Who thought of Europe as a community before its economic integration in 1957? Dina Gusejnova illustrates how a supranational European mentality was forged from depleted imperial identities. In the revolutions of 1917 to 1920, the power of the Hohenzollern, Habsburg and Romanoff dynasties over their subjects expired. Even though Germany lost its credit as a world power twice in that century, in the global cultural memory, the old Germanic families remained associated with the idea of Europe in areas reaching from Mexico to the Baltic region and India. Gusejnova's book sheds light on a group of German-speaking intellectuals of aristocratic origin who became pioneers of Europe's future regeneration. In the minds of transnational elites, the continent's future horizons retained the contours of phantom empires.

European Elites and Ideas of Empire, 1917-1957

Humility is a foundational virtue that counters selfish inclinations such as entitlement, arrogance, and narcissism (Tangney, 2000). We hypothesize that experiences of awe promote greater humility. Guided by an appraisal-tendency framework of emotion, we propose that when individuals encounter an entity that is vast and challenges their worldview, they feel awe, which leads to self-diminishment and subsequently humility. In support of these claims, awe-prone individuals were rated as more humble by friends (Study 1) and reported greater humility across a 2-week period (Study 2), controlling for other positive emotions. Inducing awe led participants to present a more balanced view of their strengths and weaknesses to others (Study 3) and acknowledge, to a greater degree, the contribution of outside forces in their own personal accomplishments (Study 4), compared with neutral and positive control conditions. Finally, an awe-inducing expansive view elicited greater reported humility than a neutral view (Study 5). We also elucidated the process by which awe leads to humility. Feelings of awe mediated the relationship between appraisals (perceptions of vastness and a challenge to one's world view) and humility (Study 4), and self-diminishment mediated the relationship between awe and humility (Study 5). Taken together, these results reveal that awe offers one path to greater humility. (PsycINFO Database Record

Awe and humility.

There is a general tendency for social psychologists to focus on processes of oppression rather than resistance This is exemplified and entrenched by the Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) Consequently, researchers and commentators have come to see domination, tyranny, and abuse as natural or inevitable in the world at large Challenging this view, research suggests that where members of low-status groups are bound together by a sense of shared social identity, this can be the basis for effective leadership and organization that allows them to counteract stress, secure support, challenge authority, and promote social change in even the most extreme of situations This view is supported by a review of experimental research—notably the SPE and the BBC Prison Study—and case studies of rebellion against carceral regimes in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Nazi Germany This evidence is used to develop a social identity model of resistance dynamics

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When Prisoners Take Over the Prison A Social Psychology of Resistance

This thesis addresses the question of how states, meaning organised political communities, were historically able to secure their sovereignty through gaining the recognition of other states. As sovereignty refers to the presence of a state’s authority, its existence is premised on states and other internal and external actors recognising claims to sovereignty. Therefore, states, such as the Ottoman Empire, which historically had a different understanding of legitimacy, faced challenges to their sovereignty following the emergence of new global understandings of sovereignty in the late nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire was distinct in that it was the only Islamic state that was not subject to and was able to avoid completely falling under the influence of then-dominant European states. However, the Ottoman Empire still experienced European intervention and there was a desire to end forms of European extraterritorial jurisdiction. Ottoman elites, who were affiliated with the reformist Young Turks, sought to secure recognition of their state’s sovereignty by reconstituting it along novel international standards of legitimate statehood. These standards were based on the concepts of “civilised”, “militarist”, “popular” and “national” statehood, and were reinterpreted by the Young Turks in the course of their efforts to secure the recognition of European powers. These efforts included diplomacy with European powers, institutional reform and conceptual innovation. However, it also involved engaging in practices associated with sovereignty such as the control of territory. In all of these areas, the Young Turks reinterpreted aspects of the existing Ottoman legacy of statehood and international norms, to secure their claim to sovereignty. Therefore, the Ottoman state elites sought to convey an impression of governing a state that could be recognised as sovereign by other European powers. Ultimately, the remnants of the Young Turks, secured international recognition of their state, reconstituted as the nation-state of Turkey in 1923.

Reconstituting sovereignty: the Young Turks’ efforts to secure external recognition and the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey, 1908 - 1923

Empire made : an historical survey of the English universities and of the processes globalisation

Introduction 1. The Ottoman Empire 2. The Italian Empire 3. The German Empire 4. Austria-Hungary 5. The Russian Empire 6. The French Empire 7. British Imperial Africa 8. The Dominions, Ireland and India 9. The Portuguese Empire 10. The Japanese Empire 11. China and Empire 12. The United States 13. Empires at the Paris Peace Conference

Empires at war : 1911-1923

The Central European Counter-Revolution: Paramilitary Violence in Germany, Austria and Hungary after the Great War

1. Paramilitarism in Europe after the Great War: An Introduction PART I: REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 2. Revolution and Counter-Revolution: The Syndrome of Violence in Russia's Civil Wars, 1918-1920 3. Bolshevism as Fantasy: Fear of Revolution and Counter-Revolutionary Violence, 1917-23 4. Fighting the Red Beast: Counterrevolutionary Violence in the Defeated States of Central Europe 5. Revolution, Civil War, and Terror in Finland in 1918 6. Paramilitary Violence in Italy: the Rationale of Fascism and the Origins of Totalitarianism PART II: NATIONS, BORDERLANDS, AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE 7. Bands of Nation Builders? Insurgency and Ideology in the Ukrainian Civil War 8. Turning Citizens into Soldiers: Baltic Paramilitary Movements after the Great War 9. Paramilitary Violence in the Balkans: Origins and Legacies 10. Paramilitary Violence in the Collapsing Ottoman Empire 11. Soldiers to Civilians, Civilians to Soldiers: Poland and Ireland after the First World War 12. The British Culture of Paramilitary Violence in the Irish War of Independence 13. Defending Victory: Paramilitary Politics in France, 1918-26. A Counter-example

War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War

This essay critically engages with the current scholarly debate about ‘connecting lines’ and structural similarities between European colonialism and German National Socialism. Following the recent publication of books on the allegedly genocidal nature of German colonialism and the role of the Herero and Nama wars (1904–07) as a precursor of and model for the German war of extermination in Eastern Europe (1939–45), the essay will critically examine the allegedly ‘exceptional’ character of the German colonial wars within the broader trans-national context of colonial violence. It will be argued that the taboo violation of 1904 was in fact very much in line with common European colonial standards. Furthermore, the essay will critically engage with the question of direct continuities between ‘Windhoek and Auschwitz’, arguing that the German war of annihilation constituted a break with European traditions of colonialism rather than a continuation.

Der Holocaust als „kolonialer Genozid“? Europäische Kolonialgewalt und nationalsozialistischer Vernichtungskrieg

If it is true, as they say, that the victors write the history, then our understanding of World War I and the century that followed is at the very least incomplete. Take, for example, the seemingly basic question of when the war ended. The standard date of November 11, 1918 privileges the experiences of the victors, most notably France, Great Britain and the United States, all of which use it as a time for national holidays based on war memorialization. Some war memorials use 1914 and 1919 to mark their periodization in recognition of June 28, 1919, the date of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles that legally ended the war with Germany. That date, too, privileges the victors. Moreover, the Paris Peace Conference produced four more treaties, the last, the Treaty of Sèvres, not signed until August 1920 then fundamentally revised by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

Robert Gerwarth

Papers

Empires at war : 1911-1923

The Central European Counter-Revolution: Paramilitary Violence in Germany, Austria and Hungary after the Great War

War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War

Der Holocaust als „kolonialer Genozid“? Europäische Kolonialgewalt und nationalsozialistischer Vernichtungskrieg

The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End