Soojin Moon

Bio: Soojin Moon is an academic researcher from University of California, Los Angeles. The author has contributed to research in topics: Fiscal adjustment & Fiscal policy. The author has an hindex of 3, co-authored 3 publications receiving 67 citations.

Do IMF-Supported Programs Help Make Fiscal Adjustment More Durable?

Abstract: This paper investigates fiscal developments in 112 countries during the 1990s. It finds that, while the overall fiscal balance improved in most of them, the composition of this improvement differed. In nonprogram countries, revenues increased modestly and expenditure declined sharply, while in program countries both revenue and expenditure declined. However, in countries with programs that included structural conditions the adjustment was effected primarily through sharp expenditure compression. We did not find evidence of a statistically significant impact of IMF conditionality. Morever, fiscal improvements are strongly influenced by cyclical factors

Is Fiscal Adjustment More Durable When The IMF is Involved

Abstract: This paper investigates fiscal developments in 112 countries during the 1990s. It finds that while the overall fiscal balance improved in most of them, the composition of this improvement differed. In countries without IMF-supported programmes, revenues increased modestly and expenditure declined sharply, while in programme countries both post-programme revenue and expenditure declined. However, in countries with programmes that included fiscal structural conditions, the adjustment was effected primarily through sharp expenditure compression. No evidence of a statistically significant impact of IMF conditionality was found. Moreover, fiscal developments were influenced by cyclical factors and by the general stance of macroeconomic policies.

Is Fiscal Adjustment More Durable When The IMF is Involved? 1

Abstract: This paper investigates fiscal developments in 112 countries during the 1990s. It finds that while the overall fiscal balance improved in most of them, the composition of this improvement differed. In countries without IMF-supported programmes, revenues increased modestly and expenditure declined sharply, while in programme countries both post-programme revenue and expenditure declined. However, in countries with programmes that included fiscal structural conditions, the adjustment was effected primarily through sharp expenditure compression. No evidence of a statistically significant impact of IMF conditionality was found. Moreover, fiscal developments were influenced by cyclical factors and by the general stance of macroeconomic policies.

IMF conditionality and development policy space, 1985–2014

Abstract: In recent years, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has re-emerged as a central actor in global economic governance. Its rhetoric and policies suggest that the organization has radically changed the ways in which it offers financial assistance to countries in economic trouble. We revisit two long-standing controversies: Has the policy content of IMF programmes evolved to allow for more policy space? Do these programmes now allow for the protection of labour and social policies? We collected relevant archival material on the IMF's lending operations and identified all policy conditionality in IMF loan agreements between 1985 and 2014, extracting 55,465 individual conditions across 131 countries in total. We find little evidence of a fundamental transformation of IMF conditionality. The organization's post-2008 programmes reincorporated many of the mandated reforms that the organization claims to no longer advocate and the number of conditions has been increasing. We also find that policies intro...

IMF conditionality: theory and evidence

Abstract: This article analyzes whether and to what extent reliance on conditionality is appropriate to guarantee the revolving character of the resources of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The paper presents theoretical arguments in favor of conditionality, and those against the use of conditions. It summarizes the track record of program implementation and discusses the evidence of factors determining implementation. Whether proponents or critics of conditionality can be supported by existing data analysis is also investigated, as is the success of conditionality in terms of outcomes. The final section draws policy implications.

The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence

Abstract: 1. Money and politics on the international stage 2. A theory of trading Security Council votes for aid 3. Examples of punishments, threats, and rewards 4. Who wins election to represent the world? 5. Statistical evidence of trading finance for favors 6. Consequences of politically motivated foreign aid 7. Reforming the security council?

Politics and IMF Conditionality

Abstract: Bailouts sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are famous for their conditionality: in return for continued installments of desperately needed loans, governments must comply with austere policy changes. Many have suggested, however, that politically important countries face rather weak stringency. Obstacles to testing this hypothesis include finding a measure of political importance that is not plagued by endogeneity and obtaining data on IMF conditionality. We propose to measure political importance using temporary membership on the United Nations Security Council and analyze a newly available dataset on the level of conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF arrangements with 101 countries over the 1992 to 2008 period. We find a negative relationship: Security Council members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions. This suggests that the major shareholders of the IMF trade softer conditionality in return for political influence over the Security Council.