Senan Fox

Bio: Senan Fox is an academic researcher from Kanazawa University. The author has contributed to research in topics: China & Exclusive economic zone. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 12 publications receiving 4 citations.

Post-Arbitration and Looking to the Future

Abstract: This concluding chapter begins by discussing Mischief Reef developments since the July 2016 South China Sea Arbitration. Particular attention is given to Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) as the United States defended this red line issue while China attempted to consolidate its position. The implications of the PRC’s continued militarization of Mischief Reef are also addressed. The chapter also shows how despite extensive constructions, there are still significant vulnerabilities involved in defending the feature. It then moves on to addressing technological advances in resource exploration and extraction. The chapter also discusses very recent developments including the influence of President Rodrigo Duterte, as well as a seeming hardening of Washington’s position over the Spratlys issue. The chapter then considers the future outlook, factoring in such variables as domestic politics, economic incentives, and the policy goals and strategic objectives of the two protagonists as well as the US. China’s desire to discourage an enhanced US naval presence, and how this may contribute to a more stable quid-pro-quo relationship of engagement with Manila are also examined, as are the compelling incentives to address the dispute peacefully. Lessons learnt as well as proposals for resolving or at least managing the dispute are also featured.

The Occupation of Mischief Reef

Abstract: Here the occupation’s various stages are discussed, detailing the immediate responses of the Philippines and other regional players as well as the USA. It includes the Second Mischief Reef Incident in 1998 when China further consolidated its gains. The chapter provides contrasting opinions of the occupation, most notably Beijing’s initial claim of its non-military character. Manila’s hopes of halting further Chinese activities were also dashed, describing the psychological shock and erosion of trust, and the limited attempts by the poorly equipped Philippines to physically respond. Scholarly opinions on the apparent Chinese dual strategy of negotiating while consolidating the take-over are also reviewed. The chapter then looks at US-Philippine security ties and alliance provisos in its aftermath. Following this, the after-effects are discussed. It shows how the occupation sent ripples through ASEAN and represented a watershed. While the organization denounced the take-over, its words were not matched with substantial punitive actions. The affair nonetheless led to calls for more binding agreements in the SCS. Despite these developments, China could not be dislodged from the reef. With military and economic retaliation off the table as feasible options, the Philippines had little choice but to adopt a three-pronged diplomatic strategy, discussed herein.

Present and Future Considerations

Abstract: This chapter discusses present and future considerations surrounding the management and possible resolution of this dispute. It evaluates the possibility of a settlement, and the options open to the two parties, contending that shared or joint-use zones in such areas as fisheries and seabed resources, for example, may serve to reduce frictions while benefitting all the parties concerned. The case is also argued for South Korea revising its contradictory natural prolongation and continental shelf-based claim vis-a-vis Japan elsewhere in the East China Sea. In addition, technological advances in resource extraction, for example, will represent opportunities and challenges for friendlier ties in the future. The chapter asserts that present and future difficulties do not necessarily mean the two neighbors are on an inevitable path to confrontation over this submerged rock.

The Occupation in the 2000s

Abstract: This chapter discusses Mischief Reef developments since the late 1990s. First, it examines China’s decision to reinforce its position on the reef in 1998 and of how the shifting regional balance of power in favor of China impacted approaches to the dispute. It considers fluctuations in Manila’s relationship with both the US and China. It also discusses the strategic context behind “Mischief Reef II” in 1998. The chapter looks at the factors that contributed to a relatively peaceful period of stability from the late 1990s until the late 2000s. The cautious optimism that followed an ASEAN-led “Declaration on a Code of Conduct” for maritime disputes in 2002 and progress on joint resource exploration is then examined. It shows how potentially dangerous incidents, “salami slicing” strategies and “cabbage tactics” by China in particular, and behaviour designed to emphasize and exaggerate claims continued to complicate this dispute. The chapter also examines the China’s extensive construction work on the reef, creating “facts in the water”, especially between 2013 and 2016. The import of a ruling against China’s legal claims and activities by an international arbitral tribunal in July 2016 also receives attention, illustrating the challenges involved in finding a legal resolution.

The Circumstances of Mischief Reef

Abstract: Here recent developments as well as preliminary background and contextual information to China’s occupation of Mischief Reef since 1994–1995 are introduced. The chapter presents the positions of the claimant states, China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan, and also explains why the furtive takeover of the feature, which today contains a runway and extensive military facilities, was disturbing for several reasons. These include the fact that it was the first major occupation of a South China Sea feature in the post-Cold War era, and the first militarized SCS dispute involving China and a state other than Vietnam. The move also appeared to be an opportunistic and unprovoked take-over of territory under the jurisdiction of an ASEAN member state. This occupation raised questions about the rising dragon’s intentions in the region. It also seemed to confirm fears regarding the objectives of PLAN since its strategic shift further out to sea after the mid-1980s. These are discussed herein. The feature’s important geographical location and potential economic value in terms of fisheries, oil, gas, and other natural resources are also described. The chapter then provides an historical overview of the important events and developments relevant to Mischief Reef before China’s take-over of the atoll.

Media discourses of territorial disputes in Japan

Abstract: This paper deconstructs Japanese media discourses of Japan’s territorial disputes in selected newspapers in English – namely The Asahi Shimbun, The Japan News and The Japan Times from 2002 to 2018....

Nationalism and international disputes in China: Implications for transnational corporations as corporate diplomats

Abstract: For decades, the territorial dispute between China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands has caused diplomatic deteriorations in Sino-Japanese relations. When there is extensive media coverage on news about the dispute, nationalist sentiments in both two countries would be triggered and could be expressed through detrimental behaviors towards transnational corporations (hereinafter TNCs). While TNCs play a significant political function as corporate diplomats for their home countries, they are subject to the risk of crises when their home countries are involved in political and economic conflicts with the foreign countries in which they have operations. Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to examine the roles of TNCs with reference to three cases of nationalism-induced crises in China. It proposes relational principles based on which TNCs could implement strategies to mitigate the damage from nationalism-induced crises and contribute to their home countries’ diplomatic goals as corporate diplomats.

South Korea's failure to implement ʺDefense Reform 2020ʺ

Abstract: Park, Hwee Rhak.December, 2014.South Korea's failure to implement ʺDefense Reform 2020ʺ,Articles,[Seoul, Korea]Korean Association of International Studies,23