Phil Vendy

Bio: Phil Vendy is an academic researcher from Dow Corning. The author has contributed to research in topics: HAL/S. The author has an hindex of 2, co-authored 2 publications receiving 9 citations.

When Computers Say It with Feeling: Communication and Synthetic Emotions in Kubrick's 2001: A Space Odyssey:

Abstract: The late Stanley Kubrick's film 2001: A Space Odyssey portrayed a computer, HAL 9000, that appeared to be a conscious entity, especially given that it seemed capable of some forms of emotional expression. This article examines the film's portrayal of communication between HAL 9000 and the astronauts. Recent developments in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) (and synthetic emotions in particular) as well as social science research on human emotions are reviewed. Interpreting select scenes from 2001 in light of these findings, the authors argue that computer-generated emotions may be so realistic that they suggest inner feelings and consciousness. Refinements in AI technology are now making such realism possible. The need for a less anthropomorphic approach with computers that appear to have feelings is stressed.

HAL's long, long run: computers and social performance in Stanley Kubrick's 2001

Abstract: T he year 2001. Can we even think of it, the real begin ning of the next millenium, without remembering the cinematic 2001 of the late Stanley Kubrick? Curiously persistent, this film continues to haunt our hopes for the future. This is especially so in the area of computer technology. Back in 1968, 2001: A Space Odyssey gave us some glimpses, both optimistic and sobering, of how computers might affect our lives. Central to that sprawling science fiction epic was a computer named HAL. \"He\" (and we realize our anthropomorphic tendencies here) closely monitored all systems, including astronauts, on a spaceship bound for Jupiter. He also ended up killing all but one of the crew in a chillingly methodical manner. HAL continues to hold our imaginations in a tight grip. Despite subsequent films with more realistic forecasting of computer hardware (War Games, Tin Man, The Net, Tron, etc.), none of these has received nearly the attention given to HAL and 2001. A recently published book on the design of artificial intelligence pays homage with the title, HALF Legacy: 2001 ~ Computer as Dream and Reality (Stork, 1997). In various articles, HAI2s image is brought up as a sort of benchmark to gauge how far we have progressed in developing higher-order thinking in computers (Garfinkel, 1997; Midbon, 1990). The computer \"incapable of error\" was even featured in an Apple television commercial during the 1999 Super Bowl. Why HAL? Why such ongoing interest in a film now over thirty years old? If the hardware of 2001 is by today's standards dated, then what accounts for both the widespread recognition of, and fascination with, HAL?

"Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state": Erratum

Abstract: The problem of which cues, internal or external, permit a person to label and identify his own emotional state has been with us since the days that James (1890) first tendered his doctrine that \"the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion\" (p. 449). Since we are aware of a variety of feeling and emotion states, it should follow from James' proposition that the various emotions will be accompanied by a variety of differentiable bodily states. Following James' pronouncement, a formidable number of studies were undertaken in search of the physiological differentiators of the emotions. The results, in these early days, were almost uniformly negative. All of the emotional states experi-

The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory

Abstract: A clutch of '-isms' characterises the approach to consciousness which David Chalmers defends: dualism, epiphenomenalism, functionalism, anti-reductionism, and -probably -panpsychism. (The author would no doubt want 'naturalism' included in the list as well, but as we shall see, Chalmers' predilection to describe his theory as 'scientific' stretches credibility.) While the book does not, as far as I can see, move consciousness research significantly forward, Chalmers succeeds admirably in clarifying the philosophical terrain around and within each of these '-isms' and in questioning the usual assumptions which suggest some of them are mutually exclusive. Because nearly all of what follows is highly critical, I want to be explicit about one thing: I do not think this is a bad book. Throughout, most discussions keep to a very high standard; it's just that they include fatal flaws.