Cryptosystem designers frequently assume that secrets will be manipulated in closed, reliable computing environments. Unfortunately, actual computers and microchips leak information about the operations they process. This paper examines specific methods for analyzing power consumption measurements to find secret keys from tamper resistant devices. We also discuss approaches for building cryptosystems that can operate securely in existing hardware that leaks information.

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Differential Power Analysis

After two decades of research and development, elliptic curve cryptography now has widespread exposure and acceptance. Industry, banking, and government standards are in place to facilitate extensive deployment of this efficient public-key mechanism. Anchored by a comprehensive treatment of the practical aspects of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), this guide explains the basic mathematics, describes state-of-the-art implementation methods, and presents standardized protocols for public-key encryption, digital signatures, and key establishment. In addition, the book addresses some issues that arise in software and hardware implementation, as well as side-channel attacks and countermeasures. Readers receive the theoretical fundamentals as an underpinning for a wealth of practical and accessible knowledge about efficient application. Features & Benefits: * Breadth of coverage and unified, integrated approach to elliptic curve cryptosystems * Describes important industry and government protocols, such as the FIPS 186-2 standard from the U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology * Provides full exposition on techniques for efficiently implementing finite-field and elliptic curve arithmetic* Distills complex mathematics and algorithms for easy understanding* Includes useful literature references, a list of algorithms, and appendices on sample parameters, ECC standards, and software toolsThis comprehensive, highly focused reference is a useful and indispensable resource for practitioners, professionals, or researchers in computer science, computer engineering, network design, and network data security.

https://cdn.preterhuman.net/texts/cryptography/Hankerson,%20Menezes,%20Vanstone.%20Guide%20to%20elliptic%20curve%20cryptography%20(Springer,%202004)(ISBN%20038795273X)(332s)_CsCr_.pdf

Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography

National Institute of Standards and Technology における超伝導研究及び生活

The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is the elliptic curve analogue of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). It was accepted in 1999 as an ANSI standard and in 2000 as IEEE and NIST standards. It was also accepted in 1998 as an ISO standard and is under consideration for inclusion in some other ISO standards. Unlike the ordinary discrete logarithm problem and the integer factorization problem, no subexponential-time algorithm is known for the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. For this reason, the strength-per-key-bit is substantially greater in an algorithm that uses elliptic curves. This paper describes the ANSI X9.62 ECDSA, and discusses related security, implementation, and interoperability issues.

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The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)

We present a formalism for the analysis of key-exchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any key-exchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with symmetric encryption and authentication functions to provide provably secure communication channels (as defined here); and (ii) the definition allows for simple modular proofs of security: one can design and prove security of key-exchange protocols in an idealized model where the communication links are perfectly authenticated, and then translate them using general tools to obtain security in the realistic setting of adversary-controlled links.

We exemplify the usability of our results by applying them to obtain the proof of two classes of key-exchange protocols, Diffie-Hellman and key-transport, authenticated via symmetric or asymmetric techniques.

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Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels

This paper proposes new protocols for two goals: authenticated key agreement and authenticated key agreement with key confirmation in the asymmetric (public-key) setting. A formal model of distributed computing is provided, and a definition of the goals within this model supplied. The protocols proposed are then proven correct within this framework in the random oracle model. We emphasize the relevance of these theoretical results to the security of systems used in practice. Practical implementation of the protocols is discussed. Such implementations are currently under consideration for standardization [2, 3, 18].

Key Agreement Protocols and Their Security Analysis

This paper surveys recent work on the design and analysis of key agreement protocols that are based on the intractability of the Diffie-Hellman problem. The focus is on protocols that have been standardized, or are in the process of being standardized, by organizations such as ANSI, IEEE, ISO/IEC, and NIST. The practical and provable security aspects of these protocols are discussed.

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Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocols

This paper presents some new unknown key-share attacks on STS-MAC, the version of the STS key agreement protocol which uses a MAC algorithm to provide key confirmation. Various methods are considered for preventing the attacks.

Unknown Key-Share Attacks on the Station-to-Station (STS) Protocol

This paper investigates security proofs for protocols that employ asymmetric (public-key techniques to solve two problems: entity authentication and authenticated key transport.

Entity Authentication and Authenticated Key Transport Protocols Employing Asymmetric Techniques

A key agreement method between a pair of entities i and j in a digital data communication system, wherein each the entity has a private and corresponding public key pair Si,Pi and Sj,Pj respectively and the system, having global parameters for generating elements of a group, the method comprising the steps of: (a) entity i selecting a random private session value Ri; (b) forwarding a public session value corresponding to the private session value Ri to the entity j; (c) entity j computing a long term shared secret key k′ derived from entity i's public key and j's private key utilizing a first function H1; (d) the entity j utilizing entity j utilizing the key k′ and computing an authenticated message on entity identities i, j and entities public session keys and forwarding the authenticated message to entity i; (e) the entity i verifying the received authenticated message; (f) the entity i computing the long term shared secret key k′ derived from the entity j's public key and i's private key in accordance with the first function H1; (g) the entity i utilizing the long term shared secret key k′ and computing an authenticated message on the entities i and j identity information and the entities public session keys and forwarding the authenticated message to the entity j: (h) entity j verifying the received authenticated message; and (i) upon both the entities i and j verifying the authenticated message, computing a short term shared secret key utilizing a respective entity's session public and private keys

Simon Blake-Wilson

Papers

Key Agreement Protocols and Their Security Analysis

Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocols

Unknown Key-Share Attacks on the Station-to-Station (STS) Protocol

Entity Authentication and Authenticated Key Transport Protocols Employing Asymmetric Techniques

Authenticated key agreement protocol