R. A. C. Parker

Bio: R. A. C. Parker is an academic researcher from Queen's University. The author has contributed to research in topics: World War II & Appeasement. The author has an hindex of 7, co-authored 12 publications receiving 256 citations.

Chamberlain and appeasement : British policy and the coming of the Second World War

Abstract: British Policy and German Grievances: Reparations and Rearmament - British Policy and the League of Nations: Challenges from Japan and Italy - British Policy and German Grievances: The Rhineland, Colonies and Frontiers - The Spanish Civil War - Chamberlain and Eden - Chamberlain and Halifax - Munich - From Munich to Prague - Guarantee to Poland - Making a 'Peace Front': Chamberlain and the Soviet Alliance - Confronting Italy, Japan and Germany: Chamberlain at Bay, April-August 1939 - The Outbreak of War - The Economies of 'Appeasement': British Rearmament and Strategy - The United States and its Dominions - Alternative Policies: Dissidents and Opponents

War as a Commitment Problem

Abstract: Although formal work on war generally sees war as a kind of bargaining breakdown resulting from asymmetric information, bargaining indivisibilities, or commitment problems, most analyses have focused on informational issues. But informational explanations and the models underlying them have at least two major limitations: they often provide a poor account of prolonged conflict, and they give an odd reading of the history of some cases. This article describes these limitations and argues that bargaining indivisibilities should really be seen as commitment problems. The present analysis then shows that a common mechanism links three important kinds of commitment problem: (1) preventive war, (2) preemptive attacks arising from first-strike or offensive advantages, and (3) conflicts resulting from bargaining over issues that affect future bargaining power. In each case, large, rapid shifts in the distribution of power can lead to war. Finally, the analysis elaborates a distinctly different mechanism based on a comparison of the cost of deterring an attack on the status quo with the expected cost of trying to eliminate the threat to the status quo.For helpful comments and criticisms, I thank James Fearon, Hein Goemans, Lisa Martin, Sebastian Mazzuca, Branislav Slantchev, and seminar participants at the University of Montreal–McGill Research Group in International Security, the Institute in Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Irvine, and University of California, Santa Barbara. I also gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-0315037).

The rise of the PR industry in Britain, 1979-98

Abstract: Public relations is politically and economically more important than ever. This article charts the growth of the PR industry in Britain since 1979. It sets out the major reasons for its growth and outlines some of the political and economic impacts of the expansion on the PR consultancy sector in Britain. In particular it focuses on the `tilt to the market' under Thatcher, the role of the PR industry in deregulation and privatization and the progressive abolition of controls on international movement of capital as exemplified in Britain by the `Big Bang'. In addition the article discusses the consequences of these developments in opening up new and expanded markets for PR consultancies.

Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement

Abstract: Great Britain faced an immensely complicated strategic problem in the 1930s, and important aspects of it can be stylized as a situation in which a state that is declining in power is unsure of the aims of a rising state. If those aims are limited, then the declining state prefers to appease the rising state's demands rather than go to war to oppose them. If, however, the rising state's demands are unlimited, then the declining state prefers fighting. And, given that the declining state is becoming weaker over time, it prefers fighting sooner rather than later if there is to be a war. This situation creates a trade-off: The earlier a state stands firm, the stronger it will be if war ensues, but the higher the chance of fighting an unnecessary war. In equilibrium, the declining state generally tries to appease the rising state by making a series of concessions.

V.K. Wellington Koo and the Emergence of Modern China

Abstract: Chinese diplomat V.K. Wellington Koo (1888-1985) was involved in virtually every foreign and domestic crisis in twentieth-century China. After earning a Ph.D. from Columbia University, Koo entered government service in 1912 intent on revising the unequal treaty system imposed on China in the nineteenth century, believing that breaking the shackles of imperialism would bring China into the "family of nations." His pursuit of this nationalistic agenda was immediately interrupted by Chinese civil war and Japanese imperialism during World War I. In the 1930s Koo attempted to use international law to force western powers to honor their treaty obligations to punish Japanese expansion. Koo also participated in creating the League of Nations and later the United Nations in the hope that collective security would become reality.

Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the Political Economy of Rearmament

Abstract: Astate that is confronted with a grave external threat has three basic options of response, each of which involves certain trade-offs. First, it can strengthen its military. Rearmament, or “internal balancing,” allows it to maintain its diplomatic freedom of action, but its economy may suffer from the strain of accelerating the production of weapons of war. Second, it can join forces with another power. Alliances may obviate the need for an arms buildup, but they carry the risk that the state will be abandoned by its partners or drawn into undesired conflicts. Finally, it can attempt to reconcile with its adversaries by conceding to some of their demands. Appeasement may be the least troublesome way to eliminate a threat, but it is also the most risky because it transfers valued resources to a potential opponent. After weighing these options, the state should choose the policy, or combination of policies, that will provide an acceptable level of security at the lowest overall cost. 1 The foregoing account is appealingly parsimonious, but it captures only part of the story. States are frequently racked by bitter internal debates over how to deal with international pressures, and changes in their political leadership sometimes bring about sudden shifts in their behavior. Of the three strategies described above, rearmament is often the most acutely divisive. It requires a sharp increase in the extraction and mobilization of resources from society, so it can become highly politicized. Some groups will inevitably bear a heavier burden than others, and their discontent may eventually endanger the regime’s hold on power or its ability to prepare for war. To ensure domestic