Statistical Analysis with Missing Data

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The Theory of Industrial Organization

Publisher Summary This chapter reviews the supply chain coordination with contracts. Numerous supply chain models are discussed. In each model, the supply chain optimal actions are identified. The chapter extends the newsvendor model by allowing the retailer to choose the retail price in addition to the stocking quantity. Coordination is more complex in this setting because the incentives provided to align one action might cause distortions with the other action. The newsvendor model is also extended by allowing the retailer to exert costly effort to increase demand. Coordination is challenging because the retailer's effort is noncontractible—that is, the firms cannot write contracts based on the effort chosen. The chapter also discusses an infinite horizon stochastic demand model in which the retailer receives replenishments from a supplier after a constant lead time. Coordination requires that the retailer chooses a large basestock level.

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts

Perspectives in supply chain risk management

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Defining and developing measures of lean production

We investigate the role of options (contingent claims) in a buyer-supplier system. Specifically using a two-period model with correlated demand, we illustrate how options provide flexibility to a buyer to respond to market changes in the second period. We also study the implications of such arrangements between a buyer and a supplier for coordination of the channel. We show that, in general, channel coordination can be achieved only if we allow the exercise price to be piecewise linear. We develop sufficient conditions on the cost parameters such that linear prices coordinate the channel. We derive the appropriate prices for channel coordination which, however, violate the individual rationality constraint for the supplier. Contrary to popular belief (based on simpler models) we show that credit for returns offered by the supplier does not always coordinate the channel and alleviate the individual rationality constraint. Credit for returns are useful only on a subset of the feasibility region under which channel coordination is achievable with linear prices. Finally, we demonstrate (numerically) the benefits of options in improving channel performance and evaluate the magnitude of loss due to lack of coordination.

Coordination and Flexibility in Supply Contracts with Options

Supply chain management is becoming an increasingly important issue, especially when in most industries the cost of materials purchased comprises 40-60% of the total sales revenue. Despite the benefits cited for single sourcing in the popular literature, there is enough evidence of industries having two/three sources for most parts. In this paper we address the operational issue of quantity allocation between two uncertain suppliers and its effects on the inventory policies of the buyer. Based on the type of delivery contract a buyer has with the suppliers, we suggest three models for the supply process. Model I is a one-delivery contract with all of the order quantity delivered either in the current period with probability β, or in the next period with probability 1-β. Model II is also a one-delivery contract with a random fraction of the order quantity delivered in the current period; the portion of the order quantity not delivered is cancelled. Model III is similar to Model II with the remaining quantity delivered in the next period. We derive the optimal ordering policies that minimize the total ordering, holding and penalty costs with backlogging. We show that the optimal ordering policy in period n for each of these models is as follows: for x â¥ A«n, order nothing; for vIn â¤ x < A«n, use only one supplier; and for x <vIn, order from both suppliers. For the limiting case in the single period version of Model I, we derive conditions under which one would continue ordering from one or the other or both suppliers. For Model II, we give sufficient conditions for not using the second more expensive supplier when the demand and yield distributions have some special form. For the single period version of Models II and III with equal marginal ordering costs we show that the optimal order quantities follow a ratio rule when demand is exponential and yields are either normal or gamma distributed.

Diversification under supply uncertainty

Creating mutual value: Lessons learned from ventures serving base of the pyramid producers

We study a single period multiproduct inventory problem with substitution and proportional costs and revenues. We consider N products and N demand classes with full downward substitution, i.e., excess demand for class i can be satisfied using product j for i ≥ j. We first discuss a two-stage profit maximization formulation for the multiproduct substitution problem. We show that a greedy allocation policy is optimal. We use this to write the expected profits and its first partials explicitly. This in turn enables us to prove additional properties of the profit function and several interesting properties of the optimal solution. In a limited computational study using two products, we illustrate the benefits of solving for the optimal quantities when substitution is considered at the ordering stage over similar computations without considering substitution while ordering. Specifically, we show that the benefits are higher with high demand variability, low substitution cost, low profit margins (or low price to cost ratio), high salvage values, and similarity of products in terms of prices and costs.

Single-Period Multiproduct Inventory Models with Substitution

We develop a general framework for the analysis of decentralized distribution systems. We carry the analysis in terms of a simplified model which entailsN retailers who face stochastic demands and hold stocks locally and/or at one or more central locations. An exogenously specified fraction of any unsatisfied demand (demand greater than locally available stock) at a retailer could be satisfied using excess stocks at other retailers and/or stocks held at a central location. We consider inventory ordering and allocation decisions. The operational decisions of inventory and allocation of stocks and the financial decision of allocation of revenues/costs must be made in a way consistent with the individual incentives of the various independent retailers. We develop a "coopetitive" framework for the sequential decisions of inventory and allocation. We introduce the notion ofclaims that allows us to separate the ownership (with decision rights) and the location of inventories in the system. For the cooperative shipping and allocation decision, we use the concept of core and develop sufficient conditions for the existence of the core. For the inventory decision, we develop conditions for the existence of a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. For this decentralized system, we show that there exists an allocation mechanism that achieves the first-best solution for inventory deployment and allocation. We develop conditions under which the first-best equilibrium will be unique. Our model can be easily generalized to include complicated ownership structures such as "super dealers," partnerships, "inventory speculators," and situations in retail e-commerce settings such as "click-through arrangements," separation of "demand generators," and "fulfillment houses," etc. It can also be applied to situations involving capacity allocations and product substitutions.

Ravi Anupindi

Papers

Coordination and Flexibility in Supply Contracts with Options

Diversification under supply uncertainty

Creating mutual value: Lessons learned from ventures serving base of the pyramid producers

Single-Period Multiproduct Inventory Models with Substitution

A General Framework for the Study of Decentralized Distribution Systems