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Robert Stalnaker

Bio: Robert Stalnaker is an academic researcher from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The author has contributed to research in topics: Possible world & Metaphysics. The author has an hindex of 38, co-authored 83 publications receiving 7197 citations. Previous affiliations of Robert Stalnaker include University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign & Yale University.


Papers
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Book ChapterDOI
Robert Stalnaker1
01 Jan 1968
TL;DR: A conditional sentence expresses a proposition which is a function of two other propositions, yet not one which is truth function of those propositions as mentioned in this paper, which has given rise to a number of philosophical problems.
Abstract: A conditional sentence expresses a proposition which is a function of two other propositions, yet not one which is a truth function of those propositions I may know the truth values of “Willie Mays played in the American League” and “Willie Mays hit four hundred” without knowing whether or not Mays, would have hit four hundred if he had played in the American League This fact has tended to puzzle, displease, or delight philosophers, and many have felt that it is a fact that calls for some comment or explanation It has given rise to a number of philosophical problems; I shall discuss three of these

1,725 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The explanatory gap as discussed by the authors has been defined as the inability of humans to make sense of the idea that a physical thing could have phenomenal states (see, e.g., Nagel 1974, Levine 1983).
Abstract: The explanatory gap. Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states (Nagel 1974, Levine 1983). Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain-say, activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6-as Crick and Koch have suggested for visual consciousness (Crick 1994). Still, that identity itself calls out for explanation! Proponents of an explanatory gap disagree about whether the gap is permanent. Some (e.g., Nagel 1974) say that we are like the scientifically naive person who is told that matter = energy, but does not have the concepts required to make sense of the idea. If we can acquire these concepts, the gap is closable. Others say the gap is unclosable because of our cognitive limitations (McGinn 1991). Still others say that the gap is a consequence of the fundamental nature of consciousness.

368 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper revisits some foundational questions concerning the abstract representation of a discourse context and responds to a criticism of the framework, and considers the way it can help to clarify some phenomena concerning pronouns with indefinite antecedents.
Abstract: This paper revisits some foundational questions concerning the abstract representation of a discourse context. The context of a conversation is represented by a body of information that is presumed to be shared by the participants in the conversation – the information that the speaker presupposes a point at which a speech act is interpreted. This notion is designed to represent both the information on which context-dependent speech acts depend, and the situation that speech acts are designed to affect, and so to be a representation of context that is appropriate for explaining the interaction of context and the contents expressed in them. After reviewing the motivating ideas and the outlines of the apparatus, the paper responds to a criticism of the framework, and considers the way it can help to clarify some phenomena concerning pronouns with indefinite antecedents.

321 citations


Cited by
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01 Jan 2011
TL;DR: To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology the authors require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind.
Abstract: Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.

4,670 citations

01 Mar 1999

3,234 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A communication task in which pairs of people conversed about arranging complex figures is described and how the proposed model accounts for many features of the references they produced is shown.

1,977 citations

Book
01 Jan 2000
TL;DR: In this article, the author outlines a theory of presumptive meanings, or preferred interpretations, governing the use of language, building on the idea of implicature developed by the philosopher H. P. Grice.
Abstract: From the Publisher: When we speak, we mean more than we say. In this book Stephen C. Levinson explains some general processes that underlie presumptions in communication. This is the first extended discussion of preferred interpretation in language understanding, integrating much of the best research in linguistic pragmatics from the last two decades. Levinson outlines a theory of presumptive meanings, or preferred interpretations, governing the use of language, building on the idea of implicature developed by the philosopher H. P. Grice. Some of the indirect information carried by speech is presumed by default because it is carried by general principles, rather than inferred from specific assumptions about intention and context. Levinson examines this class of general pragmatic inferences in detail, showing how they apply to a wide range of linguistic constructions. This approach has radical consequences for how we think about language and communication.

1,881 citations