Robert Solomon

Bio: Robert Solomon is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: International finance & Monetary system. The author has an hindex of 5, co-authored 7 publications receiving 186 citations.

The international monetary system, 1945-1976 : an insider's view

Abstract: The international monetary system, 1945-1976 : an insider's view , The international monetary system, 1945-1976 : an insider's view , کتابخانه دیجیتال و فن آوری اطلاعات دانشگاه امام صادق(ع)

Money on the Move: The Revolution in International Finance since 1980

Abstract: Preface and AcknowledgmentsList of Abbreviations and AcronymsCh. 1The Wide-Ranging Dollar, 1980-19903Ch. 2The Developing-Country Debt Crisis34Ch. 3Economic and Monetary Integration in Europe49Ch. 4Economies in Transition: International Effects97Ch. 5The 1990s: Capital Mobility and Its Effects108Ch. 6The Present and Future of the System138App. Chronology of Important Events169Notes177Index201

Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of International Monetary Relations

Abstract: This article argues that the degree of capital market integration between states meets even the restrictive criteria established by structural realists for consideration as a structural feature of international politics; that is to say, the degree of international capital mobility systematically constrains state behavior by rewarding some actions and punishing others. Key terms are defined, and a heuristic model of the "capital mobility hypothesis" is introduced. Evidence from both U.S.-Japanese and intra-European monetary relations appears to corroborate the model. However, since the distribution of costs generated by monetary independence under conditions of relatively mobile capital can be asymmetrical, caution is warranted when generalizing about the effects of heightened capital mobility on individual states' monetary autonomy.

The Rules of the Game: International Money in Historical Perspective

Abstract: NO WORLD CENTRAL BANK issues a separate currency for commerce across national boundaries. Instead, a "system" of national monies works more or less well in providing a medium of exchange and unit of account for current international transactions, as well as a store of value and standard of deferred payment for longer-term borrowing and lending. How do national governments and banking institutions interact to provide international money for merchants and investors? By necessity, this monetary interaction changes with time, place, political circumstances, and financial technology. To better understand its historical evolution, let us follow Robert Mundell and distinguish between a monetary "system" and a monetary "order":

The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: An Historical Overview

Abstract: This paper presents an overview of the Bretton Woods experience. From an historical perspective. I analyze its performance relative to other international monetary regimes. its origins. its operation. its problems and its demise. In the survey I emphasize both issues deemed important at the time and raise questions which may be of interest for the concerns of the present. Part 2 compares the macro performance of Bretton Woods with preceding and subsequent monetary regimes. The descriptive statistics on nine key macro variables point to one startling conclusion -- the Bretton Woods system. in its full convertibility phase 1959-1971, was the most stable regime for both nominal and real variables in the past century. Part 3 surveys the origins of Bretton Woods: the perceived problems of the inter war period; the plans for a new international monetary order and the steps leading to the outcome -- the Articles of Agreement. Part 4 examines the preconvertibility period from 1946 to 1958: the problems in getting the system started including the dollar shortage and the weakness of the IMF; and how the system evolved to convertibility and the gold dollar standard. Part 5 analyzes the heyday of Bretton Woods 1959 to 1971 in the context of the gold dollar standard and the famous three problems: adjustment. liquidity, and confidence. Part 6 considers the emergence of a "de facto" dollar standard in 1968 and its collapse in the face of a massive U.S. induced inflation. Part 7 considers why Bretton Woods was so stable and yet so short-lived. It also considers the importance of adherence to credible rules in the design of an effective international monetary system.

Should Capital Controls Be Banished

Abstract: AT ITS SEMIANNUAL MEETING in April 1997 the Interim Committee of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposed that the organization’s Articles of Agreement (the basic “constitution” of international financial relations among its 182 member countries) be amended to include currency convertibility for capital transactions among its fundamental objectives. Since the IMF was founded in 1946, currency convertibility for current transactions—goods, services, travel, interest, and dividend payments— enshrined in Article VIII, has been not only a fundamental objective of the organization but a condition for membership in good standing. But convertibility for capital transactions was pointedly excluded from the basic objectives; indeed, early proposals would have enjoined member countries, when requested, to help other members enforce such controls on international capital transactions as they might impose, although that provision was ultimately not adopted. Private international capital movements were badly disrupted by the extensive debt defaults of the 1930s and the ravages of World War II. Since the 1940s, however, they have grown rapidly, regaining the importance in international transactions that they had before World War I and in the 1920s. The world of international economic intercourse is thus very different today from that envisaged by the architects of the IMF. Shortly after the Interim Committee’s meeting, the Asian financial crises erupted. Some observers attributed these crises in part to unwise or excessive capital liberalization. Malaysia dramatically reimposed controls on outward capital movements in September 1998, while other countries tightened their existing controls. All these developments have made