Author
Ruud Hendrickx
Bio: Ruud Hendrickx is an academic researcher from Tilburg University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Transferable utility & Bankruptcy. The author has an hindex of 15, co-authored 79 publications receiving 901 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: This paper surveys the research area of cooperative games associated with several types of operations research problems in which various decision makers (players) are involved on the basis of a distinction between the nature of the underlying optimisation problem: connection, routing, scheduling, production and inventory.
Abstract: This paper surveys the research area of cooperative games associated with several types of operations research problems in which various decision makers (players) are involved. Cooperating players not only face a joint optimisation problem in trying, e.g., to minimise total joint costs, but also face an additional allocation problem in how to distribute these joint costs back to the individual players. This interplay between optimisation and allocation is the main subject of the area of operations research games. It is surveyed on the basis of a distinction between the nature of the underlying optimisation problem: connection, routing, scheduling, production and inventory.
211 citations
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TL;DR: This paper characterize internally stable coalitions on the proposed domains and shows how these characterizations can be used for generating a strict core element in the first case and a core elements in the second case.
Abstract: In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered. It turns out that the first domain restriction guarantees non-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic games. Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions and some sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the core already known in the literature.
84 citations
TL;DR: An axiomatic analysis of several ranking methods for general tournaments finds that the ranking method obtained by applying maximum likelihood to the (Zermelo-)Bradley-Terry model is one of the ranking methods that perform best with respect to the set of properties under consideration.
Abstract: In this paper we present an axiomatic analysis of several ranking methods for general tournaments. We find that the ranking method obtained by applying maximum likelihood to the (Zermelo-)Bradley-Terry model, the most common method in statistics and psychology, is one of the ranking methods that perform best with respect to the set of properties under consideration. A less known ranking method, generalised row sum, performs well too. We also study, among others, the fair bets ranking method, widely studied in social choice, and the least squares method.
71 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy, and propose two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies.
Abstract: In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered. We characterize internally stable coalitions on the proposed domains and show how these characterizations can be used for generating a strict core element in the first case and a core element in the second case. Moreover, we prove that an element of the strict core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an element of the core under enemies aversion is NP-hard.
69 citations
TL;DR: The run-to-the-bank rule is introduced as a solution for multi-issue allocation situations and turns out to be Shapley value of the corresponding game.
66 citations
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789 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors classify collaboration initiatives using a conceptual water-tank analogy, and discuss their dynamic behavior and key characteristics, concluding that the effectiveness of supply chain collaboration relies upon two factors: the level to which it integrates internal and external operations, and the efforts are aligned to the supply chain settings in terms of the geographical dispersion, the demand pattern, and product characteristics.
747 citations
TL;DR: This essay is an update of Thomson (2003), a survey of the literature devoted to the study of such problems as a group of agents having claims on a resource but there is not enough of it to honor all of the claims.
577 citations
Book•
25 Oct 2011TL;DR: This talk introduces basic concepts from cooperative game theory, and in particular the key solution concepts: the core and the Shapley value, and introduces the key issues that arise if one is to consider the cooperative games in a computational setting.
Abstract: The theory of cooperative games provides a rich mathematical framework with which to understand the interactions between self-interested agents in settings where they can benefit from cooperation, and where binding agreements between agents can be made. Our aim in this talk is to describe the issues that arise when we consider cooperative game theory through a computational lens. We begin by introducing basic concepts from cooperative game theory, and in particular the key solution concepts: the core and the Shapley value. We then introduce the key issues that arise if one is to consider the cooperative games in a computational setting: in particular, the issue of representing games, and the computational complexity of cooperative solution concepts.
395 citations
TL;DR: This paper investigated empirically the determinants of individuals' attitudes towards preventing environmental damage in Spain using data from the World Values Survey and European Values Survey for the periods 1990, 1995 and 1999/2000.
Abstract: This paper investigates empirically the determinants of individuals' attitudes towards preventing environmental damage in Spain using data from the World Values Survey and European Values Survey for the periods 1990, 1995 and 1999/2000 Compared to many previous studies, we present a richer set of independent variables and found that strongly neglected variables such as political interest and social capital have a strong impact on individuals' preferences to prevent environmental damage An interesting aspect in our study is the ability to investigate environmental preferences over time The results show strong differences over time Finally, using disaggregated data for Spanish regions, we also find significant regional differences
304 citations