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Spencer Weber Waller

Bio: Spencer Weber Waller is an academic researcher from Loyola University Chicago. The author has contributed to research in topics: Competition law & Monopolization. The author has an hindex of 13, co-authored 108 publications receiving 512 citations. Previous affiliations of Spencer Weber Waller include Illinois Institute of Technology & Brigham Young University.


Papers
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TL;DR: In this paper, the essential facilities debate in the antitrust field is examined and a theory of infrastructure that comprehensively defines what facilities are essential and must be shared on an open and non-discriminatory basis is proposed.
Abstract: Our article examines an age old debate about the nature and limits of property rights and the current manifestation of this debate in antitrust law. Many areas of law struggle to balance private property rights - most importantly, the right of exclusion - with the public's right of access to essential resources. What is the best way to manage resources that provide both public and private benefits? For years, academics and law makers have debated this question with respect to transportation systems, communication networks, scientific research, and a variety of other infrastructural resources. Many press for private control of such resources, arguing that the market most efficiently distributes their respective costs and benefits. Others take the position that these resources should be managed in an openly accessible manner. Advocates for this approach maintain that private control often is overly restrictive and unfairly allocates benefits to a few private parties. In the antitrust area, this tension is mediated by the essential facilities doctrine. Under certain circumstances a monopolist incurs antitrust liability in denying a competitor access to a facility under the exclusive control of the monopolist. While versions of this doctrine go back to the beginning of the antitrust laws, it has been heavily criticized by many commentators and by the Supreme Court itself in dicta. In our article, we advocate for the revitalization of the essential facilities doctrine and answer these criticisms. Our article seeks to 1) connect the essential facilities debate in the antitrust field to the broader question of private rights versus open access in other areas of the law, particularly intellectual property law; 2) propose and apply an economic theory of infrastructure that comprehensively defines what facilities are essential and must be shared on an open and non-discriminatory basis; and 3) demonstrate that courts are capable of applying this test in antitrust and elsewhere.

30 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: Arnabelski et al. as mentioned in this paper pointed out that it may simply have been that head of the Antitrust Division was the first important administration job available when Arnold's supporters and friends sought a fulltime Washington position for him.
Abstract: No one will ever know exactly why Franklin Roosevelt hired Thurman Arnold as head of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department in 1938. It may simply have been that head of the Antitrust Division was the first important administration job available when Arnold's supporters and friends sought a full-time Washington position for him. While the nomination proved to be an awkward and controversial choice, it was also an inspired choice. For the next five years, Thurman Arnold revitalized antitrust law and enforcement and changed the entire focus of the New Deal from corporatist planning to competition as the fundamental economic policy of the Roosevelt administration. Those who favor a consumer-friendly competitive economy owe him a debt that transcends the specific cases he brought and the doctrines he espoused. This Article is a look at that legacy.

21 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: The European Commission is nearing the conclusion of its lengthy review of the proper role of private damage actions in member state courts and other jurisdictions both new and old to competition enforcement are wrestling with whether and how to implement effective private enforcement as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Virtually every jurisdiction is considering the most appropriate role for private rights of actions for damages for competition violations. The United States is in the midst of reexamining these issues in the context of the Antitrust Modernization Commission created by Congress. The European Commission is nearing the conclusion of its lengthy review of the proper role of private damage actions in member state courts. Other jurisdictions both new and old to competition enforcement are wrestling with whether and how to implement effective private enforcement. Some private rights of actions are a necessary compliment to the public enforcement of competition law, but that the precise shape and extent of those rights is heavily dependent on the unique law, history, judiciary, and legal culture of each jurisdiction. At a minimum, some form of damage action for indirect purchasers and some method of class action or other form of aggregate litigation is necessary to have an effective private damage right. It is most ironic that the United States is seeking to restrict those rights of actions precisely at the same time that most of the rest of the world is seeking to expand private rights of actions to supplement existing public enforcement regimes. Neither public or private enforcement should "monopolize" competition law, but must work together to deter, detect, punish, and compensate victims of unlawful anticompetitive conduct.

19 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A review of criminalization and enforcement developments in the United States, Europe, and around the world can be found in this article, with a clear trend toward increased criminalization, as well as more robust enforcement, including collaboration among national antitrust authorities through informal transgovernmental networks.
Abstract: Countries in virtually every region of the world are criminalizing cartel offenses. Many have initiated prosecutions, several have secured convictions, and a few have imposed jail time. Yet outside the United States the enforcement record is hardly uniform, and the debate about cartel criminalization is far from resolved. This situation raises a host of questions. What spurred the trend toward cartel criminalization? Have the changes been driven primarily by criminalization evangelists such as the United States Department of Justice, whether working bilaterally or through transnational networks? Are organic, bottom-up, national processes also at work, suggesting changing moral sensibilities regarding cartel conduct? To what extent have formal legal changes been accompanied by enhanced enforcement? This Chapter tackles these questions through a review of criminalization and enforcement developments in the United States, Europe, and around the world. While the emerging legal landscape of anti-cartel activity is complex and varies significantly by jurisdiction, the clear trend is toward increased criminalization, as well as more robust enforcement, including collaboration among national antitrust authorities through informal transgovernmental networks. The trends, however, are not uniform, and the implementation of formal legal changes is an open question in light of divergent institutional contexts and social attitudes regarding cartels.

19 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze past efforts to create an internatiional competition law system and then suggest a modest approach toward instituting such a system and suggest three scenarios under which harmonization and the creation of international antitrust rules are most likely to succeed.
Abstract: This article analyzes past efforts to create an internatiional competition law system and then suggests a modest approach toward instituting such a system. Part I discusses both the failed attempts to achieve a true international or harmonized competition law and the greater success of regional efforts. Part II discusses the limited success of antitrust cooperation on a multilateral and explores the more successful regional and bilateral cooperation agreements. Part III examines the governmental, business, and institutional pressures for and against further harmonization or cooperation. Part IV suggests three scenarios under which harmonization and the creation of international antitrust rules are most likely to succeed. Finally, Part V advoctaes the modest goal of an international competiton system that requires each nation to have an effective competition law and to enforce it in a non-discriminatory manner, comporting with existing standards of national and most-favored nation treatment as those terms are understod in international economic law.

18 citations


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01 Jan 2014
TL;DR: In this paper, Cardozo et al. proposed a model for conflict resolution in the context of bankruptcy resolution, which is based on the work of the Cardozo Institute of Conflict Resolution.
Abstract: American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

1,336 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine developments since the publication of The Economics of Regulation in the theory of incentive regulation and its application to the regulation of unbundled electricity transmission and distribution networks.
Abstract: This paper examines developments since the publication of The Economics of Regulation in the theory of incentive regulation and its application to the regulation of unbundled electricity transmission and distribution networks. Conceptual mechanism design issues that arise when regulators are imperfectly informed and there is asymmetric information about costs, managerial effort, and quality of service are discussed. The design and application of price cap mechanisms and related quality of service incentives in the UK are explained. The limited literature that measures the effects of incentive regulation applied to electricity networks is reviewed.

175 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In economics, the commonly prevailing view of the firm ignores all these elements of politics and power as discussed by the authors, and we must recognize that large firms have considerable power to influence the rules of the...
Abstract: The revenues of large companies often rival those of national governments, and some companies have annual revenues higher than many national governments. Among the largest corporations in 2015, some had private security forces that rivaled the best secret services, public relations offices that dwarfed a US presidential campaign headquarters, more lawyers than the US Justice Department, and enough money to capture (through campaign donations, lobbying, and even explicit bribes) a majority of the elected representatives. The only powers these large corporations missed were the power to wage war and the legal power of detaining people, although their political influence was sufficiently large that many would argue that, at least in certain settings, large corporations can exercise those powers by proxy. Yet in economics, the commonly prevailing view of the firm ignores all these elements of politics and power. We must recognize that large firms have considerable power to influence the rules of the ...

169 citations