Following the 2016 U.S. presidential election, many have expressed concern about the effects of false stories (“fake news”), circulated largely through social media. We discuss the economics of fake news and present new data on its consumption prior to the election. Drawing on web browsing data, archives of fact-checking websites, and results from a new online survey, we find: (i) social media was an important but not dominant source of election news, with 14 percent of Americans calling social media their “most important” source; (ii) of the known false news stories that appeared in the three months before the election, those favoring Trump were shared a total of 30 million times on Facebook, while those favoring Clinton were shared 8 million times; (iii) the average American adult saw on the order of one or perhaps several fake news stories in the months around the election, with just over half of those who recalled seeing them believing them; and (iv) people are much more likely to believe stories that favor their preferred candidate, especially if they have ideologically segregated social media networks.

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Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election

We examine political polarization over climate change within the American public by analyzing data from 10 nationally representative Gallup Polls between 2001 and 2010. We find that liberals and Democrats are more likely to report beliefs consistent with the scientific consensus and express personal concern about global warming than are conservatives and Republicans. Further, the effects of educational attainment and self-reported understanding on global warming beliefs and concern are positive for liberals and Democrats, but are weaker or negative for conservatives and Republicans. Last, significant ideological and partisan polarization has occurred on the issue of climate change over the past decade.

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The politicization of climate change and polarization in the american public's views of global warming, 2001–2010

Habits of the Heart Individualism and Commitment in American Life

The current debate over the extent of polarization in the American mass public focuses on the extent to which partisans’ policy preferences have moved. Whereas "maximalists" claim that partisans’ views on policies have become more extreme over time (Abramowitz 2010), "minimalists" (Fiorina and Abrams 2009) contend that the majority of Americans remain centrist, and that what little centrifugal movement has occurred reflects sorting, i.e., the increased association between partisanship and ideology. We argue in favor of an alternative definition of polarization, based on the classic concept of social distance (Bogardus 1947). Using data from a variety of sources, we demonstrate that both Republicans and Democrats increasingly dislike, even loathe, their opponents. We also find that partisan affect is inconsistently (and perhaps artifactually) founded in policy attitudes. The more plausible account lies in the nature of political campaigns; exposure to messages attacking the out-group reinforces partisans’ biased views of their opponents.

Affect, Not Ideology A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization

We show that the demand for news varies with the perceived affinity of the news organization to the consumer’s political preferences. In an experimental setting, conservatives and Republicans preferred to read news reports attributed to Fox News and to avoid news from CNN and NPR. Democrats and liberals exhibited exactly the opposite syndrome—dividing their attention equally between CNN and NPR, but avoiding Fox News. This pattern of selective exposure based on partisan affinity held not only for news coverage of controversial issues but also for relatively ‘‘soft’’ subjects such as crime and travel. The tendency to select news based on anticipated agreement was also strengthened among more politically engaged partisans. Overall, these results suggest that the further proliferation of new media and enhanced media choices may contribute to the further polarization of the news audience.

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Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological Selectivity in Media Use

1. Culture War? 2. A 50:50 Nation? The Red and the Blue States. Is the Country Polarized? Red v. Blue States: A Summary. The Obvious Hypothesis. 3. A 50:50 Nation? Beyond the Red and the Blue. Is the Country Polarized? Demographic and Political Groups. Partisan Polarization. Is the Country Polarized? Individuals. Summary: Not a Polarized Country. 4. A Closer Look at Abortion. Public Attitudes Toward Abortion: "I'm Pro-Choice, But..." Abortion and the Gender Gap. Epilogue. 5. A Closer Look at Homosexuality. Americans Attitudes toward Homosexuals and Homosexuality. The Aftermath of Lawrence. 6. Have Electoral Cleavages Shifted? The Rise of Religious Cleavages? The Decay of Economic Cleavages? Appendix to Chapter 6. 7. Reconciling Micro and Macro Evidence. Centrist Voters and Polarized Elites. Voter Response to Elite Polarization. Appendix to Chapter 7: A Deep Identification Problem in Electoral Studies. 8. How Did It Come to This and Where Do We Go From Here? The Ascendance of the Purists. The Expansion of Government. The Rise of Participatory Democracy. The Hijacking of American Democracy. Three Important Caveats. Can Anything Be Done? A Final Thought.

Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America

For more than two decades political scientists have discussed rising elite polarization in the United States, but the study of mass polarization did not receive comparable attention until fairly recently. This article surveys the literature on mass polarization. It begins with a discussion of the concept of polarization, then moves to a critical consideration of different kinds of evidence that have been used to study polarization, concluding that much of the evidence presents problems of inference that render conclusions problematic. The most direct evidence—citizens' positions on public policy issues—shows little or no indication of increased mass polarization over the past two to three decades. Party sorting—an increased correlation between policy views and partisan identification—clearly has occurred, although the extent has sometimes been exaggerated. Geographic polarization—the hypothesized tendency of like-minded people to cluster together—remains an open question. To date, there is no conclusive e...

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Political Polarization in the American Public

Disconnect: The Breakdown of Representation in American Politics

In 2008 journalist Bill Bishop achieved the kind of notice that authors dream about. His book, The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart , was mentioned regularly during the presidential campaign; most notably, former president Bill Clinton urged audiences to read the book. Bishop's thesis is that Americans increasingly are choosing to live in neighborhoods populated with people just like themselves. In turn, these residential choices have produced a significant increase in geographic political polarization. Bishop does not contend that people consciously decide to live with fellow Democrats or Republicans; rather political segregation is a byproduct of the correlations between political views and the various demographic and life-style indicators people consider when making residential decisions. Whatever the cause, Bishop contends that the resulting geographic polarization is a troubling and dangerous development.

“The Big Sort” That Wasn't: A Skeptical Reexamination

Classical rational choice explanations of voting participation are widely thought to have failed. This article argues that the currently dominant Group Mobilization and Ethical Agency approaches have serious shortcomings in explaining individually rational turnout. It develops an informal social network (ISN) model in which people rationally vote if their informal networks of family and friends attach enough importance to voting, because voting leads to social approval and vice versa. Using results from the social psychology literature, research on social groups in sociology and their own survey data, the authors argue that the ISN model can explain individually rational non-altruistic turnout. If group variables that affect whether voting is used as a marker of individual standing in groups are included, the likelihood of turnout rises dramatically.

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/PDFfiles/Abrams_Iversen_Soskice2010.pdf

Samuel J. Abrams

Papers

Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America

Political Polarization in the American Public

Disconnect: The Breakdown of Representation in American Politics

“The Big Sort” That Wasn't: A Skeptical Reexamination

Informal Social Networks and Rational Voting