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Roberto E. Wessels

Bio: Roberto E. Wessels is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Debt & Debt ratio. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 5638 citations.

Papers
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TL;DR: In this paper, the explanatory power of some of the recent theories of optimal capital structure is analyzed empirically and a factor-analytic technique is used to mitigate the measurement problems encountered when working with proxy variables.
Abstract: This paper analyzes the explanatory power of some of the recent theories of optimal capital structure. The study extends empirical work on capital structure theory in three ways. First, it examines a much broader set of capital structure theories, many of which have not previously been analyzed empirically. Second, since the theories have different empirical implications in regard to different types of debt instruments, the authors analyze measures of short-term, long-term, and convertible debt rather than an aggregate measure of total debt. Third, the study uses a factor-analytic technique that mitigates the measurement problems encountered when working with proxy variables.

5,860 citations


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TL;DR: The authors surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world, and presents a survey of the literature.
Abstract: This paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world.

13,489 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Corporate Governance as mentioned in this paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world, and shows that most advanced market economies have solved the problem of corporate governance at least reasonably well, in that they have assured the flows of enormous amounts of capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance.
Abstract: This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEALS WITH the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profits to them? How do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply or invest it in bad projects? How do suppliers of finance control managers? At first glance, it is not entirely obvious why the suppliers of capital get anything back. After all, they part with their money, and have little to contribute to the enterprise afterward. The professional managers or entrepreneurs who run the firms might as well abscond with the money. Although they sometimes do, usually they do not. Most advanced market economies have solved the problem of corporate governance at least reasonably well, in that they have assured the flows of enormous amounts of capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance. But this does not imply that they have solved the corporate governance problem perfectly, or that the corporate governance mechanisms cannot be improved. In fact, the subject of corporate governance is of enormous practical impor

10,954 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the determinants of capital structure choice by analyzing the financing decisions of public firms in the major industrialized countries and find that factors identified by previous studies as important in determining the cross-section of the capital structure in the U.S. affect firm leverage in other countries as well.
Abstract: We investigate the determinants of capital structure choice by analyzing the financing decisions of public firms in the major industrialized countries. At an aggregate level, firm leverage is fairly similar across the G-7 countries. We find that factors identified by previous studies as important in determining the cross- section of capital structure in the U.S. affect firm leverage in other countries as well. However, a deeper examination of the U.S. and foreign evidence suggests that the theoretical underpinnings of the observed correlations are still largely unresolved.

5,935 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a survey of capital structure theories based on agency costs, asymmetric information, product/input market interactions, and corporate control considerations is presented, with a brief overview of the papers surveyed and their relation to each other.
Abstract: This paper surveys capital structure theories based on agency costs, asymmetric information, product/input market interactions, and corporate control considerations (but excluding tax-based theories). For each type of model, a brief overview of the papers surveyed and their relation to each other is provided. The central papers are described in some detail, and their results are summarized and followed by a discussion of related extensions. Each section concludes with a summary of the main implications of the models surveyed in the section. Finally, these results are collected and compared to the available evidence. Suggestions for future research are provided.

4,404 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors survey 392 CFOs about the cost of capital, capital budgeting, and capital structure and find some support for the pecking-order and trade-off capital structure hypotheses but little evidence that executives are concerned about asset substitution, asymmetric information, transactions costs, free cash flows, or personal taxes.

4,138 citations