Richard F. Nyrop
Bio: Richard F. Nyrop is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Persian. The author has an hindex of 10, co-authored 19 publications receiving 314 citations.
01 Oct 1988
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors assess the effects of oil windfalls on six developing countries, and conclude that much of the potential benefit of the windfalls, has been dissipated, and explain why some oil producers may have ended up actually worse off, despite the additional revenue.
Abstract: The oil booms of 1973 and 1979 brought unprecedented income to many, previously poor oil-producing countries. What became of their new-found wealth? In this comparative study, the author assesses for the first time, the effects of oil windfalls on six developing countries. He presents new information on how these petroleum exporters, used their oil revenue, and analyzes the consequences of government policies. He concludes that much of the potential benefit of the windfalls, has been dissipated, and, explains why some oil producers may have ended up actually worse off, despite the additional revenue. Although this issue has been previously discussed, especially anecdotally, it has not been systematically analyzed, and related to the economic policies of particular countries, and their macroeconomic characteristics. In this comparative analysis of six oil-exporting countries - the core of the book - the author blends institutional, and political aspects, with the quantitative results derived from a complex economic model, including individual country studies. The author suggests that natural resources alone will do little to promote economic development. Countries need sound economic management, and need to address the political factors that conflict with wise policy choices. Market processes are needed to help allocate public resources, and, governments and others responsible must take account of risk, and uncertainty when selecting projects, and formulating plans for development.
01 Jan 2002
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze how states become coup-proof, focusing speci cally on the policies that Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria have adopted to achieve this goal, including reliance on groups with special loyalties to the regime and the creation of parallel military organizations and multiple internal security agencies.
Abstract: In the aftermath of the U.S.-led coalition’s defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War, many observers believed that Saddam Hussein would eventually be toppled in a military coup. After years of dashed hopes, however, few expect that the Iraqi military is likely to undertake such action. Many analysts claim that the Iraqi regime is, in fact, coup-proof. Saddam Hussein’s staying power should cause any similarly led U.S. coalition to rethink not just the possibilities of both coups and coupprooang but how it would aght and defeat a coup-proof regime. In this article, I analyze how states become coup-proof, focusing speciacally on the policies that Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria have adopted to achieve this goal. These policies include reliance on groups with special loyalties to the regime and the creation of parallel military organizations and multiple internal security agencies. The United States has a particular interest in how these countries have made their regimes coup-proof. Saudi Arabia is an important U.S. ally, Iraq is a hostile state, and Syria is somewhere in between. Conoict between the United States and either Iraq or Syria, however, pits a superpower with a short attention span against regimes that have accepted serious constraints on their ability to exercise their full military potential. Both states have developed heavily politicized militaries that are incapable of realizing this potential as long as their leaderships continue to divert resources to protect their regimes. At the same time, they have created a militarized politics that is surprisingly resilient in the face of defeat. If a U.S-led coalition decides that it wants to overthrow a coup-proofed regime through military action, it will have to devote serious attention to the regime’s true underpinnings. Field commanders will need more extensive means of understanding their opponent’s political-military situation and greater insight into the coalition’s political intentions. Moreover, the coordination of political-military operations will require greater political involvement
TL;DR: The TPB model performs well in Saudi Arabia, and this validation accounts for 37 percent of the variance in behavioral intention among Saudi knowledge workers.
Abstract: Purpose – This paper aims to investigate the effects of gender, age and education on new technology implementation in Saudi Arabia, a technologically developing country, using the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB).Design/methodology/approach – The research was an empirical investigation based on surveys completed by 1,088 Saudi knowledge workers.Findings – The TPB model performs well in Saudi Arabia. This validation accounts for 37 percent of the variance in behavioral intention among Saudi knowledge workers. For the moderator variables, there were no statistically significant interactions, with the exception of the moderation of perceived behavioral control on behavioral intention by level of education.Research limitations/implications – Saudi Arabia is an exemplar for many developing nations characterized by distinct intellectual and cultural traditions that differ from Western cultures. Demographic variables (e.g. gender and age) that have been reported to be significant moderators of the influences of ...
TL;DR: The authors argue for the contingent nature of capital and labor's support for democracy, especially in the context of late development, and offer a theory of democratic contingency, proposing that a few variables, namely, state dependence, aristocratic privilege, and social fear account for much of the variation found in class support for democratization both across and within cases.
Abstract: Many classic works of political economy have identified capital and labor as the champions of democratization during the first wave of transition By contrast, this article argues for the contingent nature of capital and labor's support for democracy, especially in the context of late development The article offers a theory of democratic contingency, proposing that a few variables, namely, state dependence, aristocratic privilege, and social fear account for much of the variation found in class support for democratization both across and within cases Conditions associated with late development make capital and labor especially prone to diffidence about democratization But such diffidence is subject to change, especially under the impact of international economic integration, poverty-reducing social welfare policies, and economic growth that is widely shared Case material from Korea, Indonesia, Mexico, Zambia, Brazil, Tunisia and other countries is offered as evidence