Since critics first allegedthat feminism claimed tospeak universally for all
women, feminist researchers havebeen acutely aware ofthe limitations of 
genderas a single analyticalcategory. In fact, feministsare perhaps alone in
the academy in theextent to which theyhave embraced intersectionality – the 
relationshipsamong multiple dimensions andmodalities of social relations
and subject formations – as itselfa central category ofanalysis. One could 
evensay that intersectionality isthe most important theoreticalcontribution 
that women’s studies,in conjunction with relatedfields, has made sofar.1

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/426800

The Complexity of Intersectionality

Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.

/pdf/stanford-encyclopedia-of-philosophy-1wqoykisq0.pdf

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

萨义德以其独特的双重身份,对西方中心权力话语做了分析,通过对文学作品、演讲演说等文本的解读,将O rie n ta lis m——"东方学",做了三重释义:一门学科、一种思维方式和一种权力话语系统,对东方学权力话语做了系统的批判,同时将东方学放入空间维度对东方学文本做了细致的解读。

萨义德的“Orientalism”释义

In the present paper a research has been done on the essay ‘Can the Subaltern Speak’ by’ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’. It has been explained into much simpler language about what the author conveys for better understanding and further references. Also the criticism has been done by various critiques from various sources which is helpful from examination point of view. The paper has been divided into various contexts with an introduction and the conclusions. Also the references has been written that depicts the sources of criticism.

/pdf/can-the-subaltern-speak-559i22edvt.pdf

Can the Subaltern Speak

Research articles on women's entrepreneurship reveal, in spite of intentions to the contrary and in spite of inconclusive research results, a tendency to recreate the idea of women as being secondary to men and of women's businesses being of less significance or, at best, as being a complement. Based on a discourse analysis, this article discusses what research practices cause these results. It suggests new research directions that do not reproduce women's subordination but capture more and richer aspects of women's entrepreneurship.

/pdf/why-research-on-women-entrepreneurs-needs-new-directions-namkn8lf7t.pdf

Why research on women entrepreneurs needs new directions

Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”

L'A. etudie les paralleles et les differences entre les genres et les races du point de vue de l'epistemologie feministe. Distinguant les projets conceptuel, descriptiviste et analytique de definition des notions de genre et race, l'A. defend une theorie critique feministe et anti-raciste qui peut servir comme instrument dans le combat contre l'injustice, les inegalites et les oppressions sociales, en vue d'une redefinition normative de l'action des femmes et des gens de couleur dans le cadre de la communaute.

/pdf/gender-and-race-what-are-they-what-do-we-want-them-to-be-3csh6m8z4p.pdf

Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?

Introduction I. Social Construction 1. "Social Construction: Myths and Reality" 2. "On Being Objective and Being Objectified." 3. "Ontology and Social Construction." 4. "Social Construction: The "Debunking" Project." 5. "Feminism and Metaphysics: Negotiating the Natural." 6. "Family, Ancestry and Self: What is the Moral Significance of Biological Ties?" 7. "Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?" 8. "Future Genders? Future Races?" 9. "You Mixed? Racial Identity without Racial Biology." 10. "A Social Constructionist Analysis of Race" 11. "Oppressions: Racial and Other" III. Language and Knowledge 12. "What Knowledge Is and What It Ought To Be: Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology" 13. "What Are We Talking About? The Semantics and Politics of Social Kinds" 14. "What Good Are Our Intuitions? Philosophical Analysis and Social Kinds" 15. "But Mom, Crop-Tops Are Cute!" 16. "Language, Politics and 'The Folk': Looking for the 'Meaning' of Race " 17. "Ideology, Generics, and Common Ground"

Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique

There is a deep well of rage inside of me. Rage about how I as an individual have been treated in philosophy; rage about how others I know have been treated; and rage about the conditions that I’m sure affect many women and minorities in philosophy, and have caused many others to leave. Most of the time I suppress this rage and keep it sealed away. Until I came to MIT in 1998, I was in a constant dialogue with myself about whether to quit philosophy, even give up tenure, to do something else. In spite of my deep love for philosophy, it just didn’t seem worth it. And I am one of the very lucky ones, one of the ones who has been successful by the dominant standards of the profession. Whatever the numbers say about women and minorities in philosophy, numbers don’t begin to tell the story. Things may be getting better in some contexts, but they are far from acceptable.

/pdf/changing-the-ideology-and-culture-of-philosophy-not-by-19veufoy5p.pdf

Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone)

of temporary intrinsics rules out the possibility that objects endure through change.' Lewis maintains that to account for temporary intrinsics we should say that objects do not endure through change, but rather perdure.2 I disagree; Lewis's arguments do not demonstrate that an endurance theory cannot accommodate temporary intrinsics. The problem of temporary intrinsics is this: ordinary objects persist through changes in their intrinsic properties, i.e. those properties which an object has in virtue of the way it is, independently of anything else. To use Lewis's example, 'when I sit I'm bent, when I stand, I'm straight'. But an object cannot have incompatible properties. So how is intrinsic change possible? Lewis initially outlines three solutions to this problem, of which he favours the third. The first is the view that properties are really relations to times; the second is the view that only the present exists; the third is the doctrine of temporal parts. It is important to note that Lewis's solution, like the others he mentions, requires a trade off in our intuitions about intrinsic change. Although on his view it is true that there are persisting objects (the perdurers), and it is also true that properties such as shape are genuinely intrinsic (to the stages), there is nothing such that it persists through a change in its intrinsic properties. The intrinsic properties of the stages are not properties of the perdurer. The perdurer itself is not simply bent and then straight; if it were we'd be left with the

/pdf/endurance-and-temporary-intrinsics-2foq3sdbry.pdf

Sally Haslanger

Papers

Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”

Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?

Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique

Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone)

Endurance and temporary intrinsics