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Handbook Of Psychological Testing

Value in Ethics and Economics

Though perceived financial well-being is viewed as an important topic of consumer research, the literature contains no accepted definition of this construct. Further, there has been little systematic examination of how perceived financial well-being may affect overall well-being. Using consumer financial narratives, several large-scale surveys, and two experiments, we conceptualize perceived financial well-being as two related but separate constructs: 1) stress related to the management of money today (current money management stress), and 2) a sense of security in one’s financial future (expected future financial security). We develop and validate measures of these constructs (web appendix A) and then demonstrate their relationship to overall well-being, controlling for other life domains and objective measures of the financial domain. Our findings demonstrate that perceived financial well-being is a key predictor of overall well-being and comparable in magnitude to the combined effect of other life domains (job satisfaction, physical health assessment, and relationship support satisfaction). Further, the relative importance of current money management stress to overall well-being varies by income groups and due to the differing antecedents of current money management stress and expected future financial security. Implications for financial well-being and education efforts are offered.

How am I doing? Perceived financial well-being, its potential antecedents, and its relation to overall well-being.

"Nudge"-style interventions are often deemed successful if they generate large behavior change at low cost, but they are rarely subjected to full social welfare evaluations. We combine a field experiment with a simple theoretical framework to evaluate the welfare effects of one especially policy-relevant intervention, home energy social comparison reports. In our sample, the reports increase social welfare, although traditional evaluation approaches overstate gains because they ignore significant costs incurred by nudge recipients. Overall, home energy report welfare gains might be overstated by $620 million. We develop a prediction algorithm for optimal targeting; this approach would double the welfare gains.

/pdf/the-welfare-effects-of-nudges-a-case-study-of-energy-use-2n2lx2femv.pdf

The Welfare Effects of Nudges: A Case Study of Energy Use Social Comparisons

Measurement error is ubiquitous in experimental work. It leads to imperfect statistical controls, attenuated estimated effects of elicited behaviors, and biased correlations between characteristics. We develop statistical techniques for handling experimental measurement error. These techniques are applied to data from the Caltech Cohort Study, which conducts repeated incentivized surveys of the Caltech student body. We replicate three classic experiments, demonstrating that results change substantially when measurement error is accounted for. Collectively, these results show that failing to properly account for measurement error may cause a field-wide bias leading scholars to identify “new” phenomena.

/pdf/experimenting-with-measurement-error-techniques-with-3rmhuwppzl.pdf

Experimenting with Measurement Error: Techniques with Applications to the Caltech Cohort Study

Much of economics assumes that higher incentives increase participation in a transaction only because they exceed the reservation price of more people. This paper shows both experimentally and theoretically that when the consequences of a transaction are uncertain, incentives may also change reservation prices to further increase participation. They make people search and interpret information in a way that is more favorable to participation, and thus do not only change what people choose, but also what they believe their choices entail. This result informs the discussion about laws around the world that severely restrict incentives for transactions such as organ donation, surrogate motherhood, human egg donation, and medical trial participation. It helps bridge a gap between disciplines by using economic methodology to address a prominent concern in the ethics and policy literatures. It has implications for many fields of economics in which experts tasked with acquiring and interpreting information are subject to incentives.

An Offer You Can't Refuse? Incentives Change How We Think

We largely agree with Grimwade et al ’s1 conclusion that challenge trial participants may ethically be paid, including for risk. Here, we add further arguments, clarify some points from the perspective of economics and indicate areas where (behavioural) economists can support the development of a framework for ethically justifiable payment. Our arguments apply to carefully constructed and monitored controlled human infection model (CHIM) trials that have been appropriately reviewed and approved.

Participants in medical studies perform a service. Outside the domain of research participation, there is nearly universal agreement that workers providing a service should be compensated fairly, and that work involving more discomfort and risk should be compensated more generously. Accordingly, labour regulations impose floors (minimum wage laws), not caps on compensation. Caps, even if intended to protect against undue inducement, also raise concerns about illegal price-fixing that disadvantages workers. Such limits on payment for egg donors have successfully been challenged in court.i

Moreover, caps on compensation may harm everyone at risk of infection, not just potential participants. Insufficient compensation may impede the recruitment of enough suitable subjects, for example, when representativeness of the subject sample is required. Delays in vaccine development not only prolong disruption of social, educational and economic activity but also lead to excess infections and deaths. Unlike paid CHIM participants, individuals exposed to such infection do not accept it voluntarily, are not compensated for it, and are unlikely to receive the level of medical supervision afforded to closely monitored CHIM participants.

Payment caps can lead to attempts to circumvent the regulation. For example, many countries …

https://jme.bmj.com/content/medethics/46/12/831.full.pdf

Payment in challenge studies from an economics perspective

Unraveling over time

Previous research shows that many people seek financial advice from non-experts, and that peer interactions influence financial decisions We investigate whether such influences are beneficial, harmful, or simply haphazard In our laboratory experiment, face-to-face communication with a randomly assigned peer significantly improves the quality of private decisions, measured by subjects' ability to choose as if they properly understand their opportunity sets Subjects do not merely mimic those who know better, but also make better private decisions in novel tasks People with low financial competence experience greater improvements when their partners also exhibit low financial competence Hence, peer-to-peer communication transmits financial decision-making skills most effectively when peers are equally uninformed, rather than when an informed decision maker teaches an uninformed peer Qualitative analysis of subjects' discussions supports this interpretation The provision of effective financial education to one member of a pair influences the nature of communication but does not lead to additional improvements in the quality of the untreated partner's decisions, particularly in novel tasks

/pdf/peer-advice-on-financial-decisions-a-case-of-the-blind-3h5fvrwfhr.pdf

Peer Advice on Financial Decisions: A case of the blind leading the blind?

Previous research shows that many people seek financial advice from non-experts, and that peer interactions influence financial decisions. We investigate whether such influences are beneficial, harmful, or simply haphazard. In our laboratory experiment, face-to-face commu- nication with a randomly assigned peer significantly improves the quality of private decisions, measured by subjects’ ability to choose as if they properly understand their opportunity sets. Subjects do not merely mimic those who know better, but also make better private decisions in novel tasks. People with low financial competence experience greater improvements when their partners also exhibit low financial competence. Hence, peer-to-peer communication transmits financial decision making skills most effectively when peers are equally uninformed, rather than when an informed decision maker teaches an uninformed peer. Qualitative analysis of subjects’ discussions supports this interpretation. The provision of effective financial education to one member of a pair influences the nature of communication but but does not lead to additional improvements in the quality of the untreated partner’s decisions, particularly in novel tasks.

Sandro Ambuehl

Papers

An Offer You Can't Refuse? Incentives Change How We Think

Payment in challenge studies from an economics perspective

Unraveling over time

Peer Advice on Financial Decisions: A case of the blind leading the blind?

Social Transmission of Financial Decision Making Skills. A Case of the Blind Leading the Blind