Robert Jervis

Bio: Robert Jervis is an academic researcher from Columbia University. The author has contributed to research in topics: International relations & Foreign policy. The author has an hindex of 48, co-authored 161 publications receiving 13415 citations. Previous affiliations of Robert Jervis include Princeton University & University of Michigan.

Perception and misperception in international politics

Abstract: This study of perception and misperception in foreign policy was a landmark in the application of cognitive psychology to political decision making. The New York Times called it, in an article published nearly ten years after the book's appearance, "the seminal statement of principles underlying political psychology." The perspective established by Jervis remains an important counterpoint to structural explanations of international politics, and from it has developed a large literature on the psychology of leaders and the problems of decision making under conditions of incomplete information, stress, and cognitive bias. Jervis begins by describing the process of perception (for example, how decision makers learn from history) and then explores common forms of misperception (such as overestimating one's influence). Finally, he tests his ideas through a number of important events in international relations from nineteenth- and twentieth-century European history. In a contemporary application of Jervis's ideas, some argue that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990 in part because he misread the signals of American leaders with regard to the independence of Kuwait. Also, leaders of the United States and Iraq in the run-up to the most recent Gulf War might have been operating under cognitive biases that made them value certain kinds of information more than others, whether or not the information was true. Jervis proved that, once a leader believed something, that perception would influence the way the leader perceived all other relevant information.

Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma

Abstract: International anarchy and the resulting security dilemma (i.e., policies which increase one state's security tend to decrease that of others) make it difficult for states to realize their common interests. Two approaches are used to show when and why this dilemma operates less strongly and cooperation is more likely. First, the model of the Prisoner's Dilemma is used to demonstrate that cooperation is more likely when the costs of being exploited and the gains of exploiting others are low, when the gains from mutual cooperation and the costs of mutual noncooperation are high, and when each side expects the other to cooperate. Second, the security dilemma is ameliorated when the defense has the advantage over the offense and when defensive postures differ from offensive ones. These two variables, which can generate four possible security worlds, are influenced by geography and technology.

System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life

Abstract: Acknowledgments One Introduction Definitions and Illustrations WE CAN NEVER DO MERELY ONE THING Emergent Properties Interconnections KINDS OF INTERCONNECTIONS Games against Nature Are Not Games against Nature Two System Effects Indirect and Delayed Effects Relations Are Often Not Bilaterally Determined Interactions, Not Additivity FIRST INTERACTIONS: RESULTS CANNOT BE PREDICTED FROM THE SEPARATE ACTIONS SECOND INTERACTIONS: STRATEGIES DEPEND ON THE STRATEGIES OF OTHERS THIRD INTERACTIONS: BEHAVIOR CHANGES THE ENVIRONMENT Products of Interaction as the Unit of Analysis Circular Effects Outcomes Do Not Follow from Intentions A QUALIFICATION Regulation Implications for Testing and Method POWER CAUSES AND EFFECTS TESTING PROPOSITIONS YARDSTICKS AND INDICATORS Three Systemic Theories of International Politics What Are the Variables? STABILITY Both Dependent and Independent Variables Systemic System as the Dependent Variable System as the Independent Variable Waltz WALTZ'S CONCEPT OF STRUCTURE WHAT WALTZ'S THEORY CAN EXPLAIN Structural versus Behavioral Polarity BIPOLARITY AND STABILITY: IGNORING THE PERIPHERIES AND OVERREACTING TO THEM STRUCTURE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS Four Feedback Types of Feedback DEBATES ABOUT FEEDBACKS Balance of Power AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW--IS IT SYSTEMIC? ANTICIPATION OF THE OPERATION OF BALANCE OF POWER Negative Feedback That Resembles Balance of Power Other Forms of Negative Feedback SELF-LIMITING SUCCESS INFORMATION, INFERENCES, AND PSYCHOLOGY Positive Feedback PROCESSES AND AREAS OF POSITIVE FEEDBACK Information and Expectations Tipping Consensus Effects Competition Power POSITIVE FEEDBACK AND PATH DEPENDENCE--THE BIG IMPACT OF SMALL ADVANTAGES OTHER AREAS OF POSITIVE FEEDBACK DOMINO DYNAMICS Reputation General Validity of the Domino Theory Conditions under Which Domino Effects Are Likely SPIRALS AS POSITIVE FEEDBACK Balance of Power, Dominoes, and Spirals: Feedback and Force Five Relations, Alternatives, and Bargaining Triangular Relations THE PIVOT Seeking and Maintaining the Pivot: Divide and Influence Alternatives and Bargaining Leverage PUSHES AND PULLS The Influence of Structure Structure Does Not Determine--Room for Judgments Six Alignments and Consistency How and Why Systems Become Consistent Causes of Consistency THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS MY FRIEND Who Is the Main Enemy? Balance as a Psychological Dynamic Conditions and Limits AVOIDING UNDESIRED BALANCE SEEKING IMBALANCE: TRYING TO BE FRIENDS WITH TWO ADVERSARIES Differences in Strategies Producing Imbalance CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH BALANCE IS LIKELY Necessity for Choice PRE-WORLD WAR I DIPLOMACY: THE FORMATION OF A BALANCED SYSTEM THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENTENTES Seven Acting in a System Information, Beliefs, and Action EFFECTS DEPEND ON IMPRESSIONS Lack of Awareness of System Effects Acting in a System CONSTRAINING Anticipating System Effects THE LIJPHART EFFECT THE DOMINO THEORY PARADOX DOING THINGS "IN TWOS" QUASI-HOMEOSTASIS Seeking the Desired Level of Risk The Sequel to a Great Victory Is Often a Great Defeat Indirect Approaches MOVING IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION Doing More Than One Thing Index

The Evolution of Cooperation

Abstract: Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.

Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination

Abstract: The growing technical uncertainties and complexities of problems of global concern have made international policy coordination not only increasingly necessary but also increasingly difficult. If decision makers are unfamiliar with the technical aspects of a specific problem, how do they define state interests and develop viable solutions? What factors shape their behavior? Under conditions of uncertainty, what are the origins of international institutions? And how can we best study the processes through which international policy coordination and order emerge? While a variety of analytic approaches have been used to address the problems of international cooperation, the approaches have yielded only fragmentary insights. At its core, the study of policy coordination among states involves arguments about determinism versus free will and about the ways in which the international system is maintained and transformed. Among the overlapping topics of debate are whether national behavior is determined or broadly conditioned by system-level factors, unit-level factors, or some complex interplay between the two; whether state policymakers can identify national interests and behave independently of pressures from the social groups they nominally represent; and whether states respond consistently to opportunities to create, defend, or expand their own wealth and power, to enhance collective material benefits, or to promote nonmaterial values.' A related question of

International Norm Dynamics and Political Change

Abstract: Norms have never been absent from the study of international politics, but the sweeping “ideational turn” in the 1980s and 1990s brought them back as a central theoretical concern in the field. Much theorizing about norms has focused on how they create social structure, standards of appropriateness, and stability in international politics. Recent empirical research on norms, in contrast, has examined their role in creating political change, but change processes have been less well-theorized. We induce from this research a variety of theoretical arguments and testable hypotheses about the role of norms in political change. We argue that norms evolve in a three-stage “life cycle” of emergence, “norm cascades,” and internalization, and that each stage is governed by different motives, mechanisms, and behavioral logics. We also highlight the rational and strategic nature of many social construction processes and argue that theoretical progress will only be made by placing attention on the connections between norms and rationality rather than by opposing the two.

A Treatise on the Family

Abstract: A Treatise on the Family. G. S. Becker. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1981. Gary Becker is one of the most famous and influential economists of the second half of the 20th century, a fervent contributor to and expounder of the University of Chicago free-market philosophy, and winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in economics. Although any book with the word "treatise" in its title is clearly intended to have an impact, one coming from someone as brilliant and controversial as Becker certainly had such a lofty goal. It has received many article-length reviews in several disciplines (Ben-Porath, 1982; Bergmann, 1995; Foster, 1993; Hannan, 1982), which is one measure of its scholarly importance, and yet its impact is, I think, less than it may have initially appeared, especially for scholars with substantive interests in the family. This book is, its title notwithstanding, more about economics and the economic approach to behavior than about the family. In the first sentence of the preface, Becker writes "In this book, I develop an economic or rational choice approach to the family." Lest anyone accuse him of focusing on traditional (i.e., material) economics topics, such as family income, poverty, and labor supply, he immediately emphasizes that those topics are not his focus. "My intent is more ambitious: to analyze marriage, births, divorce, division of labor in households, prestige, and other non-material behavior with the tools and framework developed for material behavior." Indeed, the book includes chapters on many of these issues. One chapter examines the principles of the efficient division of labor in households, three analyze marriage and divorce, three analyze various child-related issues (fertility and intergenerational mobility), and others focus on broader family issues, such as intrafamily resource allocation. His analysis is not, he believes, constrained by time or place. His intention is "to present a comprehensive analysis that is applicable, at least in part, to families in the past as well as the present, in primitive as well as modern societies, and in Eastern as well as Western cultures." His tone is profoundly conservative and utterly skeptical of any constructive role for government programs. There is a clear sense of how much better things were in the old days of a genderbased division of labor and low market-work rates for married women. Indeed, Becker is ready and able to show in Chapter 2 that such a state of affairs was efficient and induced not by market or societal discrimination (although he allows that it might exist) but by small underlying household productivity differences that arise primarily from what he refers to as "complementarities" between caring for young children while carrying another to term. Most family scholars would probably find that an unconvincingly simple explanation for a profound and complex phenomenon. What, then, is the salient contribution of Treatise on the Family? It is not literally the idea that economics could be applied to the nonmarket sector and to family life because Becker had already established that with considerable success and influence. At its core, microeconomics is simple, characterized by a belief in the importance of prices and markets, the role of self-interested or rational behavior, and, somewhat less centrally, the stability of preferences. It was Becker's singular and invaluable contribution to appreciate that the behaviors potentially amenable to the economic approach were not limited to phenomenon with explicit monetary prices and formal markets. Indeed, during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, he did undeniably important and pioneering work extending the domain of economics to such topics as labor market discrimination, fertility, crime, human capital, household production, and the allocation of time. Nor is Becker's contribution the detailed analyses themselves. Many of them are, frankly, odd, idiosyncratic, and off-putting. …

Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics

Abstract: The debate between realists and liberals has reemerged as an axis of contention in international relations theory.’ Revolving in the past around competing theories of human nature, the debate is more concerned today with the extent to which state action is influenced by ‘structure’ (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus ‘process’ (interaction and learning) and institutions. Does the absence of centralized political authority force states to play competitive power politics? Can international regimes overcome this logic, and under what conditions? What in anarchy is given and immutable, and what is amenable to change?