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Rafael La Porta

Bio: Rafael La Porta is an academic researcher from Dartmouth College. The author has contributed to research in topics: Shareholder & Enforcement. The author has an hindex of 66, co-authored 107 publications receiving 107032 citations. Previous affiliations of Rafael La Porta include Harvard University & National Bureau of Economic Research.


Papers
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms, and test this model using a sample of 371 large firms from 27 wealthy economies.
Abstract: We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 371 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders, and weaker evidence of the benefits of higher flow ownership by controlling shareholders for corporate valuation.

383 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a bounced check were measured and described by Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries.
Abstract: In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries. Moreover, procedural formalism is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, more corruption, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and inferior access to justice. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.

307 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate a neglected aspect of financial systems of many countries around the world; government ownership of banks and find that government ownership is associated with slower subsequent financial development.
Abstract: In this paper, we investigate a neglected aspect of financial systems of many countries around the world; government ownership of banks. We assemble data which establish four findings. First, government ownership of banks is large and pervasive around the world. Second, such ownership is particularly significant in countries with low levels of per capita income, underdeveloped financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Third, government ownership of banks is associated with slower subsequent financial development. Finally, government ownership of banks is associated with lower subsequent growth of per capita income, and in particular with lower growth of productivity rather than slower factor accumulation. This evidence is inconsistent with the optimistic "development" theories of government ownership of banks common in the 1960s, but supports the more recent "political" theories of the effects of government ownership of firms.

189 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors used a newly assembled sample of 1,528 regions from 83 countries to compare the speed of per capita income convergence within and across countries, and found that regional growth is shaped by similar factors as national growth, such as geography and human capital.
Abstract: We use a newly assembled sample of 1,528 regions from 83 countries to compare the speed of per capita income convergence within and across countries. Regional growth is shaped by similar factors as national growth, such as geography and human capital. Regional convergence rate is about 2 % per year, comparable to that between countries. Regional convergence is faster in richer countries, and countries with better capital markets. A calibration of a neoclassical growth model suggests that significant barriers to factor mobility within countries are needed to account for the evidence.

183 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: This article examined the hypothesis that the superior return to so-called value stocks is the result of expectational errors made by investors and found that a significant portion of the return difference between value and glamour stocks is attributable to earnings surprises that are systematically more positive for value stocks.
Abstract: This paper examines the hypothesis that the superior return to so-called value stocks is the result of expectational errors made by investors. We study stock price reactions around earnings announcements for value and glamour stocks over a 5 year period after portfolio formation. The announcement returns suggest that a significant portion of the return difference between value and glamour stocks is attributable to earnings surprises that are systematically more positive for value stocks. The evidence is inconsistent with a risk-based explanation for the return differential.

182 citations


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TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Abstract: This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors, with German and Scandinavian civil law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.

14,563 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and French civil law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil law countries located in the middle.
Abstract: This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and Frenchcivil-law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.

13,984 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors showed that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets than those with stronger investor protections.
Abstract: Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.

10,005 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.
Abstract: We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means’s image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash f low rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management.

8,270 citations