Robert H. Frank

Bio: Robert H. Frank is an academic researcher from Cornell University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Consumption (economics) & Rationality. The author has an hindex of 43, co-authored 103 publications receiving 17662 citations. Previous affiliations of Robert H. Frank include University of Chicago & Saint Petersburg State University.

Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions

Abstract: The "Me" generation has justified itself by appealing to social scientists who see selfishness as the only rational basis for action. But what are we to make of selfless acts in business, personal life, even politics? In this provocative book, Robert Frank shows us that looking out for Number One may require that we look out for others, too. He finds his evidence in our emotional acts. Like the blush on telling a lie, they can serve as hard-to-fake signals of a commitment to social values. We recognize these signs; we know people we trust; and if we can identify trustworthy fellows we can reject those who do not merit our faith.

Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of Emotions.

Abstract: The \"Me\" generation has justified itself by appealing to social scientists who see selfishness as the only rational basis for action. But what are we to make of selfless acts in business, personal life, even politics? In this provocative book, Robert Frank shows us that looking out for Number One may require that we look out for others, too. He finds his evidence in our emotional acts. Like the blush on telling a lie, they can serve as hard-to-fake signals of a commitment to social values. We recognize these signs; we know people we trust; and if we can identify trustworthy fellows we can reject those who do not merit our faith.

Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation

Abstract: F rom the perspective of many economists, motives other than self-interest are peripheral to the main thrust of human endeavor, and we indulge them at our peril. In Gordon Tullock's (1976) words (as quoted by Mansbridge, 1990, p. 12), "the average human being is about 95 percent selfish in the narrow sense of the term." In this paper we investigate whether exposure to the self-interest model commonly used in economics alters the extent to which people behave in self-interested ways. The paper is organized into two parts. In the first, we report the results of several empirical studies-some our own, some by others -that suggest economists behave in more self-interested ways. By itself, this evidence does not demonstrate that exposure to the self-interest model causes more self-interested behavior, since it may be that economists were simply more self-interested to begin with, and this difference was one reason they chose to study economics. In the second part of the paper, we present preliminary evidence that exposure to the self-interest model does in fact encourage self-interested behavior.

Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status

Abstract: Is it better to be a big frog in a small pond or a small frog in a big pond? In this lively and original book, the author argues persuasively that people's concerns about status permeate and profoundly alter a broad range of human behaviour. He takes issue with his fellow economists for too often neglecting fundamental elements in human nature in their study of how people make basic economic choices.

The Winner-Take-All Society

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A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation

Abstract: There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitivemarkets butnot inbilateral bargainingsituations. Thereisalsostrong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained, although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selesh types dominate equilibrium behavior.

The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Abstract: Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.

Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review

Abstract: This paper discusses the discounted utility (DU) model: its historical development, underlying assumptions, and "anomalies" - the empirical regularities that are inconsistent with its theoretical predictions. We then summarize the alternate theoretical formulations that have been advanced to address these anomalies. We also review three decades of empirical research on intertemporal choice, and discuss reasons for the spectacular variation in implicit discount rates across studies. Throughout the paper, we stress the importance of distinguishing time preference, per se, from many other considerations that also influence intertemporal choices.

Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics

Abstract: People like to help those who are helping them and to hurt those who are hurting them. Outcomes rejecting such motivations are called fairness equilibria. Outcomes are mutual-max when each person maximizes the other's material payoffs, and mutual-min when each person minimizes the other's payoffs. It is shown that every mutual-max or mutual-min Nash equilibrium is a fairness equilibrium. If payoffs are small, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of mutual-max and mutual-min outcomes; if payoffs are large, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of Nash equilibria. Several economic examples are considered and possible welfare implications of fairness are explored. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.

Developmental Processes of Cooperative Interorganizational Relationships

Abstract: This article examines the developmental process of cooperative interorganizational relationships (IORs) that entail transaction-specific investments in deals that cannot be fully specified or controlled by the parties in advance of their execution. A process framework is introduced that focuses on formal, legal, and informal social-psychological processes by which organizational parties jointly negotiate, commit to. and execute their relationship in ways that achieve efficient and equitable outcomes and internal solutions to conflicts when they arise. The framework is elaborated with a set of propositions that explain how and why cooperative IORs emerge, evolve, and dissolve. The propositions have academic implications for enriching interorganizational relationships, transaction cost economics, agency theories, and practical implications for managing the relationship journey.