Senan Fox

Abstract: The Senkaku Shoto/Diaoyu Islands dispute in the East China Sea and the Okinotorishima dispute in the western Pacific are currently among the most prominent maritime disagreements between Japan and ...

Abstract: The interrelationship between the Socotra Rock issue and security, domestic political, and economic factors is under scrutiny in this chapter, including how they have tested and continue to test bilateral ties today and in recent years. Since normalization, Sino-South Korean economic ties have witnessed immense growth, from US $6.4 billion in 1992 to a staggering US $220.6 billion in 2011. China’s economic footprint in the ROK has alarmed many South Koreans, who fear that their neighbor has a ‘superpower mentality’ toward the Korean Peninsula. China’s economic and political influence upon North Korea in particular has raised serious questions. This sentiment is reflected with regards to Socotra Rock by leading Korean activists. The chapter discusses how such issues are intertwined with ‘Ieodo’ in South Korean popular and elite perceptions of a growing threat.

Abstract: This chapter explains the central components to the contrasting legal stances adopted by China and South Korea with regards to Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and continental shelf rights. Because maritime law is often referred to by both parties, certain basics of maritime law need to be understood when examining this topic. Their claims include China’s natural prolongation of ‘its’ continental shelf and South Korea’s more internationally accepted median line solution with the submerged feature located well within Seoul’s EEZ. These claims overlap, and Socotra Rock rests within the overlapping area. The crux of the dispute is thus not territorial, but rather one concerning the right to exercise jurisdictional authority while also protecting against ‘foreign’ intervention. These also tie directly into national and regional security concerns, making it important to clarify where international legal practice tends to stand on these questions of equidistance, proportionality, natural prolongation, jurisdiction, and freedom of navigation.

Abstract: Here, the dynamics behind the decision to occupy are examined more closely, with China’s strategic motivations and the timeline of events first presented. It postulates why the Chinese acted when they did, and why Mischief Reef was selected. The murky question of who among the Chinese elite sanctioned the risky operation is tackled, describing the key actors and agencies behind the move as well as the likely factors that led to the takeover. The chapter shows how China increasingly felt that rival claimants, especially Vietnam, were irreversibly undermining its relative claims in the area, and that action was urgently needed. It also discusses how China’s presence might have helped prevent an entente between the Philippines and Vietnam. At the very least, it ensured the Philippines did not occupy the reef first. An examination of the influence of PRC domestic politics and political circumstances of the time are undertaken, including competing interests which impacted on the country’s Spratly Islands’ policies. The influence of uncertain post-Tiananmen post-Cold War circumstances in China is also brought up. The chapter shows how stresses between the civilian leadership, the moderate Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and hardliners within the military influenced approaches to the Spratly disputes.

Abstract: This chapter addresses China and the Philippines’ legal positions in relation to Mischief Reef, particularly in regard to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, tasked with addressing maritime disputes. When the Philippines and Vietnam ratified UNCLOS in 1984 and 1994, and China followed suit in 1996, they laid out the extent of their respective maritime areas. Although China remains the primary concern, this chapter also describes how virtually all the disputants have selectively interpreted UNCLOS. The chapter then covers how disagreements over South China Sea features became more complicated from the 1970s onwards with the discovery of potentially substantial energy resources. It shows how activities related to EEZ delimitation and control over perceived maritime spheres significantly increased after the late 1980s, prompting a pre-emptive rush by claimants to control features. Analysis of China’s arguments is provided. The chapter also points to a number of significant flaws in the Philippines’ claims, and explains why both parties are at an impasse. The conclusion addresses the implications of legal developments in the SCS, most notably the landmark South China Sea Arbitration findings in July 2016, which found overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines, prompting angry responses in word and deed from China.

Abstract: This paper deconstructs Japanese media discourses of Japan’s territorial disputes in selected newspapers in English – namely The Asahi Shimbun, The Japan News and The Japan Times from 2002 to 2018....

Abstract: For decades, the territorial dispute between China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands has caused diplomatic deteriorations in Sino-Japanese relations. When there is extensive media coverage on news about the dispute, nationalist sentiments in both two countries would be triggered and could be expressed through detrimental behaviors towards transnational corporations (hereinafter TNCs). While TNCs play a significant political function as corporate diplomats for their home countries, they are subject to the risk of crises when their home countries are involved in political and economic conflicts with the foreign countries in which they have operations. Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to examine the roles of TNCs with reference to three cases of nationalism-induced crises in China. It proposes relational principles based on which TNCs could implement strategies to mitigate the damage from nationalism-induced crises and contribute to their home countries’ diplomatic goals as corporate diplomats.

Abstract: Park, Hwee Rhak.December, 2014.South Korea's failure to implement ʺDefense Reform 2020ʺ,Articles,[Seoul, Korea]Korean Association of International Studies,23