The course is focused on historical texts, most of them philosophical. Context for understanding the texts and the course of democratic development will be provided in lecture and discussions, and by some background readings (Dunn). We begin with the remarkable Athenian democracy, and its frequent enemy the Spartan oligarchy. In Athens legislation was passed directly by an assembly of all citizens, and executive officials were selected by lot rather than by competitive election. Athenian oligarchs such as Plato more admired Sparta, and their disdain for the democracy became the judgment of the ages, until well after the modern democratic revolutions. Marsilius of Padua in the early Middle Ages argued for popular sovereignty. The Italian citystates of the Middle Ages did without kings, and looked back to Rome and Greece for republican models. During the English Civil War republicans debated whether the few or the many should be full citizens of the regime. The English, French, and American revolutions struggled with justifying and establishing a representative democracy suitable for a large state, and relied on election rather than lot to select officials. The English established a constitutional monarchy, admired in Europe, and adapted by the Americans in their republican constitution. The American Revolution helped inspire the French, and the French inspired republican and democratic revolution throughout Europe during the 19 century.

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Democracy and Its Critics

Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics

Action, emotion and will

The Man of Reason

Morality and the Emotions

Emotions cannot be fully understood in purely cognitive terms. Nor can they be fully understood as mere feelings with no content. But it has not been easy to give an account of the relation of affect and cognition in a way that preserves the perceived unity of emotional experience. Consequently, emotion theories tend to lean either toward cognitivism, or, alternatively, the view that emotions are basically non-cognitive affairs. The aim of this paper is to argue for an account of emotion as a unity of affect and cognition. Emotions, it will be suggested, do not combine, blend, add, or causally relate cognition to affect, or affect to cognition, but are rather original unities which should be viewed as coordinate with, rather than subordinate to, either cognition, perception, feeling, or any other basic mental category.

Emotion as patheception

I. INTRODUCTION Ever since Muslim thinkers came into contact with Greek Philosophy and science in the seventh century, the relation between Islamic philosophy and theology has been an uneasy one. Muslim philosophers often felt compelled to defend their philosophical activities against the suspicions and attacks of the theologians, and some developed considerable energy and effort to the harmonization of philosophy and religion on some fundamental points.

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Ghazali on Miracles and Necessary Connection

This paper aims at clarifying the role which the concept of 'divine sovereignty' plays in the discussions which are taking place among Islamic thinkers (and others) concerning the possibility of democracy in an Islamic context. It argues that 'sovereignty' has at least two meanings, one 'factual', the other 'normative'. The paper also argues that the second sense of 'sovereignty' allows us to construe talk of 'divine sovereignty' as an attempt by Islamic thinkers to go beyond the merely procedural views of democracy which focus on the familiar procedures of power contestation, election and accountability.

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People vs God: The logic of ‘divine sovereignty' in Islamic democratic discourse

The object of this chapter is to discuss the meaning that “constitutionalism” has (or may come to have) in the context of Arab-Islamic political thought. Other terms which have sometimes been used as equivalents of “constitutionalism” in Western languages include “rule of law”, Rechtsstaat, and etat de droit. Some of these terms have naturalsounding equivalents in Arabic: thus dawlat al-qanun will do very nicely for Rechtsstaat, and hukm al-qanun for rule of law. “Constitutionalism”, however, has no readily identifiable Arabic equivalent. In Western political thought, terms such as “constitutionalism” and “rule of law” have come to express richer and more complex meanings than are suggested by etymology or mere juxtaposition of words. This is usually the mark of terms and concepts that have come to play a pivotal role in the theory of the subject matter in which the term is used. Such terms invariably carry a greater semantic burden than is suggested by their linguistic derivation or by the sum of their parts. The same cannot be said for the equivalent terms used in Arab-Islamic political writings. But this need not mean that Arab-Islamic political thought does not know what constitutionalism means, or that it is conceptually unequipped to deal with the issues that constitutionalism addresses. On the contrary, a concern with ruling in accordance with the law, the people’s right to oppose unjust rule, liberties which rulers are not permitted to infringe, have existed in Arab-Islamic political thought since the earliest times. There is much to be said for discussing the meaning and role constitutionalism has in Arab-Islamic political thought. Firstly, a discussion of this type can help us make sense of (or at least thematize) some of the concerns that are being expressed by Arab and Islamic political thinkers. Secondly, the concept of “constitutionalism” has come to be regarded as extremely important, as far as Western political thought is concerned.

Raja Bahlul

Papers

Emotion as patheception

Ghazali on Miracles and Necessary Connection

People vs God: The logic of ‘divine sovereignty' in Islamic democratic discourse

Is Constitutionalism Compatible with Islam

Avicenna and the Problem of Universals