Sherry Xin Li

Bio: Sherry Xin Li is an academic researcher from University of Arkansas. The author has contributed to research in topics: Government & Ingroups and outgroups. The author has an hindex of 13, co-authored 31 publications receiving 2665 citations. Previous affiliations of Sherry Xin Li include University of Texas at Dallas.

Group Identity and Social Preferences

Abstract: We present a laboratory experiment that measures the effects of induced group identity on social preferences. We find that when participants are matched with an ingroup member, they show a 47 percent increase in charity concerns and a 93 percent decrease in envy. Likewise, participants are 19 percent more likely to reward an ingroup match for good behavior, but 13 percent less likely to punish an ingroup match for misbehavior. Furthermore, participants are significantly more likely to choose social-welfare-maximizing actions when matched with an ingroup member. All results are consistent with the hypothesis that participants are more altruistic toward an ingroup match. (

Social Comparisons and Contributions to Online Communities: A Field Experiment on MovieLens

Abstract: We design a field experiment to explore the use of social comparison to increase contributions to an online community. We find that, after receiving behavioral information about the median user's total number of movie ratings, users below the median demonstrate a 530 percent increase in the number of monthly movie ratings, while those above the median decrease their ratings by 62 percent. When given outcome information about the average user's net benefit score, above-average users mainly engage in activities that help others. Our findings suggest that effective personalized social information can increase the level of public goods provision.

Social Comparisons and Contributions to Online Communities: A Field Experiment on MovieLens

Abstract: With the increasing popularity of the Internet, information technology is changing the way we interact, entertain, communicate and consume. Concurrently, traditional social forums, such as the League of Women Voters, the United Way, or the monthly bridge club, have seen a decrease (Putnam 2000). Supporting thousands of online communities, the Internet poses an opportunity to create new social capital to replace what is lost by the decline of bowling leagues and fraternal societies. In online communities, groups of people meet to share information, discuss mutual interests, play games and carry out business. Users of communities such as SourceForge (http://sourceforge.net/) and Wikipedia (http://www.wikipedia.org/) contribute information goods, which are typically shared as public goods. However, despite the popularity of online communities, many such communities fail due to nonparticipation and under-contribution. For example, Butler (2001) found that 50% of social, hobby, and work mailing lists had no tra‐c over a 122 day period. Undercontribution is a problem even in active and successful online communities. For example, in MovieLens (http://www.movielens.org), an online movie recommendation website that invites users to rate movies and, in return, makes personalized recommendations and predictions for movies the user has not already rated, under-contribution is common. More than 22% of the movies listed on the site have fewer than 40 ratings, so few that the software cannot make accurate predictions about which users would like these movies (Cosley, Ludford

Gender Differences in Preferences

Abstract: This paper reviews the literature on gender differences in economic experiments. In the three main sections, we identify robust differences in risk preferences, social (other-regarding) preferences, and competitive preferences. We also speculate on the source of these differences, as well as on their implications. Our hope is that this article will serve as a resource for those seeking to understand gender differences and to use as a starting point to illuminate the debate on gender-specific outcomes in the labor and goods markets.

Identity and the Economics of Organizations

Abstract: On plebes' first day at West Point, called R-Day, they strip down to their underwear. Their hair is cut off. They are put in uniform. They then must address an older cadet, with the proper salute and with the statement: "Sir, New Cadet Doe reports to the cadet in the Red Sash for the first time as ordered." Plebes must stand and salute and repeat, and stand and salute and repeat, until they get it exactly right, all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake. In the summary of David Lipsky (2003, pp. 145-154), who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at West Point: "On R-Day you surrender your old self in stages." But R-day is just the beginning of the training and personal re-engineering that is to come, so that West Point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the U.S. Army. Lipsky shows that, despite some failure, this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle. Economists' current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the West Point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits. In a standard economic model, an individual's preferences are fixed, and utility depends only on pecuniary variables. The Army's aim at West Point is to change cadets' preferences. They wish to inculcate non-economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the U.S. Army. Alternatively stated, the goal of West Point is to change the identity of the cadets, so they will think of themselves, above all else, as officers in the U.S. army. They will feel bad about themselves-they will lose utility-if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer. This change in identity

Group Identity and Social Preferences

Abstract: We present a laboratory experiment that measures the effects of induced group identity on social preferences. We find that when participants are matched with an ingroup member, they show a 47 percent increase in charity concerns and a 93 percent decrease in envy. Likewise, participants are 19 percent more likely to reward an ingroup match for good behavior, but 13 percent less likely to punish an ingroup match for misbehavior. Furthermore, participants are significantly more likely to choose social-welfare-maximizing actions when matched with an ingroup member. All results are consistent with the hypothesis that participants are more altruistic toward an ingroup match. (

Culture and Institutions

Abstract: A growing body of empirical work measuring different types of cultural traits has shown that culture matters for a variety of economic outcomes. This paper focuses on one specific aspect of the relevance of culture: its relationship to institutions. We review work with a theoretical, empirical, and historical bent to assess the presence of a two-way causal effect between culture and institutions. ( JEL D02, D72, I32, J12, Z13)