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Ruth Klein

Bio: Ruth Klein is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Self & Self-discrepancy theory. The author has an hindex of 4, co-authored 4 publications receiving 1515 citations.

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TL;DR: For high- Discrepancy subjects, but not low-discrepancySubjects with a predominant actual:ideal discrepancy felt more dejection whereas ought priming increased their agitation, and cognitive-motivational factors that may serve as vulnerability markers for emotional problems are discussed.
Abstract: Two studies examined whether the type of emotional change experienced by individuals is influenced by the magnitude and accessibility of the different types of self-discrepancies they possess. In both studies, subjects filled out a measure of self-discrepancy a few weeks prior to the experimental session. Subjects were asked to list up to 10 attributes each for different self-states--their actual self, their ideal self (their own or others' hopes and goals for them), and their ought self (their own or others' beliefs about their duty and obligations). Magnitude of self-discrepancy was calculated by comparing the attributes in the actual self to the attributes in either the ideal self or the ought self, with the total number of attribute pairs that matched being subtracted from the total number of attribute pairs that mismatched. In Study 1, subjects were asked to imagine either a positive event or a negative event and were then given a mood measure and a writing-speed task. Subjects with a predominant actual:ideal discrepancy felt more dejected (e.g., sad) and wrote more slowly in the negative event condition than in the positive event condition, whereas subjects with a predominant actual:ought discrepancy, if anything, felt more agitated (e.g., afraid) and wrote more quickly in the negative event condition. In Study 2, subjects were selected who were either high in both kinds of discrepancies or low in both. Half of the subjects in each group were asked to discuss their own and their parents' hopes and goals for them (ideal priming), and the other half were asked to discuss their own and their parents' beliefs concerning their duty and obligations (ought priming). For high-discrepancy subjects, but not low-discrepancy subjects, ideal priming increased their dejection whereas ought priming increased their agitation. The implications of these findings for identifying cognitive-motivational factors that may serve as vulnerability markers for emotional problems is discussed.

692 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors tested whether self-concept discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1983) provides a psychological model for distinguishing among different aspects of depression and anxiety, and the Selves Questionnaire was created to measure selfconcept discrepancy.
Abstract: This study tested whether self-concept discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1983) provides a psychological model for distinguishing among different aspects of depression and anxiety. Nondepressed, slightly depressed, and moderately depressed undergraduates filled out a variety of standard questionnaires—the Beck Depression Inventory, Blatt Depressive Experiences Questionnaire, Emotions Questionnaire (measuring chronic rather than momentary affect), and Hopkins Symptom Checklist (Depression, Anxiety, Hostility, and Somatization subscales)—as well as the Selves Questionnaire, which was created to measure self-concept discrepancy. The Selves Questionnaire asked subjects to list up to 10 attributes associated with each of six different self-concepts. Each self-concept involved a particular domain of the self (i.e., the “actual” self, the “ideal” self, or the “ought” self) combined with a particular standpoint on that self (i.e., the subject's “own” standpoint or the standpoint of a significant “other”). To calculate ...

677 citations


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is explored the possibility that romantic love is an attachment process--a biosocial process by which affectional bonds are formed between adult lovers, just as affectional Bonds are formed earlier in life between human infants and their parents.
Abstract: This article explores the possibility that romantic love is an attachment process--a biosocial process by which affectional bonds are formed between adult lovers, just as affectional bonds are formed earlier in life between human infants and their parents. Key components of attachment theory, developed by Bowlby, Ainsworth, and others to explain the development of affectional bonds in infancy, were translated into terms appropriate to adult romantic love. The translation centered on the three major styles of attachment in infancy--secure, avoidant, and anxious/ambivalent--and on the notion that continuity of relationship style is due in part to mental models (Bowlby's "inner working models") of self and social life. These models, and hence a person's attachment style, are seen as determined in part by childhood relationships with parents. Two questionnaire studies indicated that relative prevalence of the three attachment styles is roughly the same in adulthood as in infancy, the three kinds of adults differ predictably in the way they experience romantic love, and attachment style is related in theoretically meaningful ways to mental models of self and social relationships and to relationship experiences with parents. Implications for theories of romantic love are discussed, as are measurement problems and other issues related to future tests of the attachment perspective.

7,767 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
E. Tory Higgins1
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a theory of how different types of discrepancies between self-state representations are related to different kinds of emotional vulnerabilities, and they predict that differences in both the relative magnitude and the accessibility of individuals' available types of self-discrepancies are predicted to be related to differences in the kinds of discomfort people are likely to experience.
Abstract: This article presents a theory of how different types of discrepancies between self-state representations are related to different kinds of emotional vulnerabilities. One domain of the self (actual; ideal; ought) and one standpoint on the self (own; significant other) constitute each type of self-state representation. It is proposed that different types of self-discrepancies represent different types of negative psychological situations that are associated with different kinds of discomfort. Discrepancies between the actual/own self-state (i.e., the self-concept) and ideal self-states (i.e., representations of an individual's beliefs about his or her own or a sitmifieant other's hopes, wishes, or aspirations for the individual) signify the absence of positive outcomes, which is associated with dejection-related emotions (e.g., disappointment, dissatisfaction, sadness). In contrast, discrepancies between the actual/own self-state and ought self-states (i.e., representations of an individual's beliefs about his or her own or a significant other's beliefs about the individual's duties, responsibilities, or obligations) signify the presence of negative outcomes, which is associated with agitation-related emotions (e.g., fear, threat, restlessness). Differences in both the relative magnitude and the accessibility of individuals' available types of self-discrepancies are predicted to be related to differences in the kinds of discomfort people are likely to experience. Correlational and experimental evidence supports the predictions of the model. Differences between self-discrepancy theory and (a) other theories of incompatible self-beliefs and (b) actual self negativity (e.g., low self-esteem) are discussed.

5,287 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
E T Higgins1
TL;DR: In this paper, a regulatory focus is used to distinguish self-regulation with a promotion focus (accomplishments and aspirations) from self-regulatory with a prevention focus (safety and responsibilities).
Abstract: People approach pleasure and avoid pain. To discover the true nature of approach-avoidance motivation, psychologists need to move beyond this hedonic principle to the principles that underlie the different ways that it operates. One such principle is regulatory focus, which distinguishes self-regulation with a promotion focus (accomplishments and aspirations) from self-regulation with a prevention focus (safety and responsibilities). This principle is used to reconsider the fundamental nature of approach-avoidance, expectancy-value relations, and emotional and evaluative sensitivities. Both types of regulatory focus are applied to phenomena that have been treated in terms of either promotion (e.g., well-being) or prevention (e.g., cognitive dissonance). Then, regulatory focus is distinguished from regulatory anticipation and regulatory reference, 2 other principles underlying the different ways that people approach pleasure and avoid pain.

4,342 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Among the many traditions of research on "identity", two somewhat different yet strongly related strands of identity theory have developed as mentioned in this paper, reflected in the linkages of social structures with identities.
Abstract: Among the many traditions of research on "identity," two somewhat different yet strongly related strands of identity theory have developed. The first, reflected in the work of Stryker and colleagues, focuses on the linkages of social structures with identities. The second, reflected in the work of Burke and colleagues, focuses on the internal process of self-verification. In the present paper we review each of these strands and then discuss ways in which the two relate to and complement one another Each provides a context for the other: the relation of social structures to identities influences the process of self-verification, while the process of self-verification creates and sustains social structures. The paper concludes with examples of potentially useful applications of identity theory to other arenas of social psychology, and with a discussion of challenges that identity theory must meet to provide a clear understanding of the relation between self and society. The language of "identity" is ubiquitous in contemporary social science, cutting across psychoanalysis, psychology, political science, sociology, and history. The common usage of the term identity, however, belies the considerable variability in both its conceptual meanings and its theoretical role. Even when consideration is restricted to sociology and social psychology, variation is still considerable.'

2,982 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, an alternating sequence of first overgeneralizing self-conceptions and then differentiating differentiating beliefs is described. But the authors do not specify the order of the overgeneralization.
Abstract: incorporating first behaviors (e.g. "good at doing sums"), then traits ("smart"), then single abstractions ("scientific"), then higher order abstrac­ tions ("intellectual"). Within each of the phases, there is an alternating sequence of first overgeneralizing self-conceptions and then differentiating

2,890 citations