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Showing papers by "Rafael La Porta published in 1997"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors showed that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets than those with stronger investor protections.
Abstract: Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.

10,005 citations


Posted Content
TL;DR: The authors showed that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets than those with stronger investor protections.
Abstract: Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.

1,370 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the hypothesis that the superior return to so-called value stocks is the result of expectational errors made by investors and find that a significant portion of the return difference between value and glamour stocks is attributable to earnings surprises that are systematically more positive for value stocks.
Abstract: This article examines the hypothesis that the superior return to so-called value stocks is the result of expectational errors made by investors. We study stock price reactions around earnings announcements for value and glamour stocks over a 5-year period after portfolio formation. The announcement returns suggest that a significant portion of the return difference between value and glamour stocks is attributable to earnings surprises that are systematically more positive for value stocks. The evidence is inconsistent with a risk-based explanation for the return differential. MOST FINANCE RESEARCHERS AGREE that simple value strategies based on such ratios as book-to-market, earnings-to-price and cash flow-to-price have produced superior returns over a long period of time.' Interpreting these superior returns, however, has been more controversial. On one side, Fama-French (1992) argue that these superior returns represent compensation for risk along the lines of the Merton (1973) intertemporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) where portfolios formed on book-to-market ratios are interpreted as mimicking portfolios whose returns are correlated with relevant state variables representing consumption or production opportunities. On the other side, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (LSV, 1994) contend that there is little evidence that high book-to-market and high cash-flow-to-price stocks are riskier based on conventional notions of systematic risk. LSV argue instead that value stocks have been underpriced relative to their risk and return characteristics for various behavioral and institutional reasons. A specific behavioral explanation pursued in more depth by LSV (1994) is that the superior return on value stocks is due to expectational errors made by investors. In particular, investors tend to extrapolate past growth rates too far into the future. Evidence going back to Little (1962) suggests that company

669 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on two of the most likely channels for social losses: (1) increased prices as firms capitalize on their market power; and (2) layoffs and lower wages as firms seek to roll back generous labor contracts.
Abstract: Criticisms of privatization have centered around the possibility that the observed higher profitability of privatized companies comes at the expense of the rest of society. In this paper we focus on two of the most likely channels for social losses: (1) increased prices as firms capitalize on their market power; and (2) layoffs and lower wages as firms seek to roll back generous labor contracts. Using data for all 18 non-financial privatizations that took place in Mexico between 1983 and 1991 we find that privatized firms quickly bridge the pre-privatization performance gap with industry-matched control groups. For example, privatization is followed by a 24 percentage point increase in the ratio of operating income to sales. We roughly decompose those gains in profitability as follows: 10 percent of the increase is due to higher product prices, 33 percent of the increase represents a transfer from laid-off workers; and productivity gains account for the residual 57 percent. Transfers from society to the firm are partially offset by taxes which absorb slightly over half the gains in operating income. Finally, we also find evidence indicating that deregulation is associated with faster convergence to industry benchmarks.

128 citations


Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on two of the most likely channels for social losses: (1) increased prices as firms capitalize on the market power; and (2) layoffs and lower wages as firms seek to roll back generous labor contracts.
Abstract: Criticisms of privatization have centered around the possibility that the observed higher profitability of privatized companies comes at the expense of the rest of society. In this paper we focus on two of the most likely channels for social losses: (1) increased prices as firms capitalize on the market power; and (2) layoffs and lower wages as firms seek to roll back generous labor contracts. Using data for all 218 non-financial privatizations that took place in Mexico between 1983 and 1991 we find that privatized firms quickly bridge the pre-privatization performance gap with industry-matched control groups. For example, privatization is followed by a 24 percentage point increase in the ratio of operating income to sales. We roughly decompose those gains in profitability as follows: 10 percent of the increase is due to higher product prices; 33 percent of the increase represents a transfer from laid-off workers; and productivity gains account for the residual 57 percent. Transfers from society to the firm are partially offset by taxes which absorb slightly over half the gains in operating income. Finally, we also find evidence indicating that deregulation is associated with faster convergence to industry benchmarks.

108 citations


Posted Content
TL;DR: The authors show that investment strategies that seek to exploit errors in analysts' forecasts earn superior returns because expectations about future growth in earnings are too extreme, while value stocks may earn high returns because they are more risky.
Abstract: Previous research has shown that stocks with low prices relative to book value, cash flow, earnings, or dividends (that is, value stocks) earn high returns. Value stocks may earn high returns because they are more risky. Alternatively, systematic errors in expectations may explain the high returns earned by value stocks. I test for the existence of systematic errors using survey data on forecasts by stock market analysts. I show that investment strategies that seek to exploit errors in analysts' forecasts earn superior returns because expectations about future growth in earnings are too extreme.

94 citations


Posted Content
TL;DR: This article showed that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets than those with stronger investor protections.
Abstract: Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.

50 citations


Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, a new bankruptcy procedure that makes use of multiple auctions was developed. The procedure is designed to work even when capital markets do not function well (for example in developing" economies, or in economies in transition) although it can be used in all economies."
Abstract: We develop a new bankruptcy procedure that makes use of multiple auctions. The procedure" is designed to work even when capital markets do not function well (for example in developing" economies, or in economies in transition) -- although it can be used in all economies."

6 citations