René Marois

Bio: René Marois is an academic researcher from Vanderbilt University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Attentional blink & Working memory. The author has an hindex of 44, co-authored 98 publications receiving 9466 citations. Previous affiliations of René Marois include Allen Institute for Brain Science & Yale University.

Capacity limit of visual short-term memory in human posterior parietal cortex

Abstract: At any instant, our visual system allows us to perceive a rich and detailed visual world. Yet our internal, explicit representation of this visual world is extremely sparse: we can only hold in mind a minute fraction of the visual scene. These mental representations are stored in visual short-term memory (VSTM). Even though VSTM is essential for the execution of a wide array of perceptual and cognitive functions, and is supported by an extensive network of brain regions, its storage capacity is severely limited. With the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging, we show here that this capacity limit is neurally reflected in one node of this network: activity in the posterior parietal cortex is tightly correlated with the limited amount of scene information that can be stored in VSTM. These results suggest that the posterior parietal cortex is a key neural locus of our impoverished mental representation of the visual world.

The attentional blink: A review of data and theory

Abstract: Under conditions of rapid serial visual presentation, subjects display a reduced ability to report the second of two targets(Target2; T2) in a stream of distractors if it appearswithin200-500 msec of Target 1 (Tl). This effect. known as the attentional blink(AB),has been central in characterizing the limits of humans’ ability to consciously perceive stimuli distributed across time. Here, we review theoretical accounts of the AB and examine how they explain key findings in the literature. We conclude that the AB arises from attentional demands of Tl for selection, working memory encoding, episodic registration,and response selection, which prevents this high-level central resource from being applied to T2 at shortT1-T2 lags. Tl processing also transiently impairs the redeployment of these attentional resources to subsequent targets and the inhibition of distractors that appear in close temporal proximity to T2. Although these findings are consistent with a multifactorial account of the AB,they can also be largely explained by assuming that the activation of these multiple processes depends on a common capacity-limited attentional process for selecting behaviorally relevant events presented among temporally distributed distractors. Thus, at its core, the attentional blink may ultimately reveal the temporal limits of the deployment of selective attention.

The role of the fusiform face area in social cognition: implications for the pathobiology of autism.

Abstract: A region in the lateral aspect of the fusiform gyrus (FG) is more engaged by human faces than any other category of image. It has come to be known as the 'fusiform face area' (FFA). The origin and extent of this specialization is currently a topic of great interest and debate. This is of special relevance to autism, because recent studies have shown that the FFA is hypoactive to faces in this disorder. In two linked functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of healthy young adults, we show here that the FFA is engaged by a social attribution task (SAT) involving perception of human-like interactions among three simple geometric shapes. The amygdala, temporal pole, medial prefrontal cortex, inferolateral frontal cortex and superior temporal sulci were also significantly engaged. Activation of the FFA to a task without faces challenges the received view that the FFA is restricted in its activities to the perception of faces. We speculate that abstract semantic information associated with faces is encoded in the FG region and retrieved for social computations. From this perspective, the literature on hypoactivation of the FFA in autism may be interpreted as a reflection of a core social cognitive mechanism underlying the disorder.

Posterior parietal cortex activity predicts individual differences in visual short-term memory capacity

Abstract: Humans show a severe capacity limit in the number of objects they can store in visual short-term memory (VSTM). We recently demonstrated with functional magnetic resonance imaging that VSTM storage capacity estimated in averaged group data correlated strongly with posterior parietal/superior occipital cortex activity (Todd & Marois, 2004). However, individuals varied widely in their VSTM capacity. Here, we examined the neural basis of these individual differences. A voxelwise, individualdifferences analysis revealed a significant correlation between posterior parietal cortex (PPC) activity and individuals’ VSTM storage capacity. In addition, a region-of-interest analysis indicated that other brain regions, particularly visual occipital cortex, may contribute to individual differences in VSTM capacity. Thus, although not ruling out contributions from other brain regions, the individual-differences approach supports a key role for the PPC in VSTM by demonstrating that its activity level predicts individual differences in VSTM storage capacity.

疟原虫var基因转换速率变化导致抗原变异[英]／Paul H, Robert P, Christodoulou Z, et al//Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A

Abstract: 抗原变异可使得多种致病微生物易于逃避宿主免疫应答。表达在感染红细胞表面的恶性疟原虫红细胞表面蛋白1（PfPMP1）与感染红细胞、内皮细胞、树突状细胞以及胎盘的单个或多个受体作用，在黏附及免疫逃避中起关键的作用。每个单倍体基因组var基因家族编码约60种成员，通过启动转录不同的var基因变异体为抗原变异提供了分子基础。

Control of goal-directed and stimulus-driven attention in the brain

Abstract: We review evidence for partially segregated networks of brain areas that carry out different attentional functions. One system, which includes parts of the intraparietal cortex and superior frontal cortex, is involved in preparing and applying goal-directed (top-down) selection for stimuli and responses. This system is also modulated by the detection of stimuli. The other system, which includes the temporoparietal cortex and inferior frontal cortex, and is largely lateralized to the right hemisphere, is not involved in top-down selection. Instead, this system is specialized for the detection of behaviourally relevant stimuli, particularly when they are salient or unexpected. This ventral frontoparietal network works as a 'circuit breaker' for the dorsal system, directing attention to salient events. Both attentional systems interact during normal vision, and both are disrupted in unilateral spatial neglect.

Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition

Abstract: We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with oth- ers and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The develop- mental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.