Sebastian Peyer

Bio: Sebastian Peyer is an academic researcher from University of East Anglia. The author has contributed to research in topics: Damages & Competition law. The author has an hindex of 5, co-authored 15 publications receiving 84 citations.

Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law - A Differentiated Approach

Abstract: We investigate the relationship between public and private enforcers introducing a more differentiated approach In contrast to the existing literature, we take into account that the costs and benefits of detection and prosecution and, thus, the usefulness of each enforcement mode may change with a variation of the type of anticompetitive conduct We define a set of parameters that determine the costs and benefits of both types to enforce the antitrust laws and discuss implications for European competition law and policy

Private antitrust litigation in germany from 2005 to 2007: empirical evidence

Abstract: This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Journal of Competition Law and Economics following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version [Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2012, 8 (2), pp. 331-359] is available online at: http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/content/8/2/331.

Myths and Untold Stories - Private Antitrust Enforcement in Germany

Abstract: The paper offers an empirical analysis of private antitrust enforcement in Germany based on cases that were decided by courts between 2005 and 2007. The study presents information about the magnitude and nature of civil antitrust actions in Germany. The data includes inter alia, information about the courts involved in litigation, the relationship of the parties, affected industries, the remedies sought, the outcome of the claim, the alleged anticompetitive conduct, the proportion of stand-alone and follow-on litigation, and the length of proceedings before a given court. The study shows that a large number of private cases were concluded even when compared with public investigations in Germany. It seems that private antitrust actions complement rather than duplicate public enforcement efforts because of the overwhelming proportion of stand-alone claims and the amount of actions based on the abuse of market power. Only a small number of litigants asked for the compensation of loss suffered from anticompetitive conduct. Interpreting the results from the study cautiously, the paper suggests that the European Commission and other stakeholders may have misunderstood the nature of private actions in Germany (and maybe Europe) and, consequently, asked the wrong question, focusing on compensation. Expensive damages actions for the breach of the antitrust rules might not be as important as commonly assumed.

Compensation and the Damages Directive

Abstract: The EU Damages Directive came into force in December 2014. One of its objectives is to ensure the effective private enforcement of competition law by facilitating damages claims in the courts of the EU Member States. This paper looks closely at the Directive’s compensation goal and the key arrangements that are to encourage victims to seek redress in the courts. The paper uses a simple framework to demonstrate that the Damages Directive is unlikely to foster compensation because it fails to create incentives for harmed individuals to commence legal action. If more compensation claims are desired, the Member States should devise a framework for private antitrust actions that goes beyond the Directive’s remit by, for example, allowing class actions.

Cartel Members Only - Revisiting Private Antitrust Policy in Europe

Abstract: This paper examines the current European private antitrust enforcement policy. The European Commission’s White Paper of 2008, the unofficial Draft Directive of 2009 and the collective redress consultation of 2011 consider a facilitated access to private actions for all types of antitrust violations under articles 101 and 102 TFEU in order to effectively compensate the victims of anticompetitive conduct. Assuming that changes are necessary, the paper argues that it might be worthwhile to limit this policy to damages claims against hardcore violations such as cartels. This suggestion is based on two main arguments. Firstly, the current European private antitrust policy probably underestimates the risks of more damages actions against all types of infringements neglecting insights from the economic analysis of law. Secondly, a revised approach is not only in line with the thinking that underpins the reform but also addresses an actual need as revealed by a comparison of litigation data from different jurisdictions. Refining the European private antitrust policy, it is argued that a focus on hard-core anticompetitive constraints such as price fixing would mitigate the potential for a strategic use of antitrust litigation and reduce the likelihood that the reform of European antitrust damages actions will lead to negative outcomes.

Towards evaluation design for smart city development

Abstract: Smart city developments integrate digital, human and physical systems in the built environment. With growing urbanization and widespread developments, identifying suitable evaluation methodologies ...

City approaches to smart city evaluation and reporting: case studies in the United Kingdom

Abstract: Smart technologies create opportunities for urban development and regeneration, leading to a proliferation of projects/programmes designed to address city strategies around environmental, economic and social challenges. Whilst there is considerable critical debate on the merits of smart city developments, there has been surprisingly little research on the evaluation of smart interventions, and the outcomes of embedded smart technologies for cities and citizens. This examines case-study research undertaken in Birmingham, Bristol, Manchester, Milton Keynes and Peterborough, on city approaches to smart city evaluation and reporting. Findings exemplify contemporary city evaluation and reporting practices, challenges and recommendations to support smart urban development.

Class Actions and Government

Abstract: The relationship between class actions and government makes for a nuanced and fascinating study. Government sets the scene by implementing and designing the regime, by choosing whether to act as a seed-funder for the regime, and by deciding to what extent it should regulate the regime against worldwide classes being litigated on its doorstep. It can then become a key player in the litigation itself. Government may be a representative claimant bringing the action, or a class member, or a potential financial beneficiary. Most commonly of all, it may be a defendant, being sued under the very regime which it enacted into law. With numerous opt-out class action regimes around the common law world in place, and others on the horizon, the book takes a comparative perspective throughout, and concludes with a series of recommendations, drawn from that comparative analysis of government's intricate interplay with class actions.

The role of the leniency programme in the enforcement of competition law in the UK: a complementary enforcement procedure or an admission of the failure of enforcement authorities to tackle anticompetitive behaviour head on?

Abstract: Leniency Programmes have been introduced as a complementary measure in the enforcement of competition law in detecting cartels, on the basis that hard to find evidence will be provided by undertakings coming forward to confess, in exchange for immunity or reduction in fines. The advantages of leniency are deemed to be twofold, since evidence is thereby expected to be given voluntarily, and in turn it would save up the limited resources available to enforcement authorities, by reducing lengthy investigations in search of evidence. Therefore, the widely accepted view by regulators, economists, and lawyers alike is that leniency is by far the most effective method of detecting and deterring anticompetitive activities by undertakings. An ‘undertaking’ covers any entity engaged in an economic activity that offers goods or services in a given market. In the UK, Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 governs prohibitions that fall within the category of cartels of which price-fixing, market or customer sharing, agreements to restrict production or supply, and bid-rigging are the most serious ‘hard-core cartels’. This study evaluates the efficacy of the Leniency Programme in the enforcement of competition law applied in respect of cartel infringements based on cases decided by the UK’s principal enforcement authority. Chapter I cases decided and published over a twelve-year period, since the Competition Act 1998 came into force, have been analysed in order to evaluate whether the leniency programme has been an incentive for colluders to apply for leniency. The results indicate that very few leniency applications were submitted voluntarily before an investigation was begun by the enforcement authority. Moreover, the detection rate of Chapter I cases on average has been very low over the twelveyear period, less than 2 cases per year, excluding settlements. The research also shows that contrary to the accepted view that evidence relating to cartels is difficult to find, cartels studied in this thesis have left a trail of both electronic, and other evidence that the authorities were able to seize. Further, the leniency applicants were not always reliable witnesses, and despite leniency, the enforcement authorities had to conduct lengthy investigations, negating the cost saving assertion and taking resources away from ex officio interventions by the authorities. The conclusion drawn from this study is that rather than enhancing detection and deterrence of anticompetitive behaviour by undertakings, the leniency programme overlaps, and in effect, undermines the public enforcement of competition law in the UK.