Robert M. Costrell

Bio: Robert M. Costrell is an academic researcher from University of Arkansas. The author has contributed to research in topics: Pension & Cost effectiveness. The author has an hindex of 14, co-authored 64 publications receiving 1055 citations. Previous affiliations of Robert M. Costrell include Boston University & Arkansas Department of Education.

A Simple Model of Educational Standards

Abstract: The author models standards for educational credentials, such as high-school diplomas. Standard-setters maximize their conception of social welfare, knowing that utility-maximizing students choose whether to meet the standard. The author shows that more egalitarian policymakers set lower standards, the median voter would prefer higher standards (under symmetric distributions), and decentralization lowers standards (among identical communities). Optimal standards do not necessarily fall with increased student preference for leisure, deterioration of nonstudent inputs to education, or increased student heterogeneity. Superseding binary credentials by perfect information increases average achievement and social welfare for plausible degrees of heterogeneity, egalitarianism, and pooling under decentralization.

Peaks, Cliffs and Valleys: The Peculiar Incentives in Teacher Retirement Systems and their Consequences for School Staffing.

Abstract: This article examines the pattern of incentives for work versus retirement in six state teacher pension systems. We do this by examining the annual accrual of pension wealth from an additional year of work over a teacher’s career. Accrual of wealth is highly nonlinear and heavily loaded at arbitrary years that would normally be considered mid-career. One typical pattern exhibits low accrual in early years, accelerating in the mid- to late fifties, followed by dramatic decline or even negative returns in years that are relatively young for retirement. Key factors in the defined benefit formulas that drive such patterns are identified along with likely consequences for employee behavior. The authors examine efficiency and equity consequences of these systems as well as options for reform.

Incentives and Equity under Standards-based Reform

Abstract: The paper considers theoretical and empirical evidence on the impact of standards-based school reform. Our theoretical synthesis distinguishes between sorting and incentive effects of high standards, and spells out the potential tradeoffs and complementarities between enhancing efficiency and equity in student achievement. Differentiated credentials can be helpful in ameliorating tradeoffs, provided that distinct signals are clearly understood, especially between cognitive and non-cognitive skills. The paper reviews trends in state-level school accountability systems, and examines empirical evidence on the impact of increased standards and expectations on student achievement. Finally, the paper reviews some of the practical challenges facing the standards movement.

Teacher Pension Incentives, Retirement Behavior, and Potential for Reform in Arkansas

Abstract: The authors analyze the Arkansas teacher pension plan and empirically gauge the behavioral response to incentives embedded in that plan and to possible reforms. The pattern of pension wealth accrual creates sharp incentives to work until eligible for early or normal retirement, often in one's early fifties, and to separate shortly thereafter. We estimate the effect of pension wealth accrual on teacher separation decisions using a new longitudinal data set of Arkansas teachers and find a significant impact. We then simulate the response to eliminating early retirement and raising the service requirement for normal retirement. We also simulate a shift to a constant accrual retirement plan. The response to both reforms is complex, as some would leave earlier and others stay longer. A constant accrual plan smoothes the pattern of retirement behavior as individuals tailor decisions to their own preferences instead of those built into the pension formula.

What Do Cost Functions Tell Us About the Cost of an Adequate Education

Abstract: Econometric cost functions have begun to appear in education adequacy cases with greater frequency. Cost functions are superficially attractive because they give the impression of objectivity, holding out the promise of scientifically estimating the cost of achieving specified levels of performance from actual data on spending. By contrast, the opinions of educators form the basis of the most common approach to estimating the cost of adequacy, the professional judgment method. The problem is that education cost functions do not in fact tell us the cost of achieving any specified level of performance. Instead, they provide estimates of average spending for districts of given characteristics and current performance. It is a huge and unwarranted stretch to go from this interpretation of regression results to the claim that they provide estimates of the minimum cost of achieving current performance levels, and it is even more problematic to extrapolate the cost of achieving at higher levels. In this article w...

Lousy and Lovely Jobs: The Rising Polarization of Work in Britain

Abstract: This paper shows that the United Kingdom since 1975 has exhibited a pattern of job polarization with rises in employment shares in the highest- and lowest-wage occupations. This is not entirely consistent with the idea of skill-biased technical change as a hypothesis about the impact of technology on the labor market. We argue that the “routinization” hypothesis recently proposed by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) is a better explanation of job polarization, though other factors may also be important. We show that job polarization can explain one-third of the rise in the log(50/10) wage differential and one-half of the rise in the log(90/50).

Avoiding Invalid Instruments and Coping with Weak Instruments

Abstract: Archimedes said, "Give me the place to stand, and a lever long enough, and I will move the Earth" (Hirsch, Kett, and Trefil, 2002, p. 476). Economists have their own powerful lever: the instrumental variable estimator. The instrumental variable estimator can avoid the bias that ordinary least squares suffers when an explanatory variable in a regression is correlated with the regression's disturbance term. But, like Archimedes' lever, instrumental variable estimation requires both a valid instrument on which to stand and an instrument that isn't too short (or "too weak"). This paper briefly reviews instrumental variable estimation, discusses classic strategies for avoiding invalid instruments (instruments themselves correlated with the regression's disturbances), and describes recently developed strategies for coping with weak instruments (instruments only weakly correlated with the offending explanator). As an example of biased ordinary least squares, consider whether incarcerating more criminals reduces crime. To estimate the effect of increased incarceration on crime, an economist might specify a regression with the crime rate as the depen- dent variable and the incarceration rate as an explanatory variable. In this regres- sion, the naive ordinary least squares regression could misleadingly indicate that high rates of incarceration are causing high rates of crime if the actual pattern is that more crime leads to more incarceration. Ordinary least squares provides a biased estimate of the effect of incarceration rates on crime rates in this case because the incarceration rate is correlated with the regression's disturbance term. As another example, consider estimating consumption's elasticity of intertem- poral substitution (which measures the responsiveness of consumption patterns to changes in intertemporal prices). To estimate this elasticity, economists typically specify a linear relationship between the rate of growth in consumption and the

High stakes : testing for tracking, promotion, and graduation

Abstract: Everyone is in favor of "high education standards" and "fair testing" of student achievement, but there is little agreement as to what these terms actually mean. High Stakes looks at how testing affects critical decisions for American students. As more and more tests are introduced into the country's schools, it becomes increasingly important to know how those tests are used--and misused--in assessing children's performance and achievements. High Stakes focuses on how testing is used in schools to make decisions about tracking and placement, promotion and retention, and awarding or withholding high school diplomas. This book sorts out the controversies that emerge when a test score can open or close gates on a student's educational pathway. The expert panel: Proposes how to judge the appropriateness of a test. Explores how to make tests reliable, valid, and fair. Puts forward strategies and practices to promote proper test use. Recommends how decisionmakers in education should--and should not--use test results. The book discusses common misuses of testing, their political and social context, what happens when test issues are taken to court, special student populations, social promotion, and more. High Stakes will be of interest to anyone concerned about the long-term implications for individual students of picking up that Number 2 pencil: policymakers, education administrators, test designers, teachers, and parents.

Schooling resources, educational institutions and student performance: The international evidence

Abstract: The paper suggests that international differences in educational institutions explain the large international differences in student performance in cognitive achievement tests. A microeconometric student-level estimation based on data for more than 260,000 students from 39 countries reveals that positive effects on student performance stem from centralized examinations and control mechanisms, school autonomy in personnel and process decisions, competition from private educational institutions, scrutiny of achievement, and teacher influence on teaching methods. A large influence of teacher unions on curriculum scope has negative effects on student performance. The findings imply that international differences in student performance are not caused by differences in schooling resources but are mainly due to differences in educational institutions.

Publicly Provided Education

Abstract: Historically, most attention in public programs has been given to the resources devoted to the activity, and resources have been used to index both commitment and quality. Education differs from other areas of public expenditure because direct measures of outcomes are available, making it is possible to consider results and, by implication, to consider the efficiency of provision. Early interpretations of the evidence, emanating from popular interpretations of the Coleman Report that 'schools do not make a difference,' are incorrect, but the basic evidence behind the statement suggests serious performance problems of government supply, because purchased inputs to schools are not closely related to outcomes. This paper reviews that evidence along with providing an evaluation of the various controversial aspects including issues of causality, consumer behavior, and estimation approaches. Two detailed policy areas are discussed in terms of the evidence on performance: public versus private provision and the financing of schools.