American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

/pdf/current-index-to-legal-periodicals-8re353ze53.pdf

Current index to legal periodicals

http://summit.sfu.ca/system/files/iritems1/19746/etd20617.pdf

Rationalizing professional misconduct: An examination of techniques of neutralization in lawyer discipline proceedings

The U.S. faces a mounting crisis in access to justice. Vast numbers of ordinary Americans represent themselves in routine legal matters daily in our over-burdened courts. Obtaining ex ante legal advice is effectively impossible for almost everyone except larger corporate entities, organizations and governments. In this paper, I explain why, as a matter of economic policy, it is essential that the legal profession abandon the prohibition on the corporate practice of law in order to remedy the access problem. The prohibitions on the corporate practice of law rule out the use of essential organizational and contracting tools widely used in most industries to control costs, improve quality and reduce errors. This keeps prices for legal assistance high by cutting the industry off from the ordinary economic benefits of scale, data analysis, product and process engineering and diversified sources of capital and innovation. Lawyers operating in law firms have not generated these benefits but they have appeared in countries, such as the U.K., where the corporate practice of law doctrine does not prevail. Eliminating restrictions on the corporate practice of law can significantly improve the access ordinary Americans have to legal help in a law-thick world.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2347523_code49181.pdf?abstractid=2333990&mirid=1

The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice through the Corporate Practice of Law

This article argues that there are three narratives to technology’s role in augmenting, disrupting or ending the current legal services environment—each of which gives life to particular legal professional archetypes in how lawyers react to LawTech. In tracing these influential narratives and associated archetypes, we map the evolving role of LawTech, the legal profession and legal services delivery. The article concludes by proffering a further narrative of technology’s role in law known as ‘adaptive professionalism’, which emphasises the complex, contextual nature of the legal professional field. Through this normative rather than descriptive account it is suggested that the profession may access the benefits of technological developments while holding on to essential notions of ethical conduct, access to justice and the rule of law.

/pdf/the-profession-s-engagements-with-lawtech-narratives-and-53q0dbih5g.pdf

The Profession(s)’ Engagements with LawTech: Narratives and Archetypes of Future Law

This article argues that legal education is currently grappling with three narratives of technology’s role in either augmenting, disrupting or ending the current legal services environment. It identifies each of these narratives within features of curriculum design that respond to legal professional archetypes of how lawyers react to lawtech. In tracing how these influential narratives and associated archetypes feature in the law curriculum, the article maps the evolving intersection of lawtech, the legal profession and legal services delivery in legal education. It concludes by proffering the additional narrative of ‘adaptive professionalism’, which emphasises the complex and contextual nature of the legal profession, and therefore provides a more coherent direction for adaptation of the law curriculum. Through this more nuanced and grounded approach, it is suggested that law schools might equip law graduates to embrace technological developments while holding on to essential notions of ethical conduct, access to justice and the rule of law.

/pdf/the-legal-academy-s-engagements-with-lawtech-technology-voh78osnnq.pdf

The legal academy’s engagements with lawtech: technology narratives and archetypes as drivers of change

What explains the dramatic contrast between legal services regulation in the United States and anglophone Canada, on one hand, and England/Wales and Australia, on the other? In order to help explain these divergent regulatory choices, and to further comparative analysis, this Essay proposes a taxonomy of theories of legal services regulation drawn from these common-law jurisdictions. Although most jurisdictions employ a combination of approaches, as well as some hybrid methods, the Essay identifies the two dominant perspectives: (1) the professionalist-independent framework, predominate in anglophone North America, and (2) the consumerist-competitive framework found in the common law jurisdictions of Northern Europe and Australia. This theoretical divide, in turn, helps explain why the United States and Canada have largely adhered to a body of self-regulation focused upon aspirations of professionalism and professional independence. Australia and England/Wales, by contrast, have embarked upon market-oriented reform that purports to promote consumer protection and consumer interests. In describing this taxonomy, we recognise jurisdictions sometimes employ hybrid regulatory strategies that combine elements of the professionalist-independent and consumerist-competitive frameworks, such as gatekeeper rules promulgated by the State (as opposed to gatekeeper regulations promulgated by judges or the legal profession). We also acknowledge that regulatory approaches are dynamic and that regulators may very well shift perspectives over time. Nevertheless, organising the claims of commentators and regulators into categories will help to promote analysis and comparison of legal services regulations, as well as to improve the quality of decision-making by those who craft and enforce the rules. We identify, for example, the crucial distinction between how these two approaches construct an understanding of legal services clients. Consumerist-competitive systems identify clients as consumers (who are similar to consumers of other goods and services) and apply this perspective to the particular context of purchasing legal services. In contrast, professionalist-independent systems understand the experience of a legal services client as fundamentally different from that of other consumers and, accordingly, require a wholly distinct regulatory approach.The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I situates our inquiry in the context of a larger, more fundamental question: why regulate legal services in the first instance? We identify and describe various theories that explain the introduction of regulation, contrasting in particular the private interest (capture) and public interest (market failure) approaches. Part II then turns to an exploration of the regulators' normative theories on how legal services ought to be regulated. Here we describe the taxonomy of consumerist-competitive and professionalist-independent approaches, including how consumerist-competitive approaches tend to favour government regulation, market-oriented solutions, firm-level accountability, and principles-based regulatory strategies and why professionalist-independent approaches tend to favour self-regulation, individual lawyer accountability, and command-and-control regulatory strategies. We also describe how some jurisdictions employ both hybrid and multiple strategies, and identify unintended consequences that have confounded the intentions of legal services regulators.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2396041_code339387.pdf?abstractid=2396041&mirid=1&type=2

A Taxonomy of Lawyer Regulation: How Contrasting Theories of Regulation Explain the Divergent Regulatory Regimes in Australia, England/Wales, and North America

One of the most significant problems faced by the legal profession in the twenty-first century is the ineffective delivery of legal services. Millions in need of legal representation are unable to afford a lawyer and thousands of lawyers are unemployed. We are desperate for a solution to democratize access to the law through efficient and affordable delivery of legal services. Noted law scholars and economists have argued over the years that corporate ownership of law firms can offer a solution to this problem. For example, corporations like Wal-Mart or Google are especially adept at disseminating services and information to the mass public. These kinds of corporations are also financially situated to make substantial capital outlays and await a later return on the investment. Both of these attributes make corporate ownership of law firms an appealing avenue for increasing access to legal services. Yet professional conduct rules in all fifty states ban corporations from owning or investing in law firms. This Article identifies a First Amendment jurisprudential thread that establishes important constitutional interests in corporate ownership of law firms, interests held by both corporations and individuals. The Supreme Court initially recognized First Amendment protection for the delivery of legal services by a corporate entity in NAACP v. Button and most recently confirmed in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission that a corporation, whether non-profit or for-profit, enjoys the same free speech rights as an individual. Under this precedent, blanket bans on corporate ownership of law firms cannot survive. This expanded understanding of First Amendment rights for corporations parallels the economic realities of modern law practice and the regulatory changes underway in the United Kingdom and Australia. Now is the time for regulators to embrace the benefits that can accrue from corporate ownership, in particular the democratization of law through the delivery of more accessible and affordable legal services.

/pdf/democratizing-the-delivery-of-legal-services-dqd2ilfk2l.pdf

Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services

Noted law scholars and economists have argued over the years that corporate ownership of law firms can offer a solution to this problem. For example, corporations like Wal-Mart or Google are especially adept at disseminating services and information to the mass public. These kinds of corporations are also financially situated to make substantial capital outlays and await a later return on the investment. Both of these attributes make corporate ownership of law firms an appealing avenue for increasing access to legal services. Yet professional conduct rules in all fifty states and the District of Columbia ban corporations from owning or investing in law firms.

Three women now sit on the United States Supreme Court, a fourth recently retired, suggesting the attainment of formal equality. Despite this appearance of progress, women remain significantly under-represented in major leadership roles within the legal profession, where they face extensive gender bias and stereotyping. This gender bias and stereotyping is also leveraged against women who are featured in the media, illustrated most vividly by coverage of the most recent Supreme Court nominations. Headlines from mainstream news, “Then Comes the Marriage Question” in the New York Times or “The Supreme Court Needs More Mothers” in the Washington Post, and from the online blog arena, “Elena Kagan v. Sonia Sotomayor: Who Wore it Better?” in AbovetheLaw.com or “Put a Mom on the Court” in TheDailyBeast.com, are just a sampling of those that emerged during the nomination period for Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor, two highly accomplished, well-qualified nominees. The gendered nature of these and other articles led us to conduct an empirical study using quantitative and qualitative content analysis to examine media coverage for every Supreme Court nominee since Justices Powell and Rehnquist, a starting-point selected in light of the feminist movement’s influence at the time. Our project sits at the unique interdisciplinary intersection of law, gender studies, mass media, and political science. This article presents results from the first phase of data analysis looking at the week following a president’s announcement of a nominee, and we report five preliminary findings. In identifying these findings, we assess the gendered portrayals of nominees to the Court, and we reflect upon how this knowledge might motivate the resolution of gender disparity in the legal profession’s pipeline to power.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2060632_code614518.pdf?abstractid=1711344&mirid=2

Rethinking Gender Equality in the Legal Profession's Pipeline to Power: A Study on Media Coverage of Supreme Court Nominees (Phase I, The Introduction Week)

Millions of Americans lack representation for their legal problems while thousands of lawyers are unemployed. Why? Commentators and academics offer a range of answers to this question, from economic factors to regulatory constraints. Whatever the root cause, clearly a massive delivery problem exists for personal legal services. Most individuals simply do not realize when a lawyer might be necessary or helpful. This Article, written at the invitation of the Connecticut Law Review for their Volume 45 Symposium entitled "Are Law School’s Passing the Bar? Examining the Demands and Limitations of the Legal Education Market," suggests that democratizing legal education — i.e., systematically providing basic information about how to access legal services to the general public — offers a solution to the unmet need for those services, as well as to the unemployment crisis among the legal profession more broadly. Law schools have an important role to play in this effort. This article offers three recommendations.

/pdf/democratizing-legal-education-52pnsqdano.pdf

Renee Newman Knake

Papers

A Taxonomy of Lawyer Regulation: How Contrasting Theories of Regulation Explain the Divergent Regulatory Regimes in Australia, England/Wales, and North America

Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services

Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services

Rethinking Gender Equality in the Legal Profession's Pipeline to Power: A Study on Media Coverage of Supreme Court Nominees (Phase I, The Introduction Week)

Democratizing Legal Education