Robert Dur

TL;DR: This article developed a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterised optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions, and showed that when effort is verifiable, the government optimally attracts motivated workers as well as the economy's laziest workers by offering separating contracts.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the implications of workers' intrinsic motivation for optimal monetary incentive schemes and show that motivated workers work harder and, for a given level of effort, are willing to work for a lower wage.

TL;DR: This paper developed a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterised optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions, and showed that when effort is verifiable, the government optimally attracts motivated workers as well as the economy's laziest workers by offering separating contracts.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors run a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain consisting of 128 stores and introduce short-term sales competitions among subsets of stores, finding that sales competitions have a large effect on sales growth, but only in stores where the store manager and a sufficiently large fraction of the employees have the same gender.

TL;DR: In this article, self-selection into managerial and non-managerial positions in the public and private sectors was studied using a model of a perfectly competitive economy where people differ in managerial ability and in public service motivation.