarian governments using the same Internet freedom. …

The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It

Abstract: The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It Jonathan Zittrain. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008. 342 pages. $30.00.Jonathan Zittrain's book, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It, discusses the tension between generativity, the "capacity to produce unanticipated change through unfiltered contributions from a broad and varied audience" and the security problems inherent in today's personal computers and Internet system (70). This generativity, Zittrain argues, is the greatest strength of personal computers and the Internet and had led to great innovations, including creative software, peer-to-peer networking, blogs and content sites such as Wikipedia, and even the Internet itself. Yet this same generativity has also spawned security, legal, and social problems that may lead to the demise of personal computers and the Internet as they exist today (101). If we do not find solutions for these problems, Zittrain warns, we will be faced with government or corporate control of personal computers and the Internet, similar to current controls of cellular telephones and cable converter boxes, which will effectively shut down the innovations that personal computers and the Internet currently enable (245). Personal computers, according to Zittrain, will become nothing but appliances programmed by the manufacturer, capable only of limited tasks, and stripped of the tools and capabilities necessary for innovation.The first part of the book traces the history of personal computers, mainframes, proprietary servers, and the Internet. This section highlights how differences in technology and administration fostered generativity in personal computers and on the Internet and prohibited innovation on the mainframes and proprietary networks. Yet the innovations made possible by the generative nature of the Internet and personal computers also created its vulnerabilities: viruses, worms, malware, and spyware. Despite his obvious support of generativity, Zittrain admits that the current situation is "not sustainable" (43), but warns that the obvious solutions-such as limited functionality, governmental controls, and censorship-completely undermine the creativity made possible by personal computers and the Internet. The sec- ond part of the book defines generativity and explores its benefits and detriments. Here, Zittrain proposes that information technology functions best when generative, while admitting that we cannot ignore the problems caused by generativity (64), and warns equally of the dangers of controlled appliances: censorships, surveillance, forced legal compliance, and unannounced changes in machine functions. Chapter 6 in this section considers Wikikpedia as a self-regulating generative system that functions imperfectly but well. Part Three proposes technological, legal, and social solutions to the problems discussed earlier in the book.The Future of the Internet intertwines its analysis of current personal computer/Internet problems with current and historical examples from business, law, culture (Internet and otherwise), and technology. These examples, often worthwhile and interesting in and of themselves, underpin Zittrain's analysis rationally and support his conclusions. The examples show that the kind of sledgehammer solutions that Zittrain predicts are not merely possibilities or potentialities, but already have been and are being employed by various companies and governments. Perhaps best of all, Zittrain's use of these historical and current examples avoids the sensationalism often seen in other works that predict governmental and corporate control of options, behavior, and creativity. …

Cyber war will not take place

Abstract: For almost two decades, experts and defense establishments the world over have been predicting that cyber war is coming. But is it? This article argues in three steps that cyber war has never happened in the past, that cyber war does not take place in the present, and that it is unlikely that cyber war will occur in the future. It first outlines what would constitute cyber war: a potentially lethal, instrumental, and political act of force conducted through malicious code. The second part shows what cyber war is not, case-by-case. Not one single cyber offense on record constitutes an act of war on its own. The final part offers a more nuanced terminology to come to terms with cyber attacks. All politically motivated cyber attacks are merely sophisticated versions of three activities that are as old as warfare itself: sabotage, espionage, and subversion.

The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era

Abstract: The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era. By Micheline R. Ishay. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. 459p. $24.95.Are human rights universal or culturally bounded? From what religious or philosophical premises are they derived? Do they conflict? Do they empower or instead disempower the weak and oppressed? What is their fate in an era of globalization? The key to answering these questions may lie more in historical than conceptual investigation. This is the hunch that inspires Micheline Ishay's remarkably learned and wide-ranging book. It delivers forceful conclusions, which need no belaboring by the author, since she allows them to emerge from the historical record. Among the lessons we learn are that human rights should indeed be viewed as universal; that they draw nourishment from diverse ideological sources; that their meaning has always been contested, though not primarily along cultural lines; that civil and political rights on the one hand and socioeconomic rights on the other have historically been dependent on each other; that the claim to national self-determination as a human right has often been a cover for human rights violations; and that the idea of human rights has regularly been reborn, often strengthened, after periods of tyranny and oppression.