Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories

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The Scientific Image

This encyclopedia entry gives the reader a brief overview of the origins of this prominent and sometimes controversial theory, including its origins and key tenets, the later developments of the theory in neuroscientific and hormone research, and the critical response to the theory.

The Extreme Male Brain theory of autism

Clinical assessment of malingering and deception (2nd ed.)

Reference and Essence

1. Introduction PART I: QUESTIONS OF ONTOLOGY 2. Universals 3. Tropes 4. Properties as Sets 5. Resemblance Classes 6. Properties as Ungrounded Entities PART II: DIFFERENT ACCOUNTS OF PROPERTIES:WHICH PROPERTIES ARE THERE, AND WHAT CAN THEY DO? 7. Properties at Work 8. Are Properties Sparse or Abundant? 9. The Ontological Status of Properties Conclusion Glossary References Index

A Critical Introduction to Properties

Can metaphysics ever really be compatible with science? In this paper, I investigate the implications of the methodological approach to metaphysical theorizing known as naturalized metaphysics. In the past, metaphysics has been rejected entirely by empirically-minded philosophers as being too open to speculation and for relying on methods which are not conducive to truth. But naturalized metaphysics aims to be a less radical solution to these difficulties, treating metaphysical theorizing as being continuous with science and restricting metaphysical methods to empirically respectable ones. I investigate a significant difficulty for naturalized metaphysics: that it lacks the methodological resources to comparatively evaluate competing ontological theories, or even to distinguish adequately between them. This objection is more acute when applied to robust realist versions of naturalized metaphysics, since the realist should be able to say which theory is true of the objective world. If this objection holds, then it seems that the commitment to naturalized metaphysics, or to robust realism about the categories and processes in metaphysics, will have to be relaxed.

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What Matters in (Naturalized) Metaphysics

This paper investigates interactive kinds, a class of kinds suggested by Ian Hacking for which classification generates a feedback loop between the classifiers and what is classified, and argues that human interactive kinds should be distinguished from non-human ones. First, I challenge the claim that there is nothing ontologically special about interactive kinds in virtue of their members being classified as such. To do so, I reject Cooper’s counterexample to Hacking’s thesis that kind descriptions are necessary for intentional action, arguing that classification (although not necessarily linguistic description) is required for intentional action. Having considered ways to characterise the metaphysics of interactive kinds and the semantics of kind terms, I argue that the fact that classification facilitates intentional action makes human interactive kinds ontologically distinctive because of the anomalous nature of the change which the kind-classification brings about. I then briefly examine further distinguishing features of human interactive kinds.

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Kinds behaving badly: intentional action and interactive kinds

Dans le cadre du debat sur le realisme metaphysique, l'A. se propose d'approfondir la position defendue par M. K. McGowan concernant les implications ontologiques, complexes et non-benignes, d'une telle conception du monde. Examinant le principe des proprietes naturelles, ainsi que l'argument du scepticisme classificateur, l'A. rejette le recours au realisme scientifique pour forunir une explication plus coherente de la structure objective du monde.

Deepening the Controversy over Metaphysical Realism

Abstract This paper argues that it is implausible to treat philosophical categories as if they exist as a matter of necessity, and implausible to deny that they do. The former because it restricts the modal range which can be characterized, thereby violating the principle of plenitude with respect to all possibilities; and the latter because it results in there being no stable, univocal way of characterizing those very possibilities, resulting in the range of what there is becoming a pluralist patchwork of distinct and potentially incompatible collections of categories which lack any unifying ontological principle. Some potential responses to this observation are then briefly explored, including restricting categories or modality by stipulation, treating categories as instrumental, or finding a way in which the apparently competing systems of categories can be unified.

Sophie R. Allen

Papers

A Critical Introduction to Properties

What Matters in (Naturalized) Metaphysics

Kinds behaving badly: intentional action and interactive kinds

Deepening the Controversy over Metaphysical Realism

Curiosity Kills the Categories: A Dilemma about Categories and Modality