Priscilla Clapp

Bio: Priscilla Clapp is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Martial law & Sanctions. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 10 citations.

Prospects for Rapprochement between the United States and Myanmar

Abstract: If rapprochement is defined as the establishment or resumption of harmonious relations, one must conclude that it is premature to apply this concept to the current state of relations between the United States and Myanmar. While the shift in US policy towards Myanmar's military junta--the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)--which seeks to balance sanctions with engagement, could, under the right circumstances, lead in this direction, we have not seen rapprochement yet and may not see it for some time to come. Therefore, it is probably more appropriate to describe the current state of US-Myanmar relations as "suspended animation", with both sides waiting for the completion of Myanmar's transition process to decide whether it will create an environment conducive to engagement and possibly rapprochement as well. US relations with Myanmar have been stuck in neutral gear for at least two decades, with the engine running, but propelling the vehicle neither forwards nor backwards. During this period, major changes have occurred in Southeast Asia, leading to much broader and more cordial relations between the United States and all ASEAN members, except Myanmar. Yet, in the case of US-Myanmar relations, until recently the fundamentals of the relationship had been barely revisited by either side for decades. While a stubborn, entrenched regime concentrated single-mindedly on consolidating its grip on internal power, repressing and impoverishing its population in the process, a frustrated superpower piled on layers of punishing sanctions in the interest of supporting Myanmar's embattled political opposition. Is the time of reckoning now approaching? The Obama administration's seven-month review of US policy towards Myanmar in 2009 was Washington's first comprehensive reassessment of the bilateral relationship in decades. The review happened to coincide with the final stages of the SPDC's "seven-step plan" for replacing two decades of martial law with "discipline-flourishing democracy". The aim of this paper is to explore whether genuine rapprochement between the United States and Myanmar can emerge from this convergence of events. Underlying Factors In the United States The Obama administration came to office with the stated intention of reorienting US foreign policy towards greater collaboration and cooperation with international partners and opening the door to engagement with previously shunned "outposts of tyranny". The idea was that confrontation, particularly in a unilateral form, might not be the best or only means of achieving US policy objectives with unfriendly governments. (1) Immediately after President Obama's inauguration, the new Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travelled to Asia, including Southeast Asia, where she expressed frustration with the failure of either sanctions or engagement strategies to exert a positive influence on the behaviour of Myanmar's military regime. (2) Secretary Clinton announced that the new administration would be reviewing America's Myanmar policy and, upon her return to Washington, initiated this review. During the long period of policy stasis in US-Myanmar relations, both sides did, of course, make small policy adjustments in response to events, which over time had the effect of modifying policy direction somewhat. In the case of the United States, these adjustments included additional sanctions when the regime cracked down on opposition groups (such as following the Depayin Incident in 2003), but there were also a series of more positive moves during the past decade to expand US humanitarian assistance to Myanmar. In fact, the United States became one of the largest donor governments in the international response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008. The policy review of 2009 allowed Washington to take full account of the various threads of past US policy and activities concerning Myanmar and to re-evaluate US interests in that country and the region in the context of current and prospective conditions and events. …

Asymmetric bargaining between Myanmar and China in the Myitsone Dam controversy: social opposition akin to David's stone against Goliath

Abstract: The Myitsone Dam suspension is an asymmetric negotiation between Naypyitaw and Beijing. The bilateral agreement of the hydropower project was concluded in 2009. However, Myanmar's civil society sta...

Threat Consensus and Rapprochement Failure: Revisiting the Collapse of US–North Korea Relations, 1994–2002

Abstract: Why do states that make a deliberate effort to pursue rapprochement sometimes fail? This article dissects US–North Korea relations between 1994 and 2002 as one way to better understand how deliberate decisions to dramatically improve relations with a historical adversary go awry. This vastly understudied period in US–North Korea relations started in late 1994 with an ambitious agreement to move toward diplomatic normalization through a gradual process based on reciprocal “action for action,” abruptly ending in 2002 with mutual acrimony and the resumption of long-standing hostility. Why did reciprocity strategies by both sides in the intervening period fail to deliver the promised relational change? The seemingly obvious explanation—a lack of consensus among US policy elites about North Korea policy—does not fit with what actually happened. Moreover, theories of rapprochement that might have anticipated success in the US–North Korea case cannot readily explain why rapprochement failed without resorting to situation-specific factors, which undermines their explanatory power. At the same time, theories of rapprochement that would have correctly predicted failure, on the basis of identity incompatibility or other unfavorable conditions, offer an incomplete account of events. Such rapprochement pessimists struggle to explain why the United States would seek rapprochement with North Korea if the prospects of success were so predictably dim, why the Clinton administration would settle on the rapprochement approach it did, and why it would simultaneously pursue rapprochement while publicly promoting North Korea as a threat. …

The United States and Myanmar: From Antagonists to Security Partners?

Abstract: This article provides an overview both of the considerable makeover that relations between the United States and Myanmar have undergone since Naypyidaw ushered in a programme of wide-ranging reforms, and of the main policy areas in relation to which Washington remains keen to induce further change. The article also aims to explain why, notwithstanding the significant improvement in bilateral relations and the Obama administration’s interest in also pursuing military engagement, progress in this field has remained rather limited. Focusing on the politics of US policymaking on Burma, the article argues that while the Obama administration was able to take the initiative on recalibrating US Burma policy, congressional resistance in particular, amid wider concerns shared by non-governmental organisations, has so far constrained the administration vis-a-vis US–Myanmar military-to-military relations.

Myanmar (Burma): Nationalism and International Ideology Trumps emic Norms of Interaction and Governance

Abstract: Burma also known as Myanmar is presently best known for political repression and extreme poverty, yet at one point it was a powerful Southeast Asian Kingdom and a thriving part of the British Empire. This chapter interprets Burma’s post-independence history through the lens of the Mode of Harmony through Holistic Engagement and concludes that the model fails to explain the country’s foreign policy. Burma’s foreign policy behavior does not fit the model due to the influence of a virulent type of Nationalism influenced by international ideological trends imposed first by the leaders of the independence movement and later on by military leaders. The chapter concludes that Burma’s best hope for stability and development is a transition to a truly emic form of nationalism that is more attuned to local values and less reliant on sharp dichotomies.