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Pranab Bardhan

Bio: Pranab Bardhan is an academic researcher from University of California, Berkeley. The author has contributed to research in topics: Decentralization & Poverty. The author has an hindex of 63, co-authored 238 publications receiving 16822 citations. Previous affiliations of Pranab Bardhan include University of Cambridge & University of California, Santa Cruz.


Papers
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Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the reasons for the persistence of corruption that have to do with frequency-dependent equilibria or intertemporal externalities, and suggest that corruption may actually improve efficiency and help growth.
Abstract: Corruption has its adverse effects not just on static efficiency but also on investment and growth. This chapter discusses the reasons for the persistence of corruption that have to do with frequency-dependent equilibria or intertemporal externalities. There are many cases where corruption is mutually beneficial between the official and his client, so neither the briber nor the bribee has an incentive to report or protest, for example, when a customs officer lets contraband through, or a tax auditor purposely overlooks a case of tax evasion, and so on. The idea of multiple equilibria in the incidence of corruption is salient in some of the recent economic theorists' explanations. There is a strand in the corruption literature, contributed both by economists and non-economists, suggesting that, in the context of pervasive and cumbersome regulations in developing countries, corruption may actually improve efficiency and help growth.

2,743 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Decentralization has been widely accepted as a way of reducing the role of the state in general, by fragmenting central authority and introducing more intergovernmental competition and checks and balances as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: All around the world in matters of governance, decentralization is the rage. Even apart from the widely debated issues of subsidiarity and devolution in the European Union and states’ rights in the United States, decentralization has been at the center stage of policy experiments in the last two decades in a large number of developing and transition economies in Latin America, Africa and Asia. The World Bank, for example, has embraced it as one of the major governance reforms on its agenda (for example, World Bank, 2000; Burki, Perry and Dillinger, 1999). Take also the examples of the two largest countries of the world, China and India. Decentralization has been regarded as the major institutional framework for the phenomenal industrial growth in the last two decades in China, taking place largely in the nonstate nonprivate sector. India ushered in a landmark constitutional reform in favor of decentralization around the same time it launched a major program of economic reform in the early 1990s. On account of its many failures, the centralized state everywhere has lost a great deal of legitimacy, and decentralization is widely believed to promise a range of benee ts. It is often suggested as a way of reducing the role of the state in general, by fragmenting central authority and introducing more intergovernmental competition and checks and balances. It is viewed as a way to make government more responsive and efe cient. Technological changes have also made it somewhat easier than before to provide public services (like electricity and water supply) relatively efe ciently in smaller market areas, and the lower levels of government have now a greater ability to handle certain tasks. In a world of rampant ethnic cone icts and separatist movements, decentralization is also regarded as a way of diffusing social and political tensions and ensuring local cultural and political autonomy. These potential benee ts of decentralization have attracted a very diverse range

1,601 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors describe a model of two-party electoral competition with "probabilistic" voting behavior and lobbying by special interest groups that helps identify determinants of relative capture at different levels of government.
Abstract: 135 Despite the importance of this issue, not much systematic research appears to have been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to interestgroup capture. Here we describe a model of two-party electoral competition with “probabilistic” voting behavior and lobbying by specialinterest groups based on David Baron (1994) and Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1996) that helps identify determinants of relative capture at different levels of government. These include relative levels of voter awareness and interest-group cohesiveness, electoral uncertainty, electoral competition, heterogeneity of districts with respect to inequality, and the electoral system. While some of these uphold the traditional Madisonian presumption, others are likely to create a tendency for lower capture at the local level, so the net effect is theoretically ambiguous. This suggests that the extent of relative capture may be context-specific and needs to be assessed empirically.

986 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the effects of decentralisation on service volumes, efficiency and equity are analyzed under different financing arrangements for local governments, where the central government is uninformed about local need and unable to monitor service allocations.
Abstract: Many developing countries are experimenting with decentralisation of public service delivery to elected local governments instead of bureaucrats appointed by a central government. We study the resulting implications in a theoretical model in which the central government is uninformed about local need and unable to monitor service allocations. Bureaucrats charge bribes for services as monopoly providers, resulting in underprovision of services, especially for the poor. Local governments are directly responsive to their citizens needs but may be subject to capture by elites. Effects of decentralisation on service volumes, efficiency and equity are analysed under different financing arrangements for local governments. The theme of the 2004 World Development Report is summarised by its opening paragraph: Too often, services fail poor people ‐ in access, in quantity, in quality. But the fact that there are strong examples where services do work means governments and citizens can do better. How? By putting poor people at the center of service provision: by enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers, by amplifying their voice in policymaking, and by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the poor. Problems of accountability associated with traditional modes of delivery involving centralised bureaucracies include cost padding, service diversion, limited responsiveness to local needs, limited access and high prices charged especially to the poor. 1 Many developing countries have thus begun to experiment with initiatives to increase accountability of service providers by providing greater control rights to citizen groups. These include decentralisation of service delivery to local governments, community participation, direct transfers to households and contracting out delivery to private providers and NGOs. The programmes include a wide range of infrastructure services (water, sanitation, electricity, telecommunications, roads) and social services (education, health and welfare programmes). Countries where such trends have gathered

497 citations


Cited by
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the usefulness of analyzing firms from the resource side rather than from the product side, in analogy to entry barriers and growth-share matrices, the concepts of resource position barrier and resource-product matrices are suggested.
Abstract: Summary The paper explores the usefulness of analysing firms from the resource side rather than from the product side. In analogy to entry barriers and growth-share matrices, the concepts of resource position barrier and resource-product matrices are suggested. These tools are then used to highlight the new strategic options which naturally emerge from the resource perspective.

18,677 citations

Posted Content
01 Jan 2012
TL;DR: The 2008 crash has left all the established economic doctrines - equilibrium models, real business cycles, disequilibria models - in disarray as discussed by the authors, and a good viewpoint to take bearings anew lies in comparing the post-Great Depression institutions with those emerging from Thatcher and Reagan's economic policies: deregulation, exogenous vs. endoge- nous money, shadow banking vs. Volcker's Rule.
Abstract: The 2008 crash has left all the established economic doctrines - equilibrium models, real business cycles, disequilibria models - in disarray. Part of the problem is due to Smith’s "veil of ignorance": individuals unknowingly pursue society’s interest and, as a result, have no clue as to the macroeconomic effects of their actions: witness the Keynes and Leontief multipliers, the concept of value added, fiat money, Engel’s law and technical progress, to name but a few of the macrofoundations of microeconomics. A good viewpoint to take bearings anew lies in comparing the post-Great Depression institutions with those emerging from Thatcher and Reagan’s economic policies: deregulation, exogenous vs. endoge- nous money, shadow banking vs. Volcker’s Rule. Very simply, the banks, whose lending determined deposits after Roosevelt, and were a public service became private enterprises whose deposits determine lending. These underlay the great moderation preceding 2006, and the subsequent crash.

3,447 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
Elinor Ostrom1
TL;DR: The Logic of Collective Action (LCA) as mentioned in this paper was a seminal work in modern democratic thought that challenged the assumption that groups would tend to form and take collective action in democratic societies.
Abstract: With the publication of The Logic of Collective Action in 1965, Mancur Olson challenged a cherished foundation of modern democratic thought that groups would tend to form and take collective action...

3,231 citations

31 Jan 1982
TL;DR: This article reviewed various studies which have provided a description of and possible explanation to patterns of innovation adoption in the agricultural sector and highlighted the diversity in observed patterns among various farmers' classes as well as differences in results from different studies in different socioeconomic environments.
Abstract: This paper is a revised version of Staff Working Paper 444 It reviews various studies which have provided a description of and possible explanation to patterns of innovation adoption in the agricultural sector It therefore covers both empirical and theoretical studies The discussion highlights the diversity in observed patterns among various farmers' classes as well as differences in results from different studies in different socio-economic environments, and reviews the attempts to rationalize such findings Special attention is given to the methodologies which are commonly used in studies of innovation adoption, and suggestions for improvements of such work through the use of appropriate economometric methods are provided The diversity of experiences with different innovations in different geographical and socio-cultural environments suggest that studies of adoption patterns should provide detailed information on attributes of the institutional, social and cultural setting and their interactions with economic factors These may be an important element in explaining conflicting experiences

3,145 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization, including subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians.
Abstract: We present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization. Subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians emerge naturally in the model. We use the model and several extensions to understand why commercialization and privatization might work, and what forces contribute to effective restructuring of public enterprises. We illustrate the model using examples from several countries.

3,143 citations