Sarah Tinker Perrault

Bio: Sarah Tinker Perrault is an academic researcher from University of California, Davis. The author has contributed to research in topics: Teamwork & Information design. The author has an hindex of 4, co-authored 11 publications receiving 131 citations.

“Editing” Genes: A Case Study About How Language Matters in Bioethics

Abstract: Metaphors used to describe new technologies mediate public understanding of the innovations. Analyzing the linguistic, rhetorical, and affective aspects of these metaphors opens the range of issues available for bioethical scrutiny and increases public accountability. This article shows how such a multidisciplinary approach can be useful by looking at a set of texts about one issue, the use of a newly developed technique for genetic modification, CRISPRcas9.

Health Misinformation and the Power of Narrative Messaging in the Public Sphere

Abstract: Numerous social, economic and academic pressures can have a negative impact on representations of biomedical research. We review several of the forces playing an increasingly pernicious role in how health and science information is interpreted, shared and used, drawing discussions towards the role of narrative. In turn, we explore how aspects of narrative are used in different social contexts and communication environments, and present creative responses that may help counter the negative trends. As traditional methods of communication have in many ways failed the public, changes in approach are required, including the creative use of narratives.

Journeys as Shared Human Experiences

Abstract: Nie and colleagues' (2016) thoughtful and persuasive argument for altering war metaphors or emphasizing the alternative “journey” metaphor is especially useful because gradual shifts are more succe...

Marketing the Research Missions of Academic Medical Centers: Why Messages Blurring Lines Between Clinical Care and Research Are Bad for both Business and Ethics

Abstract: Academic Medical Centers (AMCs) offer patient care and perform research Increasingly, AMCs advertise to the public in order to garner income that can support these dual missions In what follows, we raise concerns about the ways that advertising blurs important distinctions between them Such blurring is detrimental to AMC efforts to fulfill critically important ethical responsibilities pertaining both to science communication and clinical research, because marketing campaigns can employ hype that weakens research integrity and contributes to therapeutic misconception and misestimation, undermining the informed consent process that is essential to the ethical conduct of research We offer ethical analysis of common advertising practices that justify these concerns We also suggest the need for a deliberative body convened by the Association of American Medical Colleges and others to develop a set of voluntary guidelines that AMCs can use to avoid in the future, the problems found in many current AMC advertising practices

The search for meaning.

Abstract: insistent quest for the meaning of things. The question is one that faces "everyman" from the child's first awareness of the mystery of life to the adult's apprehension of the mystery of death. As one existential writer put it, "I know only two things?one, that I will be dead someday, two, that I am not dead now. The only question is what shall I do be tween those two points." Does nihilistic literature and philosophy have the answer?wallowing in nothingness? Are the Madison Avenue thought controllers right in their claim that the time for the individual has passed and that we should conform to collectivities because there is safety in numbers? Shall we follow the "beat generation" and the "angry young men" who say we should conform to non-conformity in the name of pure rebelliousness and non-constructive creativity? Or should we just capitu late with the "positive thinkers" who say that all this concern about what things mean is too nerve-wracking, and that the problems of life can best be met by taking existential tranquilizers in the form of sugar coated mottos? The way in which contemporary man is clutching at straws in his search for meaning is symptomatic both of the depth of his concern and of the inadequacy of the answers which are emerging. In the material which follows, I will develop this theme primarily by elaboration of relevant material on the problems of reality and value, and the psy chology of perception and personality. Since the search for meaning ultimately implies an effort to arrive at something irreducible, it seems reasonable to open the inquiry with the question of knowledge and reality.

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?-Open Peer Commentary-Differences, games, and pluralism

Abstract: Much research in the last two decades has demonstrated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision making and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be interpreted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experimenter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the model response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implications of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance errors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations underlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Unexpected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning

Abstract: Edward Schiappa, Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003 xvi + 213 pp $6000 cloth; $2500 paper Every author who writes about definitions faces the temptation to refer to Alice's conversation with Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking-Glass "The question is," says Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things" "The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all" While Edward Schiappa does not refer to this passage in his book, it is clear that he stands foursquare with Humpty Dumpty Defining Reality brings social-constructivist theory to bear on the process of defining terms After introducing his own constructivist and pragmatist theory of definition, Schiappa proceeds to analyze the history of several legal controversies that hinge on definition These include "legal death," "rape," "wetlands," "art," and "human person" Then he proceeds to examine how controversies about definitions set technical, personal, and public meanings at odds with each other His conclusion argues for a social constructivist and pragmatist definition of definition, one that will escape what he sees as a "metaphysical absolutism" that "implies a potentially dangerous ideology" (178) Schiappa begins his introduction by distinguishing two kinds of definitions: the "fact of essence" which purports to state what something is and a "fact of usage" which describes how a word is used-this being the lexical or "dictionary" definition (5) Schiappa immediately dismisses both forms of definitions precisely because each claims to state a fact, that is, a proposition that describes a state of affairs from a neutral or objective standpoint Schiappa, on the contrary, argues that definitions should be considered as "ought propositions" rather than as "is propositions" (10) Definitions, he says, are "rhetorically induced" (29) The author then describes how meaning is acquired and defining is learned While Schiappa cites several modern linguists as his sources, this section (and some others) seems to borrow from the old general semantics developed by Alfred Korzybski and popularized by S I Hayakawa in his Language in Thought and Action, now in its fifth, and much revised, edition Many of Schiappa's metaphors derive from general semantics: the ladder of abstraction, reality as a territory of which language is a map, etc He concludes this part of the book by claiming that formal and informal definitions "can be understood as persuasion aimed at shared understanding and denotative conformity" (31) Schiappa then turns to his case studies to illustrate his constructivist view of definitions Schiappa says that definitions become problematic in the context of some controversy A definitional gap occurs when one encounters an unfamiliar word Checking the word in a dictionary usually resolves the matter A definitional rupture, on the other hand, occurs when the very process of defining becomes problematic (8-10) Schiappa's first example of a definitional rupture is "death" Schiappa analyzes how "brain death" is dissociated from the conventional meaning of death, cardiorespiratory failure Schiappa points out that defining "death" did not become a problem until the development of medical procedures for organ transplants "Brain death," or irreversible coma, is a desirable definition because it allows the "harvesting" of organs that are still viable Cardiorespiratory failure usually renders other organs unusable for transplants Schiappa says that the argument for a practical and useful definition ought to be conducted ethically, but he rules out of court any argument from ethics When a person's organs can be harvested is ultimately a case of "practical utility," Schiappa only says the discussion should be ethical, that is, it should not be about real definitions because they, according to Schiappa, are "ethically suspect" (48) …

Figurative Language I

Abstract: The second one is a lot more enticing, right? The first sentence consists of plain, ordinary language while the second is unique and vivid because it contains figurative language. Such language “paints a picture for readers” and allows them to better visualize what’s depicted or gain a deeper understanding of what’s being conveyed. In the above example, readers know the writer spends a lot of time watching movies. However, the writer does not actually “get lost in the canyons of time.” Figurative language is not meant to be taken literally. For example, “He is as strong as steel” conveys that he is powerful and strong, yet no human could equal the strength of steel. Even though figurative language is not factually true, it helps writers re-create an experience for readers, describe something vividly, or express a thought that literal language could never convey.