Showing papers by "Rafael La Porta published in 2001"
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 75 countries and show that the official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries.
Abstract: We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 75 countries. The data set contains information on the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have fewer entry regulations. The evidence is inconsistent with Pigouvian (helping hand) theories of benevolent regulation, but support the (grabbing hand) view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.
679 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present new data on the regulation of the entry of start-up firms in 85 countries, covering the number if procedures, official time, and official costs that a startup firm must bear before it can operate legally.
Abstract: The authors present new data on the regulation of the entry of start-up firms in 85 countries The data cover the number if procedures, official time, and official costs that a start-up firm must bear before it can operate legally The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries Countries that regulate entry more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economics, but not better quality goods (public or private) Countries with more democratic and limited governments regulate entry more lightly The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulations, but supports the public choice view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats
163 citations