Following the end of the Cold War and accelerating after 9/11, a new wave of research on deterrence has emerged. Building on an earlier characterization by Robert Jervis, this work is here designated the fourth wave. The fourth wave reflects efforts to grapple with the change from a relatively symmetrical situation of mutual deterrence that characterized the Cold War to the asymmetric threats that dominate the current security environment for the United States and many other states. Despite widespread doubts that have been expressed in public about whether the most threatening actors today are deterrable, the fourth wave is nearly unanimous in finding that deterrence remains relevant, even with respect to terrorism. Beyond this basic consensus, the fourth wave also includes vigorous debates, particularly regarding alternative strategies for dealing with WMD-seeking rogue states. Because few analysts expect deterrence to be foolproof, especially in dealing with non-state actors, much of the work has focuse...

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The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research

This article examines the coercive and deterrent utility of targeting the leaders of violent, non-state organizations with precision force. Building on the literatures on targeted killings and deterrence theory, this article provides a case study analysis of targeted killings in Afghanistan. Relying on publicly available and semi-private sources, the article presents a comparative analysis of four targeted killings conducted against Taliban leaders. Findings suggest that the eliminations degraded Taliban professionalism, diminished the group's success rates, influenced their selection of targets, and weakened morale. These findings speak to the efficacy of targeted killings in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and to their value as both counter-capability and counter-motivation operations.

Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency

........................................................................................................................ i SAMENVATTING .............................................................................................................ii ÖZET ................................................................................................................................. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................ vi ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................................... viii Chapter 1 – Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Thesis, objectives and methodology ...................................................................... 2 1.2 Contextual missiology, comparative theology, Biblical and Qur’anic interpretation. ............................................................................................................... 4 1.3 Preview of chapters .............................................................................................. 15 1.4 Possible benefits................................................................................................... 18 PART ONE: ABRAHAMIC DIALOGUE AND WORLDVIEW DISSONANCE .......... 21 Chapter 2 – Interfaith and interscriptural Abrahamic dialogue ......................................... 21 2.1 Interfaith Abrahamic dialogue ............................................................................. 21 2.2 Interscriptural Abrahamic dialogue. .................................................................... 35 2.3 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 46 Chapter 3 – A model for Christian-Muslim narrative and worldview comparison ........... 47 3.1 Narrative and Worldview ..................................................................................... 47 3.2 Limitations of a worldview approach .................................................................. 51 3.3 Christian and Muslim worldviews ....................................................................... 55 3.4 Worldview Polarities comparison ........................................................................ 71 3.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 101 Appendix 3.1 Biblical story-summary passages ...................................................... 102 Appendix 3.2 Prophets named in the Qur’an ........................................................... 103 PART TWO: UNDERSTANDING ABRAHAM ........................................................... 105 Chapter 4 – Understanding the Genesis Abraham narrative ............................................ 106 4.1 Abraham in the Hebrew Scriptures outside the main narrative ......................... 106 4.2 Presuppositions regarding Biblical narrative ..................................................... 108 4.3 The Abraham narrative (Genesis 11:27–25:11) ................................................. 110 4.4 Link with the following narrative ...................................................................... 141 4.5 Summary of primary themes .............................................................................. 143 4.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 147 Chapter 5 – New Testament use of Abraham .................................................................. 149 5.1 NT use of the OT – preliminary comments ....................................................... 149 5.2 NT use of Abraham ............................................................................................ 155

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Abraham in Narrative Worldviews: Doing Comparative Theology through Christian-Muslim Dialogue in Turkey

This book explains why conflicts in Africa are sometimes ethnic and sometimes religious, and why a conflict might change from ethnic to religious even as the opponents remain fixed. Conflicts in the region are often viewed as either 'tribal' or 'Muslim-Christian', seemingly rooted in deep-seated ethnic or religious hatreds. Yet, as this book explains, those labels emerge as a function of political mobilization. It argues that ethnicity and religion inspire distinct passions among individuals, and that political leaders exploit those passions to achieve their own strategic goals when the institutions of the state break down. To support this argument, the book relies on a novel experiment conducted in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana to demonstrate that individual preferences change in ethnic and religious contexts. It then uses case illustrations from Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, and Sudan to highlight the strategic choices of leaders that ultimately shape the frames of conflict.

The Logic of Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Africa

This article argues that deterrence theory can be applied to counterterrorism. Doing so requires broadening the traditional concept of deterrence by punishment, expanding deterrence by denial to include defense, mitigation, and strategic hindrance, and developing deterrence by delegitimization to influence the political, ideological, and religious rationales informing terrorist behavior. In practice, deterring terrorism requires tailoring threats against state and individual facilitators, diffusing the intended consequences of terrorism, and manipulating terrorist self–restraints. When these and other deterrent leverages are applied simultaneously against various actors and processes involved in terrorism, coercion can be achieved.

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2011.541760

Deterring the Undeterrable: Coercion, Denial, and Delegitimization in Counterterrorism

Minimizing a religious explanation for Islamic terrorism, several analysts emphasize political and socioeconomic causes: the Arab-Israeli conflict, which Arabs view as an unendurable humiliation; the extension of Western political power and cultural influence into the Middle East, which is seen as still another humiliation; and the economic hardships that grip the Arab masses, which provide recruits for terrorist organizations. Shmuel Bar, a veteran of the Israeli intelligence community and a senior research fellow at an Israeli think-tank, recognizes the importance of these factors but maintains that they do “not do justice to the significance of the religious culture in which [Islamic terrorism] is rooted and nurtured,” a culture in which there is no distinction between religion and politics. His essay examines the religious-ideological motivation for Islamic terrorism.

The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism

"Only when not a single breach is visible in the iron wall, only then do extreme groups lose their sway, and influence transfers to moderate groups Only then would these moderate groups come to us with proposals for mutual concessions" --Ze'ev Jabotinsky, "The Iron Wall," November 4, 1923 ISRAEL HAS BEEN waging a "War on Terror" since before it was established, with a high degree of success However, during most of this period, the conventional wisdom there (as else where) was that terrorists cannot be "deterred" and, therefore, that the strategy against them should focus on prevention, disruption, and offensive action in order to eradicate them Numerous cases of failed deterrence seemed to verify this assumption: the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000 and the outbreak of the second Intifada in October of that year, the attacks of September 11 and the continuing insurgency in Iraq, the ups and downs in the Indian struggle against the jihadi movement in Kashmir Nevertheless, looking closer at the history of Israel's conflicts with terrorist organizations, we see that a de facto deterrence strategy was employed and often succeeded, achieving periods of relative quiet in both the Lebanese and the Palestinian theaters In this article I will endeavor to draw an outline of the key elements that a strategy of deterrence against terrorists should take into account Relevant attributes of terrorist entities THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN a defending state and a nonstate terrorist organization is inherently asymmetric One successful attack out of tens or even hundreds of disrupted plans is a total success for the terrorist organization, whereas for the state it is a total failure (1) Terrorist organizations also enjoy the advantages of the weaker party In the West Bank and Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, and elsewhere, they take advantage of the Western commitment to international norms and conventions (constraints on indiscriminate firepower in the vicinity of civilians, the need to tailor operations to minimize civilian casualties, commitments regarding treatment of prisoners); create conditions for a humanitarian crisis that is left at the state's doorstep if it makes use of its superior power; and exploit the Western media to create an image of a terrorist potential which far exceeds what the terrorist organization is really capable of (promises of revenge for targeted killings or the widely publicized Iranian recruitment campaign of "martyrs" in case of an attack on Iran) Finally, they succeed in neutralizing the advantages of the state's superior power by decentralizing their command and control so that military successes of the state enemy in one sector are irrelevant in terms of deterrence for others The degree of state-like attributes of the organization and the extent of links between such an organization and a sovereign state, with all the burdens sovereignty entails, have a significant influence on strategies that can be implemented to deter that organization The most salient of these attributes are (1) the role of culture and ideology--religious tenets, the existence of a "national" or transnational/religious agenda; (2) sources of authority, leadership and instruments of command and control; (3) the ways in which the leadership assesses the nature of the situation it faces as it attempts to fulfill its goals, including (at least) its self-assessment, its assessment of its allies' capability and will to assist, and its assessment of the identity, capabilities, and wills of its immediate and potential enemies (these are not objective, but are influenced by ingrained self-images and images of the "other"); (4) affinity with the "host population" or "host state," actual control over territory and the existence of a social agenda and commitment towards that population; and (5} patron-proxy relationships and financial and logistic dependence and channels of supply …

Deterring Terrorists: What Israel Has Learned

THE MIDDLE EAST has gone through eras of projection of power by external powers, and it has adapted to the balance of power between them. This was the case during the age of colonialism (predominance of Britain and France), the Cold War (competition between the U.S. and the USSR), and the period of American predominance since the end of the Cold War. For the last two decades, the region has been characterized by the conflict between "status-quo" and "anti-status-quo" forces. The former were represented by the existing regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, etc., and the latter by Iran, the Islamic movement, Hezbollah, and their allies. For over two decades, the United States has been the predominant superpower in the region and the main force in maintaining the status quo. However, today, the Middle East is undergoing a sea change. The revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya were the result of developments within the countries themselves: deep economic and social malaise and the perception of the loss of domestic deterrence by ossified regimes led by aging leaders. However, the popular perception that the United States had abandoned its erstwhile allies to support those revolutions facilitated their spread to other theaters. This turnabout in American policy is not seen in the region as reflecting American power though intervention, but rather the decline of American power, manifested in a policy of "bandwagoning" after years of proactive American policy. Clearly, the decline of American projection of power in the region will have as profound an effect as the projection of American power had at its height. The policies of the United States under the Obama administration have given rise to a broad perception in the region that the United States is no longer willing to play the role of guarantor of the security of its allies there; America is indeed "speaking softly" but has neither the present intention nor the future willpower to wield "a big stick" if push comes to shove. This perception is reflected in seven, key interrelated regional issues: (1) Islam and jihadi terrorism; (2) revolution and democratization in the region; (3) nuclear proliferation; (4) Iran; (5) the Israeli-Arab peace process; (6) Iraq; and (7) Af-Pak. In all these issues, the U.S. is perceived as searching for the path of least resistance, lowering its strategic profile, and attempting to accommodate the de facto powers in the region. In all these areas, the United States is projecting an aversion to proactive action, disinclination to project power, and lack of resolve to support its allies. Remaining American allies in the region realize that they cannot rely on the United States and must adapt themselves to pressures of the masses, predominance of radical ideologies, and Iranian strategic hegemony. Obama's strategic Weltanschauung THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION views the revolutions in the Arab I world as a rerun of the fall of the Soviet bloc in 1989, which resulted in a surge of democracy that was conducive to American strategic interests. However, the transformation of America from staunch supporter of status quo (even in Iran) to surfer on the wave of revolutionary change is not without a price. Having lost the already waning confidence of its remaining allies from the "anciens regimes" in the region, it has not gained that of the new regimes, which have yet to take form. This transformation, though, did not take place overnight. It came after a long-perceived decline in the American support of its allies against external and domestic challenges, decline in its resolve to employ force to support them, and decline in its willingness to persevere. This perception was not unfounded; the Obama administration came to office with an agenda, according to which the United States is strategically overstretched and must implement a drastic reduction in its strategic profile. Such a change could be brought about, according to the worldview of the administration, only through engagement and dialogue with those very forces which had been perceived as anathema to the previous administration and by eschewing the confrontation--the projection (not to mention actual use) of hard power and unilateralism--which characterized the Bush administration. …

Shmuel Bar

Papers

The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism

Deterring Terrorists: What Israel Has Learned

America's Fading Middle East Influence