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Samuel Scott
Researcher at Royal Holloway, University of London
Publications - 10
Citations - 1121
Samuel Scott is an academic researcher from Royal Holloway, University of London. The author has contributed to research in topics: Hash-based message authentication code & Password. The author has an hindex of 7, co-authored 10 publications receiving 922 citations. Previous affiliations of Samuel Scott include Cornell University & University of London.
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Journal ArticleDOI
On the concrete hardness of Learning with Errors
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present hardness results for concrete instances of LWE and give concrete estimates for various families of instances, provide a Sage module for computing these estimates and highlight gaps in the knowledge about algorithms for solving the Learning with Errors problem.
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On the concrete hardness of Learning with Errors.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present hardness results for concrete instances of LWE and give concrete estimates for various families of instances, provide a Sage module for computing these estimates and highlight gaps in the knowledge about algorithms for solving the Learning with Errors problem.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
A Comprehensive Symbolic Analysis of TLS 1.3
TL;DR: The most comprehensive, faithful, and modular symbolic model of the TLS~1.3 draft 21 release candidate is constructed, and an unexpected behaviour is revealed, which is expected to inhibit strong authentication guarantees in some implementations of the protocol.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Automated Analysis and Verification of TLS 1.3: 0-RTT, Resumption and Delayed Authentication
TL;DR: This work model and analyse revision 10 of the TLS 1.3 specification using the Tamarin prover, a tool for the automated analysis of security protocols, and shows the strict necessity of recent suggestions to include more information in the protocol's signature contents.
Proceedings Article
The pythia PRF service
TL;DR: A modern PRF service called PYTHIA is proposed designed to offer a level of flexibility, security, and ease-of-deployability lacking in prior approaches, and a new cryptographic primitive called a verifiable partially-oblivious PRF that reveals a portion of an input message to the service but hides the rest.