Seungbae Park

Bio: Seungbae Park is an academic researcher from Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology. The author has contributed to research in topics: Scientific realism & Pessimistic induction. The author has an hindex of 10, co-authored 75 publications receiving 369 citations.

A Confutation of the Pessimistic Induction

Abstract: The pessimistic induction holds that successful past scientific theories are completely false, so successful current ones are completely false too. I object that past science did not perform as poorly as the pessimistic induction depicts. A close study of the history of science entitles us to construct an optimistic induction that would neutralize the pessimistic induction. Also, even if past theories were completely false, it does not even inductively follow that the current theories will also turn out to be completely false because the current theories are more successful and have better birth qualities than the past theories. Finally, the extra success and better birth qualities justify an anti-induction in favor of the present theories.

Does Scientific Progress Consist in Increasing Knowledge or Understanding

Abstract: Bird (2007) argues that scientific progress consists in increasing knowledge. Dellsen (2016a) objects that increasing knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific progress, and argues that scientific progress rather consists in increasing understanding. Dellsen also contends that unlike Bird’s view, his view can account for the scientific practices of using idealizations and of choosing simple theories over complex ones. I argue that Dellsen’s criticisms against Bird’s view fail, and that increasing understanding cannot account for scientific progress, if acceptance, as opposed to belief, is required for scientific understanding.

A Pessimistic Induction against Scientific Antirealism

Abstract: There are nine antirealist explanations of the success of science in the literature. I raise difficulties against all of them except the latest one, and then construct a pessimistic induction that the latest one will turn out to be problematic because its eight forerunners turned out to be problematic. This pessimistic induction is on a par with the traditional pessimistic induction that successful present scientific theories will be revealed to be false because successful past scientific theories were revealed to be false.

Why Should We Be Pessimistic About Antirealists and Pessimists

Abstract: The pessimistic induction over scientific theories (Poincare in Science and hypothesis, Dover, New York, 1905/1952) holds that present theories will be overthrown as were past theories. The pessimistic induction over scientists (Stanford in Exceeding our grasp: science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) holds that present scientists cannot conceive of future theories just as past scientists could not conceive of present theories. The pessimistic induction over realists (Wray in Synthese 190(18):4321–4330, 2013) holds that present realists are wrong about present theories just as past realists were wrong about past theories. The pessimistic induction over antirealist theories (Park in Organon F 21(1):3–21, 2014) holds that the latest antirealist explanation of the success of science (Lyons in Philos Sci 70(5):891–901, 2003) has hidden problems just as its eight predecessors did. In this paper, I (1) criticize the pessimistic inductions over scientific theories, scientists, and realists, (2) introduce a pessimistic induction over antirealist theories, and then (3) construct two new pessimistic inductions. One is a pessimistic induction over antirealists according to which the author of the latest antirealist proposal cannot see hidden problems with his proposal just as his antirealist predecessors could not see hidden problems with their proposals. The other is the pessimistic induction over pessimists according to which since past pessimists have been wrong about their present scientific theories from the early twentieth century to the early twenty-first century, future pessimists will also be wrong about their present scientific theories from the early twenty-first century to the early twenty-second century.

Justifying the Special Theory of Relativity with Unconceived Methods

Abstract: Many realists argue that present scientific theories will not follow the fate of past scientific theories because the former are more successful than the latter. Critics object that realists need to show that present theories have reached the level of success that warrants their truth. I reply that the special theory of relativity has been repeatedly reinforced by unconceived scientific methods, so it will be reinforced by infinitely many unconceived scientific methods. This argument for the special theory of relativity overcomes the critics’ objection, and has advantages over the no-miracle argument and the selective induction for it.

Science in action

Abstract: Ecological Engineering: Journal of Ecotechnology. Editor-in-chief William J. Mitsch. Elsevier. 4/yr. DFL 361, $195.

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