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Phil C. Neal

Bio: Phil C. Neal is an academic researcher from University of Chicago. The author has contributed to research in topics: Administration (government) & Carr. The author has an hindex of 2, co-authored 4 publications receiving 15 citations.

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TL;DR: In this paper, Baker et al. pointed out that the Alabama constitution does not change the representation in the state legislature based on the population of the state, and proposed a constitutional amendment to change it.
Abstract: OF THE UNITED STATES 360 [1961].) 171 The provision of the Alabama constitution referred tois the last sentence of ? 284. Section 284 prescribes the mode of amending the constitution. The last sentence provides: \"Representation in the legislature shall be based upon population, and such basis of representation shall not be changed by constitutional amendments.\" Ala. Code ? 284 (1958). Article IX of the Alabama constitution, ?? 197-203, prescribes the composition of the Alabama legislature. Section 197 fixes the size of the Senate at not less than one-fourth nor more than one-third of the number of representatives. Section 198 limits the size of the House of Representatives to 105, plus one for each new county, and provides for decennial reapportionment \"among the several counties of the state, according to the number of inhabitants in them, respectively.\" Section 199 provides that each county shall be entitled to at least one representative. Section 200 provides that the legislature shall determine s natorial districts \"as nearly equal to each other in the number of inhabitants as may be,\" that each district shall elect one senator, and that no county shall be divided between two districts. Section 202 prescribed the initial allocation of representatives and Section 203 determined the initial groupings of counties into senatorial districts. These original pportionments of Senate and House have continued in effect until the present. If ? 284 is taken literally there is obvious incompatibility between itand Article IX. However, all the provisions were adopted simultaneously in the constitution of 1901. In an advisory opinion the Supreme Court of Alabama held that a proposed consti252] BAKER V. CAR R 313 Representatives must depart substantially from the population standard, asthe Alabama constitutional provisions require,'72 then \"it may well be\" that representation according to population must \"to some extent\" be reflected inboth Houses. Whether this latter requirement was thought to follow solely from the Fourteenth Amendment the court did not make clear, although that appears to have been its view; here and throughout the opinion, however, there was a confusing interweaving of State and federal constitutional arguments. Indeed it is not clear whether the court meant o advance as an independent ground for invalidating the proposed constitutional amendment that under State law the State constitution was not amendable inthe manner proposed.178 In holding the statutory eapportionment invalid the court chose the House of Representatives provisions as the chief target of its criticism. The Senate provisions were \"a step in the right direction\" though \"an extremely short step.\" They eliminated a few of the more glaring disparities but left control of the Senate in 27.6 per cent of the people, \"an improvement of only 2.6 per cent over the present control f 25.1 per cent,\" and they also left wide disparities tutional mendment providing for allotment of representatives on a bracket system, with a maximum of 12 representatives for the largest counties and a minimum of one for counties with less than 38,500 population each, was consistent with S 284. It also held that a proposal for giving one senator to each county under 650,000 population and two to each county over that number was not consistent with S 284, but that its adoption would be lawful and would impliedly repeal ? 284. Opinion of the Justices, 263 Ala. 158 (1955). The district ourt's repeated reference to? 284 as the \"controlling or dominant provision\" of the Alabama constitution is difficult to understand. 172 What the court apparently regarded as a substantial departure from the \"population standard\" would necessarily result, under either the present or the proposed constitutional provisions, from the limit on the size of the House of Representatives in combination with the requirement that each county have at least one representative. While the principle here is the same as that which determines the federal House of Representatives, the resulting disparities in any particular State may of course be greater than in the case of Congress. 173s Despite the Alabama Supreme Court opinion referred to in note 171, supra, the district ourt expressed doubt hat it would be followed in view of the fact that the Alabama court had divided 4-3 on the question and that two of the majority, but none of the dissenters, had since been replaced. The district court said: \"The manifest uncertainty of the legality of the proposed constitutional amendment ... forces this Court o the conclusion that he Legislature may not have complied with the State Constitution in the passage of such an Act.\" 314 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [1962 existing in the weights of individual votes as between the most populous and least populous groups of districts. The House of Representatives provisions, however, were \"totally unacceptable\" because \"no rational reapportionment plan was followed.\" This characterization is difficult to follow. What he legislature obviously did was distribute among the larger counties the 39 representatives remaining after giving each county one, allowing a maximum of 12 to Jefferson, the largest county, and allowing proportionate extra representation to the others. Thus Jefferson County with 634,000 population was given 12 representatives, Mobile with 314,000 received 6, Tuscaloosa with 109,000 received 3, and so on. Disparities within the \"brackets\" which were allotted extra representatives do not appear great; for example, the largest 3-representative county has a population of 117,000 and the smallest 95,000. That the court should consider this not a \"rational\" plan is incomprehensible, unless it meant that amathematical formula, orsome particular mathematical formula, must be employed. The latter inference is suggested by the court's contrasting endorsement of the \"equal proportions method,\" adopted in the proposed constitutional amendment, as a \"known and accepted\" standard of apportionment. As a further reason for invalidating the reapportionment statute the court observed that it would not go into effect until the election of 1966 and that here was no good reason why the plaintiffs should be thus postponed in the enjoyment of their rights. It deserves note, however, that he members of both houses of the Alabama legislature are elected for four-year terms.'74 If the legislature considered that he interval between July 12 and the date of the general election in November was too short to permit reasonable opportunity for selecting candidates and holding campaigns in the newly constituted districts, he election of 1966 was the earliest next date which could have been chosen. Itwas also, of course, the earliest date at which an election under the proposed constitutional amendment could be held since approval of the amendment at a general election was a prerequisite. The court considered only the latter factor and deemed it eliminated by the ruling invalidating the proposed amendment. On July 25 the court entered a decree enjoining all election officials in Alabama from taking any steps in connection with the 174 Ala. Const., art. IV, 5 46. 252] BAKER V. CARR 315 holding of elections for members of the State legislature \" xcept and in accordance with the apportionment of the Alabama Legislature as hereinafter specifically set out.\"17 It then decreed the number of representatives each county should have, adopting in this respect the apportionment prescribed in the proposed constitutional amendment, and it specified the composition of the 35 senatorial districts, adopting in this respect the apportionment prescribed in the invalidated new statute. It ordered officials of the State Democratic and Republican Committees, together with certain State officers, to take the necessary steps to nominate candidates for an election of the new legislature in November, and it decreed that the new apportionment should remain in effect until the legislature reapportions itself \"in accordance with the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.\" In adopting this apportionment the court made clear that it did not regard it as meeting the constitutional standard permanently required but that it preferred taking parts of legislation already passed by the legislature to imposing a wholly new apportionment of the court's own devising. It expressed the hope that the revisions ordered would \"break the stranglehold\" on the legislature and enable it to reapportion itself constitutionally. On August 25 Mr. Justice Black denied a stay.176 D. THE GEORGIA C SES 1. The county-unit case. Within hours after Baker v. Carr was announced, the attack on the so-called county-unit system of voting for Statewide offices was renewed. In Sanders v. Gray\"77 a voter in Fulton County, Georgia's most populous county, sought a declaration of the invalidity of the Neill Primary Act,178 the county-unit statute, and an injunction against the holding of any primary under 175 Decree, Sims v. Frink, Civil Action No. 1744-N (M.D. Ala.), filed July 25, 1962. 176 N.Y. Times, August 26, 1962, p. 42, col. 3. The reapportionment problem ay have reached its apex of irony in the statement a tributed toMr. Justice Black in denying the stay: \"All preparations for this primary appear to have been made. No facts are alleged or shown which in my judgment would support a stay that would so drastically disrupt the state's primary plan.\" 177 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962). 17s Ga. Laws 1917, p. 183 et seq., as amended by Ga. Laws 1950, p. 79, GA. CODE ANN. ?? 34-3213 to 34-3218. 316 THE SUPREME COURT EVIEW [1962 its terms. The governor, not waiting for action by a court, called a special session of the legislature shortly afterward\"79 and on April 27 a new county-unit statute was enacted.'s8 On April 28 the federal district ourt heard and granted the plaintiff's application for what the court termed a \"temporary\" injunction.

8 citations

Journal ArticleDOI

4 citations


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01 Jan 2017
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors make specific recommendations that are directed at enhancing the effectiveness of South-South collaborations pertaining to cross-border cartel activities in order to realize economic development and alleviate poverty.
Abstract: Competition law and its enforcement have become necessary tools in the face of trade liberalisation. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of cross-border cartels. The global South is steadily becoming aware of this. With the advent of globalisation and trade liberalisation, individual economies have become intrinsically linked. Anti-competitive conduct in one territory may have an impact in another territory. Therefore, an effective regional competition law framework complements trade liberalisation, especially in light of the principal objective of the South-South regional economic communities: the deepening of regional integration, in order to realise economic development and alleviate poverty. Cartel practices, such as, market allocation cartels, are in direct contradiction to this primary objective. This is when enforcement collaborations in South-South regional economic communities becomes crucial. The regional legal instruments of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the East African Community, the Southern African Customs Union and the Southern African Development Community make provision for enforcement collaborations among Member States. To facilitate collaboration, regional competition authorities have been created to investigate, among other things, cross-border cartels. Within these economic communities, there is a strong case for enforcement collaborations, as evidence shows that the majority of the firms engaging in cartels are the so-called Regional Multinational Corporations. They operate throughout the territories of Member States. Additionally, the international nature of cartels, such as, private international cartels and export cartels, provide an opportunity for South-South co-operation to be utilised. However, this co-operation has not been utilised to the fullest extent, especially with reference to cross-border cartel activities. This has been attributed to various factors, such as, institutional incapacities, resource austerity, the absence of common procedural rules, the lack of adequate investigatory tools, and political ineptitude. As a solution, this current study makes specific recommendations that are directed at enhancing the effectiveness of South-South collaborations pertaining to cross-border cartel activities.

43 citations

01 Jan 2017
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the nature of the truth claims is "particularist and localized, rather than universal" and that "historical studies of institutions tend to be driven by empirical phenomena or puzzles rather than gaps in theory".
Abstract: ed away from them. The consequence has been, to quote Suddaby et al, the new institutionalism has become ahistorical. That is, in search for scientific legitimacy—that is, the ability to make broad theoretical generalizations and claims of universal knowledge—contemporary organizational institutionalists have minimized or obscured the role of history.43 In their efforts to bring back history into new institutionalism—what they call historical institutionalism—Suddaby, Foster, and Mills argue for four propositions that should motivate the historical study of institutions. First, the nature of the truth claims is “particularist and localized, rather than universal.” Second, “historical studies of institutions focus on complex, rather than unitary causality.” Third, the “motivations for historical studies of institutions tend to be driven by empirical phenomena or puzzles rather than gaps in theory.” And finally, historical institutionalism is focused on “endogenous rather than exogenous explanations for institutions.”44 This new and growing trend to think through organizational theory from the methodological perspective of history is an important departure point for the narrative institutional history proposed in this dissertation. Certainly, the attention to complex causality—central related to the importance of contingency and historical “accidents” as drivers of historical change—is crucial to the study of institutional history. And thinking of “institutions” as a process whereby organizations develop some sort of social stickiness 43 Ibid. at 106. 44 ibid. at 104-105. 30 is important, too. Throughout this dissertation, the process of institutionalization—both in history and historicity—will play a central role in the narrative institutional history I

35 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The most recent explanations for the existence of committee systems in legislative chambers have posited that committees are the agents of one of three very different principal actors: (1) individual members (distributive theory), (2) the full chamber (informational theory), or (3) the major political party (partisan theory).
Abstract: The most recent explanations for the existence of committee systems in legislative chambers have posited that committees are the agents of one of three very different principal actors: (1) individual members (distributive theory), (2) the full chamber (informational theory), or (3) the major political party (partisan theory). In addition to defining and operationalizing the concept of institutional committee system autonomy, I put forth and test several hypotheses linking these three explanations to committee system autonomy. In the end, the results show empirical support for the informational theory over the distributive and partisan theories.

22 citations

01 Jan 2008
TL;DR: Hickey as mentioned in this paper used the concept of constitutive rhetoric to examine the Supreme Court's reapportionment and redistricting decision, arguing that in times of historical crisis, speakers possess the ability to repair the language of the community and reshape the identity of the communities.
Abstract: Reconstituting Representation: The Supreme Court and the Rhetorical Controversy over State and Congressional Redistricting. (December 2008) Jeremiah Peter Hickey, B.S., St. John Fisher College; M.A., SUNY Brockport Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James Arnt Aune Constitutive rhetoric focuses on the idea that in times of historical crisis, speakers possess the ability to repair the language of the community and reshape the identity of the community. This dissertation relies upon the concept of constitutive rhetoric to examine the Supreme Court’s reapportionment and redistricting decision. By employing constitutive rhetoric, the Supreme Court reacts to the crisis of representation because of malapportionment and redistricting to transform our Constitutional republic to a Constitutional democracy and, further, to debate competing visions of representation and democracy necessary to sustain political life and the democratic experience. Chapter I offers readers a literature review on constitutive rhetoric, a literature review on reapportionment and redistricting, and presents readers with an outline of the dissertation. Chapter II provides a brief history of redistricting in the United States since Colonial times, the development of apportionment and redistricting law at the state court level, and the Supreme Court’s invention of a rhetorical tradition in apportionment and districting law before the Reapportionment Revolution. In the last section of Chapter II, I

15 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: This paper found that the more the public learns about pre-dispute binding arbitration, the more they believe this dispute-resolution procedure is unjust and illegitimate, and that the vast majority of participants mistakenly believed that they had never entered into a binding arbitration clause.
Abstract: This Article discusses a troubling cause of the decline in civil trials — the growing ubiquity of predispute binding arbitration clauses — and discusses tension between roles and responsibilities classically associated with zealous advocacy and the pressing need for new roles and responsibilities associated with ethical dispute system design. Over the past decade, two interacting patterns have come to encourage transactional attorneys to engage in zealous advocacy when crafting predispute binding arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts. First, recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence broadly defers and delegates authority to those who create such clauses in adhesion contracts with little oversight. Second, members of the public rarely read or understand these clauses buried in the boilerplate. Predispute binding arbitration clauses displace the legal backdrop of fair, legitimate, and just public legal institutions with the dispute-system procedure most preferred by those who draft and design these adhesion contracts. Therefore, norms of zealous advocacy may collide with a wider and more virtuous ethic that considers third parties and the public’s desire for a fair, legitimate, and just civil justice system. Before turning to the dialectic between these two ethical principles, we report a psychological experiment conducted with the American public. The study randomly assigned members of the public into conditions that varied how much they learned about the procedure (e.g., a legal definition, an example clause, a New York Times article) and asked them to rate the fairness and justice of binding arbitration. The experiment reveals that the more the public learns about pre-dispute binding arbitration, the more they believe this dispute-resolution procedure is unjust and illegitimate. Yet the vast majority of participants mistakenly believed that they had never entered into a binding-arbitration clause. This empirical legal study illustrates the psychological and felt injustice that many poor and middle-income members of the public experience when learning from legal professionals for the first time both that the legal wrongs they have suffered will likely not be remedied because of barriers imposed by binding arbitration and that the will likely not be able to secure legal representation as a result. Drawing on these findings, we discuss the pressing need for a wider ethic that applies to the transactional attorneys who design binding-arbitration clauses within adhesion contracts. We also draw lessons from behavioral legal ethics and social psychology. These lessons reveal that this wider ethic may be endangered by the situational influences that currently operate within law firms (and in-house) due to these two intersecting patterns. We discuss ways of altering the regulatory environment to encourage the wider ethic to flourish in this time of vanishing trials.

14 citations