Russell Hardin

Bio: Russell Hardin is an academic researcher from New York University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Democracy & Rationality. The author has an hindex of 26, co-authored 94 publications receiving 4794 citations. Previous affiliations of Russell Hardin include Illinois Institute of Technology & University of Maryland, College Park.

The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust:

Abstract: L'A. analyse la structure epistemologique de la confiance en voyant en particulier comment la relation intersubjective en cree les conditions, et quel rapport a la rationalite la confiance entretient

One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict

Abstract: In a book that challenges the most widely held ideas of why individuals engage in collective conflict, Russell Hardin offers an explanation of group action in its most destructive forms. Contrary to those observers who attribute group violence to irrationality, primordial instinct, or complex psychology, Hardin uncovers a systematic exploitation of self-interest in the underpinnings of group identification and collective violence. Using examples from Mafia vendettas to ethnic violence in places such as Bosnia and Rwanda, he describes the social and economic circumstances that set this violence into motion. Hardin explains why hatred alone does not necessarily start wars but how leaders cultivate it to mobilize their people. He also reveals the thinking behind the pre-emptive strikes that contribute to much of the violence between groups, identifies the dangers of "particularist" communitarianism, and argues for government structures to prevent any ethnic or other group from having too much sway. Exploring conflict between groups such as Serbs and Croats, Hutu and Tutsi, Northern Irish Catholics and Protestants, Hardin vividly illustrates the danger that arises when individual and group interests merge. In these examples, groups of people have been governed by movements that managed to reflect their members' personal interests - mainly by striving for political and economic advances at the expense of other groups and by closing themselves off from society at large. The author concludes that we make a better and safer world if we design our social institutions to facilitate individual efforts to achieve personal goals than if we concentrate on the ethnic political makeup of our respective societies.

Cooperation Without Trust

Abstract: In a recent Public Administration Review sympo sium on collaboration, 9 out of 12 articles dis cussed, to various degrees, the importance of trust. Are public administration scholars misplacing their trust in trust? In a recent panel on trust at the Midwest Political Science Association conference, two practitioners, scheduled to share experience on how good city management improves citizen trust, were genuinely disturbed by the views expressed by other academics on the panel that trust does not matter. Are public managers misdirecting resources when they work to improve trust?

Collective action as an agreeable n‐prisoners' dilemma

Abstract: The problem of collective action to produce a group collective good is analyzed as the game of Individual vs. Collective and then as an n-person game to show that, under the constraints of Mancur Olson's analysis, it is an n-prisoners' dilemma in the cases of latent and intermediate groups. The usual analysis according to which noncooperation is considered the rational strategy for classical 2-prisoners' dilemma is logically similar to Olson's analysis, which suggests that rational members of a latent group should not contribute toward the purchase of the group collective good. However, in the game analysis it is clear that the latent and intermediate groups are not logically different, but rather are distinguishable only statistically. Some prisoners' dilemma experimental results are used to suggest how the difference might arise and how the vast prisoners' dilemma literature can be related to the problem of collective action. The game of collective action is then analyzed not from the view of strategies but of outcomes. There is presented a theorem which states that the outcome in which all player-members of a group pay and all benefit is a Condorcet choice from the set of realizable outcomes for the game. Hence the cooperative outcome in such a game would prevail in election against all other outcomes.

Behavioral intention formation in knowledge sharing: examining the roles of extrinsic motivators, social-psychological factors, and organizational climate

Abstract: Individuals' knowledge does not transform easily into organizational knowledge even with the implementation of knowledge repositories. Rather, individuals tend to hoard knowledge for various reasons. The aim of this study is to develop an integrative understanding of the factors supporting or inhibiting individuals' knowledge-sharing intentions. We employ as our theoretical framework the theory of reasoned action (TRA), and augment it with extrinsic motivators, social-psychological forces and organizational climate factors that are believed to influence individuals' knowledge- sharing intentions. Through a field survey of 154 managers from 27 Korean organizations, we confirm our hypothesis that attitudes toward and subjective norms with regard to knowledge sharing as well as organizational climate affect individuals' intentions to share knowledge. Additionally, we find that anticipated reciprocal relationships affect individuals' attitudes toward knowledge sharing while both sense of self-worth and organizational climate affect subjective norms. Contrary to common belief, we find anticipated extrinsic rewards exert a negative effect on individuals' knowledge-sharing attitudes.

Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics

Abstract: Introduction 1 Contentious politics and social movements: Part I The Birth of the Modern Social Movement: 2 Modular collective action 3 Print and association 4 Statebuilding and social movements Part II From Contention to Social Movements: 5 Political opportunities and constraints 6 The repertoire of contention 7 Framing contention 8 Mobilising structures and contentious politics Part III The Dynamics of Movement: 9 Cycles of contention 10 Struggling to reform 11 Transnational contention/conclusion: the future of social movements

Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms

Abstract: With the publication of The Logic of Collective Action in 1965, Mancur Olson challenged a cherished foundation of modern democratic thought that groups would tend to form and take collective action...

Trust in Automation: Designing for Appropriate Reliance

Abstract: Automation is often problematic because people fail to rely upon it appropriately. Because people respond to technology socially, trust influences reliance on automation. In particular, trust guides reliance when complexity and unanticipated situations make a complete understanding of the automation impractical. This review considers trust from the organizational, sociological, interpersonal, psychological, and neurological perspectives. It considers how the context, automation characteristics, and cognitive processes affect the appropriateness of trust. The context in which the automation is used influences automation performance and provides a goal-oriented perspective to assess automation characteristics along a dimension of attributional abstraction. These characteristics can influence trust through analytic, analogical, and affective processes. The challenges of extrapolating the concept of trust in people to trust in automation are discussed. A conceptual model integrates research regarding trust in automation and describes the dynamics of trust, the role of context, and the influence of display characteristics. Actual or potential applications of this research include improved designs of systems that require people to manage imperfect automation.

Two Treatises of Government.

Abstract: All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.