Richard B. Cheney

Bio: Richard B. Cheney is an academic researcher from University of Wisconsin-Madison. The author has contributed to research in topics: Voting behavior & Voting. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 65 citations.

A Comparative Analysis of Senate-House Voting on Economic and Welfare Policy, 1953–1964

Abstract: The manifest purpose of the roll call analysis described in this paper is that of demonstrating the existence of two policy dimensions in Congressional voting: economic and welfare. Support is sought for two propositions:I. Each of the two dimensions appears in both the House and the Senate in each of six Congresses, the 83rd through the 88th, 1953–1964;II. Roll call voting on the economic policy dimension is more heavily influenced by partisan differences while welfare policy voting is more subject to constituency constraints.The second proposition is significant as an attempt to distinguish between a policy dimension on which partisan differences appear to be responsible for the greater part of the voting variation, and a policy dimension on which constituency factors have a substantial impact. This bears upon the more general concern with distinguishing those party differences in voting behavior which are a function of an independent partisan factor from those which may be attributed to any number of factors correlated with partisan affiliation. This problem will be viewed from different analytic perspectives, including an analysis of the effects of intra-party and inter-party personnel turnover on the policy positions taken by representatives of the same constituency.

Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress

Abstract: Interest group ratings are widely used in studies of legislative behavior. Since the set of votes used is not constant over time and across chambers, the scales underlying the scores can shift and stretch. We introduce an econometric model that corrects the problem. Specifically, we derive an index, much like an inflation index for consumer prices, that allows one to make intertemporal and interchamber comparisons of interest group ratings. The adjusted scores for the ADA show a strong liberal trend in the average member of Congress during 1947–94, followed by a conservative reversal. A nonparametric test using ADA and ACU scores demonstrates the validity of adjusted scores and the invalidity of nominal scores for intertemporal and interchamber comparisons. Using two studies (Levitt 1996; Shipan and Lowry 1997) we illustrate that the choice of adjusted versus nominal scores may greatly affect substantive conclusions of researchers.

Party Influence in Congress

Abstract: Smith provides an overview of legislators' motivations to create parties and the kinds of influence that parties might exercise once organized. In commenting on the sizable political science literature on these subjects, the author argues that party leaders are motivated by both policy and electoral goals and frequently must balance those goals. Leaders deploy a variety of resources to exercise both a positive and negative effect on legislative outcomes. From observing many episodes of party and leadership action on Capitol Hill, I have found it useful to characterize congressional parties as seeking two collective goals – majority party status and policy. The goals are founded on the goals of individual legislators – reelection, good public policy, and power. For example, legislators seeking to enact certain policies are advantaged if their party wins majority control of Congress, its committees, and scheduling mechanisms. Legislators seeking reelection are advantaged if their party's record for policy achievement is viewed favorably by the public. The collective electoral and policy goals of the congressional parties have the character of public goods. A public good is a benefit that is nonexcludable and jointly supplied. That is, achievement of a party goal benefits all party members whether or not they have contributed materially to the collective effort (nonexcludable) and is not exhausted for some members as other members benefit from it (jointly supplied). These features deserve a little discussion. Congressional parties have the ability to determine their own membership so, in principle, the benefits of membership are excludable.

Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959–1980

Abstract: Current methods of roll-call analysis have practical as well as theoretical shortcomings. We propose here a method based on a spatial theory of voting that overcomes these problems. We apply metric multidimensional unfolding to interest-group ratings of members of Congress in order to obtain a Euclidean spatial configuration of congressmen. Each roll-call vote is then mapped into the configuration of members in a way consistent with spatial theory. Based on 190,000 ratings issued from 1959 to 1980, our empirical analysis demonstrates that a single liberal-conservative dimension accounts for more than 80% of the variance in the ratings. A second dimension, associated with party unity, accounts for 7% of the variance. Approximately 86% of all roll-call voting for the 22 years of our study is consistent with a simple one-dimensional spatial model. The votes that best fit the liberal-conservative dimension are drawn from the government management, social welfare, and foreign policy areas. The votes that best fit the two-dimensional configurations are drawn from the agricultural area.

Changing Public Policy: The Impact of Public Opinion, Antiwar Demonstrations, and War Costs on Senate Voting on Vietnam War Motions'

Abstract: A new approach to the study of legislative change enables us to deal directly and quantitatively with questions about how long-term changes in public policy come about. The approach is applied to the aggregate change of mind by the U.S. Senate as it moved from support of the Vietnam war to opposition from 1964 to 1973. Substantively, cumulative war costs, public opinion, and antiwar demonstrations all had significant effects on Senate roll call outcomes, but they were so highly intercorrelated that their separate effects could not be disentangled. In addition, demonstrations taking place in the months before a vote had a slight positive impact on the number of dovish votes received by motions. The 1970 invasion of Cambodia seems to have led to a significant turning point in the way the Senate dealt with the war. The general strengths and weaknesses of the new approach are assessed. It opens a new area to statistical inquiry and generates a number of novel questions that should lead to additional research.

Dimensions of Interest Group Evaluation of the U.S. Senate, 1969-1978

Abstract: Each year many varied interest groups rate members of Congress. These ratings may be regarded as preferential choice data because they indicate the degree of approval of the members' voting records. Applying multidimensional unfolding to the ratings of U.S. senators for 1969-1978 produces one common evaluative dimension that accounts for approximately 80 percent of the variance. The ten configurations were fitted together so that senators and interest groups could be tracked across time. The large majority of senators and interest groups are stable on the identitied dimension over time with the exception that senators up for election tend to change position and become more ambiguous.