R. J. R. Blair

Bio: R. J. R. Blair is an academic researcher from National Institutes of Health. The author has contributed to research in topics: Psychopathy & Emotional expression. The author has an hindex of 39, co-authored 43 publications receiving 14423 citations. Previous affiliations of R. J. R. Blair include University College London.

Dissociable neural responses to facial expressions of sadness and anger

Abstract: Previous neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies have investigated the neural substrates which mediate responses to fearful, disgusted and happy expressions. No previous studies have investigated the neural substrates which mediate responses to sad and angry expressions. Using functional neuroimaging, we tested two hypotheses. First, we tested whether the amygdala has a neural response to sad and/or angry facial expressions. Secondly, we tested whether the orbitofrontal cortex has a specific neural response to angry facial expressions. Volunteer subjects were scanned, using PET, while they performed a sex discrimination task involving static grey-scale images of faces expressing varying degrees of sadness and anger. We found that increasing intensity of sad facial expression was associated with enhanced activity in the left amygdala and right temporal pole. In addition, we found that increasing intensity of angry facial expression was associated with enhanced activity in the orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortex. We found no support for the suggestion that angry expressions generate a signal in the amygdala. The results provide evidence for dissociable, but interlocking, systems for the processing of distinct categories of negative facial expression.

Impaired social response reversal. A case of 'acquired sociopathy'.

Abstract: In this study, we report a patient (J.S.) who, following trauma to the right frontal region, including the orbitofrontal cortex, presented with 'acquired sociopathy'. His behaviour was notably aberrant and marked by high levels of aggression and a callous disregard for others. A series of experimental investigations were conducted to address the cognitive dysfunction that might underpin his profoundly aberrant behaviour. His performance was contrasted with that of a second patient (C.L.A.), who also presented with a grave dysexecutive syndrome but no socially aberrant behaviour, and five inmates of Wormwood Scrubs prison with developmental psychopathy. While J.S. showed no reversal learning impairment, he presented with severe difficulty in emotional expression recognition, autonomic responding and social cognition. Unlike the comparison populations, J.S. showed impairment in: the recognition of, and autonomic responding to, angry and disgusted expressions; attributing the emotions of fear, anger and embarrassment to story protagonists; and the identification of violations of social behaviour. The findings are discussed with reference to models regarding the role of the orbitofrontal cortex in the control of aggression. It is suggested that J.S.'s impairment is due to a reduced ability to generate expectations of others' negative emotional reactions, in particular anger. In healthy individuals, these representations act to suppress behaviour that is inappropriate in specific social contexts. Moreover, it is proposed that the orbitofrontal cortex may be implicated specifically either in the generation of these expectations or the use of these expectations to suppress inappropriate behaviour.

The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Abstract: Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.

The empathy quotient: an investigation of adults with Asperger syndrome or high functioning autism, and normal sex differences.

Abstract: Empathy is an essential part of normal social functioning, yet there are precious few instruments for measuring individual differences in this domain. In this article we review psychological theories of empathy and its measurement. Previous instruments that purport to measure this have not always focused purely on empathy. We report a new self-report questionnaire, the Empathy Quotient (EQ), for use with adults of normal intelligence. It contains 40 empathy items and 20 filler/control items. On each empathy item a person can score 2, 1, or 0, so the EQ has a maximum score of 80 and a minimum of zero. In Study 1 we employed the EQ with n = 90 adults (65 males, 25 females) with Asperger Syndrome (AS) or high-functioning autism (HFA), who are reported clinically to have difficulties in empathy. The adults with AS/HFA scored significantly lower on the EQ than n = 90 (65 males, 25 females) age-matched controls. Of the adults with AS/HFA, 81% scored equal to or fewer than 30 points out of 80, compared with only 12% of controls. In Study 2 we carried out a study of n = 197 adults from a general population, to test for previously reported sex differences (female superiority) in empathy. This confirmed that women scored significantly higher than men. The EQ reveals both a sex difference in empathy in the general population and an empathy deficit in AS/HFA.

Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases.

Abstract: There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cogni- tive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mecha- nism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors (e.g., alarm, social facilitation, vicar- iousness of emotions, mother-infant responsiveness, and the modeling of competitors and predators) that are crucial for the reproduc- tive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model (PAM), together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature (similarity, familiarity, past experience, explicit teach- ing, and salience). It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empa- thy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of de- velopment, and situations.